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CHAPTER 1  
Introduction1 
What role does European integration play in domestic politics in Western European coun-
tries? Since the early 1990s and in the course of an unprecedented deepening and widen-
ing of the European Union, European integration has become an ever more contested 
political issue. Not only has Euroscepticism among citizens grown continuously over the 
years (Eichenberg and Dalton 2007), but the issue has made its way into national election 
campaigns, fostering party competition and creating new opportunities for challengers, 
mostly from the right-wing populist end of the spectrum (Kriesi 2007). Evidence also 
suggests that European matters have eventually become an integral part not only of insti-
tutionalized politics, but also of the realm of protest politics and social movements (Balme 




1 The book Politicizing European integration – Struggling with the Awakening Giant, published in 2016 
with Palgrave Macmillan, is a revised, extended and updated account of this thesis’ content [Link]. 
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and Chabanet 2008; Imig 2004). In short, the longstanding former “permissive consen-
sus” in this area among the political elite has been eroded and given way to a new “con-
straining dissensus” (Hooghe and Marks 2006).  
However, the true extent of the domestic politicization of European integration is 
far from clear and remains a source of scholarly disagreement. Many scholars believe that 
the “sleeping giant” (van der Eijk and Franklin 2004) – a metaphor used to describe the 
widespread Euroscepticism among citizens with the not yet exploited potential to funda-
mentally reshape domestic politics – has been finally woken up by political entrepreneurs 
who deliberately mobilize on this issue (de Vries 2007; Hooghe and Marks 2009; also see 
van der Eijk and Franklin 2004; Kriesi 2007). If this holds true, the structuring of domes-
tic political conflict and political competition, as we know them, is set to change radically. 
Indeed, a few highly visible manifestations of massive European contestation left a lasting 
imprint on the first decade of this century – particularly the defeated referendums on the 
Constitutional Treaty in France and the Netherlands in 2005, and more recently on the 
Lisbon Treaty in Ireland (approved only on the second attempt). Yet do these single ex-
traordinary events reflect the true significance of European integration in domestic poli-
tics? A second strand of scholars is skeptical arguing that the extent of Europe’s politici-
zation is greatly exaggerated. In their view, the issue of European integration is, and will 
remain, a “giant fast asleep” – particularly because those who ultimately matter, namely 
the mainstream parties, have no incentive to politicize it (Green-Pedersen 2011; also see 
Mair 2001, 48). They expect European integration to remain a marginal issue in domestic 
politics and unlikely to rock the boat, as opposed to other newly emerging issues, such as 
immigration.  
Intimately connected to the question about the scope of the politicization of Eu-
rope is the question of what actually drives this process. Which politicians strive to polit-
icize this political issue, and for which underlying reasons? The prominent inverted-U-
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curve hypothesis suggests that it is fringe parties from both the left and the right which 
oppose European integration in the same motivated strategic move to challenge main-
stream politicians (Mair 2001; Sitter 2002; Taggart 1998). Yet a few scholars have gone 
beyond this simple notion of a curvilinear pattern of contestation. They argue that this 
conflict goes much deeper, given that these two groups fundamentally differ in their ide-
ological outlook and that opposition against Europe has already entered the mainstream 
(e.g. Hooghe and Marks 2009; Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson 2004; Kriesi 2007). In their 
view, substantive and more general political divides, such as the economic left-right and 
the cultural TAN-GAL2 dimensions, crucially shape political contestation about Europe 
and explain why some actors eagerly try to politicize Europe, while others refrain doing 
so.  
The present study engages in this ongoing scholarly debate about the extent of the 
domestic politicization of European integration as well as its agents and causes by pre-
senting new theoretical arguments and fresh empirical evidence. Moreover, while focus-
ing on European integration the study also contributes to the more general question of 
why a political issue becomes politicized (or not). The approach adopted, as will be shown 
shortly, is also motivated by the recent call by Peter Mair (2007, 162): “What is really 
needed here, however [...] is a much more systematic, inductive, and largely bottom-up 
comparison of political discussions at the national level [...] we need to know more about 
how Europe actually plays in national political discourse, as well as about the way it is 
conceived”.  




2 The TAN-GAL dimension stretches from traditional, authoritarian and nationalist (TAN) values to 
green, alternative and libertarian (GAL) views. 




This study is situated at the intersection of two fast-growing fields of research, political 
communication (specifically framing and agenda setting) and research on European inte-
gration politics. Such a combined approach offers several advantages and, together, al-
lows for a better understanding of the politicization of Europe. Three key features distin-
guish the study from others. First, it does justice to the inherently multifaceted nature of 
European integration. Instead of treating this issue analytically as a monolithic “black 
box”, as usually done in previous research in this field, this study differentiates in many 
of its analyses between the four fundamental areas of integration, namely deepening, en-
largement, market making, and social regulation. Disentangling the issue of European 
integration then enables the equally complex patterns of political conflict surrounding it 
to be uncovered. Second, the study develops a more comprehensive conceptualization of 
issue politicization. It conceives of politicization as consisting of three elements: polari-
zation (resulting from dissenting elite attitudes), the intensity of the public debate (as an 
outcome of the emphasis politicians give to an issue), and the connection of the issue to 
more basic political concerns (as done via framing). It therbey draws together three nor-
mally separate strands of research into one common framework. Third, the study focuses 
on public debate as the central venue for political contestation in contemporary Western 
democracies, which is also reflected in the choice of the data. I rely on original data from 
a large-scale quantitative media-content analysis covering public statements not only by 
parties, but by all kinds of relevant political actors in six Western European countries and 
spanning multiple years. This novel data allows for the comprehensive, yet still system-
atic comparative analysis of the politicization of European integration that is presented in 
the following chapters. 
The main argument can be summarized in a nutshell as follows. The question of 
how to deal with European integration in domestic politics poses a tough challenge for 
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the political elite in Western European countries – politicians struggle constantly, some-
times desperately, with this intricate giant. This is not because Europe is a new issue that 
is unrelated to traditional lines of conflict. Ideology is a crucial factor in shaping domestic 
conflict about Europe. Pre-existing lines of conflict powerfully shape politicians’ re-
sponses to European integration. Yet, due to its multifaceted nature, European integration 
is related to existing lines of conflict in complex and multiple ways. This provides nu-
merous opportunities and substantive reasons for politicians of all sorts to politicize Eu-
rope but, at the same time, makes it a difficult and risky task. The lines of conflict are 
unclear, the meaning of the issue difficult to control and potential strange bedfellows 
discourage mainstream actors in particular. Many opportunities, yet it is difficult to suc-
cessfully take advantage of them – this setting leads to an enduring politicization of Eu-
ropean integration which, at the same time, only has a limited magnitude. Culturally con-
servative parties – the Radical/Populist Right, but also representatives of the Conservative 
and Christian-democratic party family – are currently the most successful in dealing with 
this delicate task by mobilizing opposition primarily against the cultural dimension of 
European integration. 
 
The argument is developed as follows: Chapter 2 lays the foundations for the subsequent 
chapters by providing the overall theoretical framework and outlining the argument in 
more detail. Chapter 3 on the design of the study introduces the innovative method used 
in this study to collect the empirical data – the nuclear sentence coding of actor statements 
in the mass media. Moreover, it explains why investigating the politicization of European 
integration by studying public debate offers considerable advantages over other, more 
traditional approaches. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the reliability and va-
lidity of this novel data.  
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Chapter 4 goes on to identify the general dynamics and relevant political actors 
in the public debate on European integration. The great battle over Europe does not take 
place on the streets, as some scholars suggest, but in the partisan arena. Party politicians 
and public authorities, the chapter indicates, dominate and exercise tight control over the 
debate, while civil society representatives such as social movements are marginalized. 
This pattern does not change fundamentally during referendum campaigns, whose excep-
tional ability to focus public attention indeed provides additional opportunities for other-
wise marginalized actors. Yet it is the already strong parties that manage to benefit the 
most from these periods of heightened public attention, particularly the Eurosceptic fringe 
parties.  
Next, Chapter 5 demonstrates that – contrary to some scholars’ claims – elite at-
titudes to Europe are clearly structured and related to their ideological core concerns. 
Other frequently mentioned factors such as government-opposition status and nationality 
only hold secondary relevance. Yet the patterns vary depending on the particular sub-
issue at stake, which confirms the inherently multidimensional nature of this issue. Inter-
estingly, the cultural TAN-GAL axis is the strongest structuring force across all sub-is-
sues, yet the economic left-right axis also has some (shifting) influence. This complex 
linkage of European integration with the political space, it is argued, not only places high 
demands on political analysts who strive to uncover them, but also poses a challenge for 
politicians on the ground, who struggle with how to incorporate European integration into 
their programmatic profiles.  
Chapter 6 shows that the European integration issue emphasis is also shaped by 
ideology, although to a smaller extent than attitudes. The reason is not that strategic con-
siderations play a more important role here. Rather, an individual party’s choice about 
how strongly to emphasize Europe is seriously constrained by the importance assigned to 
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this issue by the general political agenda. If no one else is talking about Europe, an indi-
vidual party does not succeed on its own in prioritizing this issue. Nonetheless, the chap-
ter finds that the closer a Eurosceptic party is to the culturally conservative TAN pole of 
the political space, the more likely it is to emphasize Europe. Yet the growing tendency 
during the 1990s among these parties – mainly from the Populist/Radical Right, but also 
some members of the Christian-democratic and Conservative party family – to emphasize 
Europe stagnated or was even reversed in the 2000s. The issue of choice is not Europe, 
but immigration, to which these parties are increasingly turning.  
The framing of European integration is explored in Chapter 7. We will see that 
the complex structure of the European integration issue offers much leeway to political 
actors concerning how to present it to their constituencies, resulting in highly diverse 
framing. An intense framing contest is raging in which politicians try to connect Europe 
to their respective political core concerns. Depending on their programmatic profile, pol-
iticians strive to frame European integration in more economic or cultural terms. Accord-
ingly, opposition may be motivated by two very different motives – either by worries 
about unemployment and the dismantling of the national welfare state, or by perceived 
threats to national sovereignty and national identity.  
Finally, Chapter 8 looks at the system-wide politicization of European integration 
and uses a new indicator for this purpose that combines issue polarization and salience. 
The findings in the previous chapters provided conflicting arguments on the importance 
of Europe in domestic political conflict compared to other issues. The result of the em-
pirical analysis, as will be shown, turns out accordingly and suggests a sustained but at 
the same time limited politicization of Europe in Western European countries.  
  
  
CHAPTER 2  
Theoretical framework: The politicization of a complex issue 
The central argument of the present study is that pre-existing lines of political conflict 
powerfully shape politicians’ responses to European integration. In many respects Euro-
pean integration is a very peculiar political issue. It is not only a comparatively new issue, 
but also highly complex and touches on numerous political topics. This holds major im-
plications for the way the issue relates to political conflict generally and this, in turn, 
affects how Europe is being politicized in domestic politics. This chapter develops the 
theoretical framework for exploring the politicization of this unusual political issue. It 
starts with a section describing how European integration is linked to political conflict in 
general. The multiple linkages to existing lines of conflict are crucial for a thorough un-
derstanding of the politicization of Europe which, as a result, is more complex and less 
straightforward than of most other political issues. The reason for these multiple linkages, 
the next section argues, lies in the multi-faceted nature of European integration. A failure 
to consider this adequately in the analysis is likely to lead to flawed conclusions. Conse-
quently, the section sets out to open the “black box” by distinguishing four sub-issues 
that each represent a distinct, yet fundamental area of European integration, namely mar-
ket making, social regulation, deepening and enlargement. Next, the chapter clarifies how 
10 Chapter 2 
 
  
it conceives of the concept of politicization – a threefold process that comprises the po-
larization of politicians’ orientations, an intensification of the public debate, and the con-
nection of the issue to core political concerns creating wider resonance and shaping public 
opinion. Moreover, I elaborate on the three corresponding strategies that politicians rely 
on to politicize European integration: adopting dissenting attitudes, issue emphasis and 
framing. 
 
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND THE GENERAL POLITICAL SPACE  
In order to properly understand the politicization of Europe, we need to explore how con-
testation over Europe is connected to more general lines of political conflict. Politics takes 
place within the realms of the political space. This can be conceived of as a virtual space 
of low dimensionality in which political actors, notably but not exclusively parties, posi-
tion themselves with regard to political issues and compete for public support. Although 
there is an infinite number of political issues and politicians may in principle hold any 
combination of positions on them, only a limited number of conflict dimensions structure 
the political space. The reason for this is that positions on issues cluster – political actors 
bundle them into distinct programmatic packages (Hinich and Munger 2008, 1511; 
Kitschelt 2000, 850–1). For example, tough attitudes on immigrants are rarely combined 
with support for gay and lesbian rights. Similarly, a politician is unlikely to call for both 
lower taxes and more economic regulations. In politics, not everything goes with every-
thing; positions on different issues are interconnected. This clustering of issue positions 
is accomplished by political ideologies, understood in a very basic sense as an internally 
consistent set of normative propositions about what is good, who gets what, and who rules 
(Hinich and Munger 1992, 13–6). Political ideologies provide a shared meaning of what 
a specific package of positions is essentially about. They are difficult and extremely costly 
 Theoretical framework: The politicization of a complex issue 11 
to establish and, once adopted, they severely constrain politicians’ positional flexibility. 
As a result, issue positions are sticky, and political actors develop a well-established rep-
utation based on their political ideologies. In a long-term and comparative perspective, 
this is also captured by the concept of party families (Mair and Mudde 1998), each of 
which is characterized by a particular programmatic profile.  
As to the reasons why politicians rely on political ideologies and accept the con-
straints that come along with them, the literature provides several compelling explana-
tions in addition to what is probably the most apparent, namely that parties care about 
their ideology because ideological conflict is the very reason of their existence in most 
Western democracies. This is suggested by the cleavage approach (Rokkan and Lipset 
1967). First, thanks to ideologies, voters only have to look for a few fundamental princi-
ples instead of getting to know a party’s positions on all possible issues, including yet 
unknown future ones (Kitschelt 2000, 851). Hence, political ideologies reduce complex-
ity, solve problems of uncertainty and a lack of information and therefore make it easier 
for politicians to communicate with and attract voters. Second, ideology solves the com-
mitment problem that politicians face: Why should voters believe that rational politicians 
will stick to their position after the election, rather than opportunistically readapting their 
position to the (new) median voter to win the next election? Ideology solves this problem 
as it enables politicians to build solid reputations based on more general concerns (Hinich 
and Munger 2008, 1512). In order not to lose their reputation, they have to stick to their 
ideology, even if it may be costly in the short term, e.g. when incompatible views prevent 
them from forming coalition governments with certain other parties. 
These ideological constraints also explain the standard reaction of established po-
litical actors when a new issue emerges, such as European integration. Politicians try to 
fit it into the existing political space by aligning it with established conflict dimensions 
and by adjusting their ideological framework only slightly. Usually, this strategy works 
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out as long as it does not lead to serious inconsistencies or the new issue does not become 
all-dominant.  
In most Western European countries, the political space essentially has a two-
dimensional structure. Politicians do not compete along a single left-right dimension, but 
along both an economic and a cultural axis (Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson 2004; Inglehart 
and Flanagan 1987; Kitschelt and McGann 1995; Kriesi et al. 2008; for a critical discus-
sion see Jost, Federico, and Napier 2009, 313). The economic left-right axis sees adher-
ents to market intervention and an encompassing welfare state opposed to proponents of 
market liberalization and lean government. The cultural axis has changed its meaning 
over time and – with the waning of the religious cleavage – currently stretches from tra-
ditional, authoritarian and nationalist (TAN) values to green, alternative and libertarian 
(GAL) views.3 Moreover, the cultural axis has been particularly affected by the newly 
emerging conflict between the winners and losers of globalization (Kriesi et al. 2012; 
Kriesi et al. 2008). Political actors are located in this two-dimensional political space 
according to their positions on the issues that make up each of the two dimensions. For 
individual parties, their traditional party family affiliations are supposed to be reasonably 
good predictors of their location since members of a party family share a similar pro-
grammatic profile. 
Figure 2.1 shows the configuration of this highly relevant sub-set of political ac-
tors, the parties, in this two-dimensional space. The data it relies on are party statements 




3 These labels were introduced by Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson (2004). The cultural axis has also been la-
beled the new politics, post-materialist (Inglehart and Flanagan 1987), or libertarian-authoritarian axis 
(Kitschelt 1994). 
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on any political issue made in national election campaigns between 2002 and 2007.4 I 
present these empirical results already here because this configuration constitutes the 
point of departure for the further argument. The score a party has on the economic left-
right and the cultural TAN-GAL axes is a salience-weighted index of its average orienta-
tions regarding all economic and cultural issues, respectively.5 
The horizontal economic axis ranges from the economic left to the right pole, the 
vertical politico-cultural axis from the traditional-authoritarian-nationalist (TAN) pole at 
the bottom to the upper green-alternative-libertarian (GAL) pole at the top. As shown by 
the distribution of the parties in the configuration, the two axes are negatively associated, 
meaning that the parties tend to concentrate in the upper-left and the lower-right quadrant. 
Hence, culturally liberal parties tend to also be to the economic left, while culturally con-
servatives are likely to also be to the economic right. However, the resulting correlation 
of the two axes is, with -0.50, far from perfect. The members of each 




4 For each country, I used the statements from two national election campaigns, one shortly before and 
one during or shortly after the debate period under study: Austria 2002 and 2006, UK 2001 and 2005, 
Germany 2002 and 2005, Netherlands 2003 and 2006, Switzerland 2003 and 2007. See Chapter 3 for fur-
ther details of the data and the coding method. 
5 Alternatively, I performed a factor analysis to create the axis scores inductively. The extraction method 
used was principle factors, the rotation method oblique oblimin (as the factors that represent the two axes 
of the political space are expected to be correlated on theoretical grounds). The resulting two factors cor-
related highly with the corresponding salience-weighted additive index scores (as used in the present 
study): r=0.88** for the index score of the economic axis with the economic factor, r=0.95** for the in-
dex score of the cultural axis with the cultural factor (N=29). Because factor analysis does not allow for 
weighting and, moreover, because the factor scores are more difficult to interpret, I use the weighted ad-
ditive index scores for all the following analyses.  






Notes: The politico-cultural axis spans from the traditional-authoritarian-nationalist TAN-pole at 
the bottom of the figure to the green-alternative-libertarian GAL-pole at the top, the economic 
axis from the economic leftist pole at the left to the economic rightist pole to the right. The two 
reference lines indicate the average scores of the two axes (-0.24 for the economic axis, 0.10 for 
the cultural axis). A parties’ score on the two axes is a salience-weighted index of the orientations 
towards cultural and economic issues, respectively, in domestic election campaigns in the 2000s. 
The issues assigned to the economic axis are welfare, economic liberalization, and budgetary 
rigor. The issues of the cultural axis are cultural liberalism, culture, immigration, army, security, 
and ecology. In addition to these issues, a few statements on infrastructure and institutional re-
form were also coded. However, as they are not clearly attributable to one of the two axes, I 
excluded them from the analysis. To avoid endogeneity in the later analyses, statements on Eu-
ropean integration are not included. 
FIGURE 2.1. Location of the parties in the political space  
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party family cluster together at those places where we would expect them. The Radical 
Left Parties and the Greens are situated at the upper-left quadrant near the economic leftist 
and the culturally liberal GAL-pole; the Populist/Extreme Right are close to the culturally 
conservative TAN-pole and scattered along the economic axis; and the three mainstream 
party families are in the center of the configuration. Among the mainstream parties, the 
Social Democrats reach out to the economic leftist and the culturally liberal GAL-pole, 
the Christian Democrats and Conservatives more to the culturally conservative TAN-
pole, and the Liberals to the economic right pole. There is also quite some overlap among 
party families, suggesting that in many cases the party family concept is a relatively im-
precise predictor of a party’s programmatic profile. 
Readers familiar with the work of Kriesi et al. (2006; 2008; 2012) will notice that 
this figure closely resembles the one presented in Kriesi (2012). However, the method 
used in that study was different, namely multidimensional scaling, due to the different 
research interests. The aim there was to inductively explore the dimensionality of political 
space and the location of the various political issues, including European integration. By 
contrast, the present study takes the two-dimensionality of the political space and the 
assignment of political issues to the economic and cultural axes as given. The scores the 
parties have on these two axes of the political space are then used to explain the politici-
zation of Europe. Hence, while the issue of European integration is treated in Kriesi et al. 
(2012) as one of several independent variables that make up the structure of the political 
space, the present study treats the issue of European integration as a dependent variable 
which, among others, is explained by the configuration of the political space. Conse-
quently, the axis scores used in this study are calculated without the statements on the 
European integration issue to avoid endogeneity.  
How is Europe expected to fit into the existing two-dimensional political space? 
Recently, it has been argued that Europe has become firmly integrated into the political 
16 Chapter 2 
 
  
space and, moreover, that the issue is strongly attached to the cultural axis, more so than 
to the economic one (Hooghe and Marks 2009; Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson 2004; Kriesi 
2007). European integration, in this view, has chiefly become a political conflict between 
green, alternative and libertarian (GAL) supporters on one hand, and traditionalist, au-
thoritarian and nationalist (TAN) opponents on the other. The latter include not only fringe 
parties from the Populist/Extreme Right, but also Conservative and Christian-democratic 
mainstream parties (such as the British Conservatives and the German CDU/CSU). 
Hooghe, Marks et al. (2009, 17; 2002, 131–2) suggest that this opposition from 
the TAN-pole is motivated by more general concerns about national sovereignty and na-
tional community, which these parties are eager to protect. This sits nicely with public 
opinion findings which show citizens’ attitudes to Europe are not only and not even pri-
marily shaped by economic and other utilitarian concerns, but by identity (de Vries and 
van Kersbergen 2007; McLaren 2006). Specifically, an exclusive national identity spurs 
Euroscepticism (Hooghe and Marks 2004).  
Kriesi and colleagues (2012; also see Kriesi 2009) argue similarly, but see oppo-
sition to European integration as part of a more general structural conflict between the 
winners and losers of globalization. In their view, this conflict is not exclusively cultural, 
but also includes an economic dimension related to the opening up of previously protected 
domestic markets, ongoing economic liberalization and de–regulation. However, their 
empirical findings suggest that this new cleavage is only successfully mobilized by TAN-
parties and therefore mainly expressed in cultural terms. Consequently, they argue that 
the politicization of European integration is also primarily culturally driven (also see 
Kriesi 2007).  
In contrast, some studies argue that conflict over European integration is not 
mainly aligned along the cultural dimension of conflict but is primarily driven by eco-
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nomic rationales, e.g. by adherents of a regulated capitalism vs. free marketers (Steenber-
gen and Marks 2004; Tsebelis and Garrett 2000). Indeed, up until the mid-1980s Euro-
pean social democratic and green parties constituted the main source of opposition against 
European integration, which back then was largely a matter of market making. However, 
these left parties finally came to accept the common market as “only game in town” and, 
instead of trying to reverse integration, they pushed it further in the direction of social 
regulation and other market correcting measures (Marks and Wilson 2000, 442–8). This 
development ran against the interests of many political actors from the right, who are 
generally skeptical of more market intervention but continued to promote further liberal-
ization steps. Hence, the direction of the linkage between European integration and the 
economic conflict dimension has become ambiguous. Political actors on both sides of the 
economic left-right divide have reasons to support and oppose European integration, but 
for opposite reasons.  
The ambiguous alignment of European integration with the economic line of con-
flict might be a reason why, as suggested by the literature referred to above, the once 
dominating economic dimension in contestation over European integration is, at the be-
ginning of the new century, surpassed by the cultural dimension. Another factor that 
weakens the alignment of the economic axis is the general growing convergence of the 
parties along this axis (Kriesi et al. 2008). The economic divide has lost some of its con-
flict potential in recent decades. However, although for these reasons I expect the linkage 
between European integration and the economic dimension to be weaker than that with 
the cultural dimension, the former is expected to be still crucial for the politicization of 
Europe – if only to complicate matters by interfering with the predominant politico-cul-
tural linkage and leading to contradictory attitudes to Europe. Moreover, since European 
integration is a moving target, the relative importance of the two conflict dimensions may 
again change in the course of the further development of European integration.  
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There are other scholars who do not share the claim that Europe is embedded in 
the political space and primarily aligned along the cultural axis, as argued in the present 
study. First, it has been argued that European integration is not embedded at all, but or-
thogonal to the existing domestic lines of conflict (Hix and Lord 1997, 49–50, also see 
Benoit and Laver 2006, Chapter 5). If that were true, the politicization of Europe would 
be independent of the traditional programmatic profiles. One manifestation of the lack of 
embedding of a newly emerging issue is conflict that breaks out within parties, causing 
internal division or even fissures. For European integration, this was indeed the case in 
France in the 1990s. Hence, the Eurosceptic Mouvement des Citoyens, led by Jean-Pierre 
Chevènement, broke away from the Socialists in 1993 after the Maastricht referendum 
while, on the right, Philippe de Villiers’ Mouvement pour la France and the Rassemble-
ment pour la France led by Charles Pasqua was formed. At the very beginning of the life 
career of an issue, orthogonality is the norm. It takes some time for politicians to incor-
porate a new issue into their ideological packages. The crucial question, however, is 
whether the established political actors succeed in embedding the emerging issue within 
reasonable time or, by contrast, whether it remains unconnected to the traditional political 
issues, either to become marginalized or to establish a fundamentally new basic line of 
conflict.  
Second, it has been argued that opposition parties mobilize the issue mainly for 
strategic reasons in order to challenge the governing coalition, and fringe parties simply 
take a Eurosceptic stance to signal to voters that they are different from the mainstream 
parties (Mair 2001; Sitter 2002; Taggart 1998). However, while such government-oppo-
sition dynamics certainly play a role (like for many other issues, too), this factor should 
not be overemphasized. Research along these lines has usually focused on fundamental 
opposition to Europe (“hard Euroscepticism”) and, of course, such an extreme anti-Euro-
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pean stance would deprive any party of its ability to govern and to join government coa-
litions as it would lead to a permanent conflict with its governmental tasks. Yet moderate 
critical positions on and opposition to specific European integration sub-issues are also 
common among mainstream parties as the resistance of the moderate left against earlier 
drafts of the services directive and the widespread opposition to Turkey’s accession 
among the Christian Democrats and Conservatives illustrates. In addition, while many 
opposition parties are indeed fundamentally Eurosceptic, quite a few are not, like many 
Green or small Liberal parties. Nevertheless, despite these critical objections this promi-
nent alternative hypothesis will be duly considered in the subsequent empirical chapters. 
To conclude, this section presented the general structure of the political space in 
Western European democracies and argued that European integration is firmly embedded 
therein. Therefore, ideology is expected to critically shape the politicization of Europe, 
although strategic considerations might also play a role. Moreover, I presented the hy-
pothesis that the issue of European integration is embedded in a complicated way as it is 
linked to both the cultural and, to a lesser extent, economic axis of conflict. 
 
DISENTANGLING EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 
What is the reason for these multiple and over time changing linkages of the European 
integration issue with traditional lines of conflict? The answer is quite simple: The pro-
cess of European integration itself is truly multi-faceted. The initial objective of creating 
a single common market has come a long way, and at the same time the scope of integra-
tion has been steadily extended to encompass other purposes. The EU is now active in 
virtually every policy field (although its competencies vary greatly) and has a say in areas 
that used to be exclusive domains of the nation-state. Current European policies are not 
restricted to the common market and the related monetary union, areas in which they are 
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mainly preoccupied with fine-tuning, re-regulating (e.g., implementing common social 
and environmental standards), and tackling some “unfinished business” (e.g., the liberal-
ization of services). European policies also deal with regional redistribution (e.g., the co-
hesion and structural funds), fundamental rights, immigration, internal security, and for-
eign relations, not to forget the continuous institutional reforms and ongoing widening of 
the European Union. In short, European integration has given rise to an unprecedented 
“system of multi-level governance” (Hooghe and Marks 2001) on the European conti-
nent. 
Political conflict over European integration, as a consequence, is also not uni-
dimensional. Disagreements over European integration are not just a matter of arguing 
whether and how much Europe one would like to have, as the influential “hard vs. soft 
Euroscepticism” dichotomy by Taggart and Szczerbiak (2008a; 2008b) suggests. Partic-
ular political actors will answer this question differently, depending on the specific aspect 
at stake. For example, the European Greens strongly opposed the Commission’s services 
directive, which seeks to create a single market for services, out of a fear of “social dump-
ing”. However, at the same time they were one of the few party groups that unanimously 
welcomed the start of accession negotiations with Turkey.  
Yet, despite this obvious insight, most existing research on the politicization of 
Europe has treated European integration as a unitary issue and stuck to what one might 
call a “black-box approach” to European integration (or, alternatively, reduced it to the 
question of further deepening). The reason for this has less to do with a theoretical defi-
ciency, but a lack of adequate data. Against this backdrop, I argue that to understand the 
politicization of Europe and uncover how European integration is precisely linked to the 
political space one needs to break the issue of European integration down into its compo-
nents and take a closer look at what is actually at stake when Europe is being debated. 
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Consequently, this study distinguishes four sub-issues of European integration, 
Deepening, Enlargement, Market making, and Social regulation & redistribution, which 
represent different fundamental areas of European integration. Based on Bartolini’s 
(2005) Rokkan-inspired framework for theorizing European integration, which he con-
ceives as a process of transcendence and redefinition of existing cultural, political and 
economic boundaries, these four sub-issues represent more general conflict dimensions. 
Since the present study is not dealing with European integration per se, but political con-
flict over European integration and how it relates to political conflict in general, this is a 
suitable analytical framework. It is more useful for our purposes to categorize European 
policies along these conflict dimensions, and not along criteria specific to integration, 
such as supranational EU legislation vs. intergovernmental policy coordination, or con-
stitutional vs. “normal” issues, as political actors and particularly citizens care little about 
these differentiations in every–day political conflict.  
According to Bartolini, European integration leads at the national level to a low-
ering of the long-standing boundaries that were gradually established in the age-long pro-
cesses of state- and nation-building in Europe.6 This ongoing development has often been 
accompanied by the creation of new external boundaries at the European level and by the 
founding or strengthening of European institutions, although not necessarily. Hence, we 
can distinguish between areas of European integration where the main thrust is the re-




6 See Milward (2000) for the argument that European integration is actually a means to “rescue the nation 
state”, in particular with regards to economic policy, in times of increasing globalization. These two 
views are often seen as contradictory. However, I will not engage here in the ongoing debate on the mo-
tives and essential character of European integration, which would be a different subject of study. 
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moval or extension of existing boundaries, and areas where such a dismantling is accom-
panied by a significant degree of center formation at the European level. This is the first 
distinction I draw for the categorization of the European integration sub-issues. The other 
distinction is between the economic and politico-cultural dimensions of European inte-
gration, with the latter including all issues dealing with non-economic areas, i.e. cultural, 
politico-administrative7, and coercive boundaries. Figure 2.2 shows a two-by-two table 
that results from cross-tabulating the two criteria, and in which the four European inte-
gration sub-issues can be placed. 
The two sub-issues dealing with the economic dimension of European integration 
are Market making and Social regulation & redistribution. They both promote the low-
ering of national boundaries in economic and social policies. But whereas Market making 
policies stop there, Social regulation & redistribution policies go further by establishing 
market complementary measures at the European level, thereby stimulating new center 
formation. Hence, the two sub-issues are similar to Scharpf’s distinction between nega-
tive and positive integration, “i.e. between measures increasing market integration by 
eliminating national restraints on trade and distortions of competition […] and common 
European policies to shape the conditions under which markets operate” (1996, 15).  
More specifically, the sub-issue of Market making aims at removing national bar-
riers to economic exchange. Policies subsumed under this sub-issue are concerned with 
strict enforcement of the “four freedoms” of goods, services, capital, and labor (workers), 




7 As long as there are no economic regulations concerned. Economic regulations are assigned to the So-
cial regulation & redistribution sub-issue.  
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and hence the establishment of a competitive common market. This has been a core ob-
jective of European integration from the start. A historical milestone was achieved with 
the Single European Act (SEA) entering into force, when the objective was set to remove 
any existing obstacles to a single market by the end of 1992. More recent examples are 
the drafting and adoption of the services directive (the “Bolkestein directive”), the exten-
sion of the free movement of persons to new member countries, and the pursuit of the 
Lisbon Strategy with its goal to make the EU the “most competitive and dynamic 
knowledge-based economy in the world” (European Council 2000).  
 Policies of the sub-issue Social regulation & redistribution are meant to correct 
market failures and compensate for the perceived adverse effects of market liberalization 
by strengthening the EU’ social dimension (social protection and equality). This is mainly 
achieved by re-regulation at the European level. Typical examples include environmental 
and labor market regulations, common measures against unemployment, collective rights 
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funds, there is also a certain redistributive element – to date only between member states, 
not directly between individuals. Because of the marginal relevance of this redistributive 
element, and for ease of terminology, this sub-issue will be subsequently called Social 
regulation. 
Enlargement is the politico-cultural counterpart to Market making. It does not 
lower national boundaries but European ones by pushing them further and incorporating 
new member countries. The integration process was initiated by just six countries back 
in the 1950s, while the European Union now includes 27 member states. The second 
round of EU enlargement into Eastern Europe and Turkey’s potential accession are prime 
examples of the ongoing enlargement in the period under study. However, the conflict 
inherent here is not merely about the geographic borders of Europe, but also about its 
cultural and social boundaries, which touches on questions of group identity and social 
belonging. Therefore, this sub-issue includes related calls to strengthen “Fortress Europe” 
and discussions of Europe’s “Christian heritage”. 
Finally, the politico-cultural sub-issue of Deepening contributes to the strength-
ening of the new supranational center. It consists of non-economic policies that shift com-
petencies from the national to the European level, including issues that further develop 
the EU’s institutional framework. Examples include the democratic participation of citi-
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zens, the strengthening of the European parliament, policies to enhance judicial and po-
lice cooperation, a common foreign and security policy, and the various aspects of the 
constitutional treaty.8 
With these four fundamental European integration sub-issues, the several thou-
sand statements in our data on almost any European integration policy can be systemati-
cally classified – instead of simply lumping them all under one single label. Note that the 
four sub-issues are a categorization of different policies and hence should not be confused 
with competing visions of European integration, such as the federalist vs. the intergov-
ernementalist model, Jachtenfuchs, Diez, and Jung’s (1998) polity ideas,9 or the neolib-
eral vs. the regulated capitalism project (Hooghe and Marks 1999). Yet the two perspec-
tives are somewhat related as each of these visions comes with specific policy prefer-
ences. For example, adherents of a European regulated capitalism are in favor of Social 
regulation policies and they are at the same time likely to be skeptical of further Market 
making measures (especially if not accompanied by flanking social regulation). Moreo-
ver, they are also likely to be in favor of deepening (as it facilitates the introduction of 
such measures). However, not all policy preferences can be derived so straightforwardly. 
It is unclear, for example, whether adherents of a European regulated capitalism are in 
favor or opposed to further Enlargement. In the end, the connection between specific 




8 In the Swiss case, bilateral treaties are assigned to this sub-issue as well, as they represent far more than 
simple economic integration. Taken together, they provide a comprehensive framework of Swiss-EU re-
lations.  
9 Jachtenfuchs, Diez, and Jung (1998) identify the following distinct polity ideas: intergovernmental co-
operation, federal state, economic eommunity, and network. 
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policy preferences and the competing visions of what European integration should actu-
ally mean is an empirical question. 
European integration is not only multi-faceted but is also a moving target that 
changes its characteristics over time (Hooghe and Marks 2008). Historically, with the 
establishment of the common market (although still imperfect) and the monetary union 
in the 1990s the core objectives of European integration have gradually shifted from mar-
ket making to market shaping. Moreover, areas other than the economy have gained more 
importance. Hence, the relative weight of each of the four sub-issues is changing over 
time. This leads political actors to incrementally adjust or even abruptly reverse their 
attitudes to European integration. For example, Marks and Wilson (2000, 442–8) argue 
that once the Social Democrats had accepted that membership and the common market 
were “the only game in town”, they changed their originally skeptical attitude to deepen-
ing and eventually became strongly supportive, which further propelled the shifting em-
phasis in the integration process from market making to social regulations. We will there-
fore also keep an eye on developments over time in the subsequent empirical chapters.  
 
THE POLITICIZATION OF EUROPE – A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH 
The multi-faceted nature of European integration and the resulting complex linkages of 
this issue with the general political space, as explicated in the two previous sections, are 
expected to have a crucial impact on how Europe is being politicized. But what does 
politicization exactly mean? I suggest that politicization is best understood as a process 
by which a particular political issue enters the field of mass politics, in which the audi-
ence is widened and public contestation increases. The Oxford Dictionary of the Social 
Sciences defines politicization as a “process through which certain issues become objects 
of public contention and debate, and are thereby legitimated as concerns of the state or 
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political realm. Politicization is therefore generally a contentious process […].” (Calhoun 
2002). The notion of the politicization of the integration process already present in the 
neo-functionalist work by Philippe C. Schmitter is in line with the above general defini-
tion. For Schmitter, politicization is a “rise in the controversiality of the regional deci-
sionmaking process”, because “national actors find themselves gradually embroiled in 
ever more salient or controversial areas of policymaking”. This situation is “likely to lead 
to a widening of the audience or clientele interested and active in integration” (Schmitter 
1969, 166, italics in original). Interestingly, he hypothesized that politicization would lead 
to a reevaluation of the integration goals, but eventually push integration further – an 
overly deterministic view.  
Based on a comprehensive review of previous studies, Hooghe and Marks (2009) 
argue there is compelling evidence of the widespread and sustained politicization of Eu-
rope at the beginning of the 21st century. According to them, this is suggested by three 
key indicators: public attitudes to Europe are well-structured, Europe is salient in the gen-
eral public (and therefore relevant for party competition), and the issue is connected to 
the basic dimensions that structure domestic conflict in European countries (2009, 6–7). 
While a number of prominent scholars (Börzel and Risse 2009; Kriesi 2009; Schmitter 
2009) share their general conclusion, they nevertheless disagree on several issues such as 
the broader implications and specific causes, and call for a more solid empirical founda-
tion for these claims. Moreover, Green-Pedersen (2011) in particular argues decisively 
against this view of a widespread politicization of Europe, claiming on the contrary that 
the sleeping giant is “to remain fast asleep” and that the politicization of Europe consti-
tutes, if anything, a strongly limited phenomenon. Part of this scholarly disagreement may 
be due to different understandings of the concept itself and its different measurements. 
Some of the above authors focus on diverging positions on European integration, while 
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others mainly consider salience; some look at the development of the European integra-
tion issue over time, while others compare it with other political issues; and some authors 
focus on mainstream parties, while others deem fringe parties and non-partisan actors 
most relevant. 
That being said, it seems desirable to adopt a comprehensive conceptualization of 
politicization that takes account of the various insights of these diverging approaches. I 
suggest to distinguish between three essential elements of politicization (also see de 
Wilde 2007; 2011): the polarization of attitudes, the intensification of the public debate, 
and a connection of the contested issue to pre-existing basic political concerns (which 
ensures wider public resonance). 10 As shown above, politicization is often simply equated 
with one of these elements. By contrast, I argue that all three of them are necessary for 
substantial and enduring politicization.  
To study these three elements of politicization jointly, public debate is the pre-
ferred place we should turn to. As public debate is open to all kinds of political actors, it 
reflects the ongoing contestation in various sub-systems, such as the party system or the 
arena of protest politics. Hence, in public debate the spectrum of actors that are potentially 
able to politicize Europe is not by design a priori restricted to a specific type of actors, as 
in the majority of studies that focus exclusively on the party system. While in the follow-




10 While politicization is in principle a dual process, i.e. the political elite is responsive to citizens’ de-
mands and these demands are in turn shaped by the political elite, I focus on the politicization as reflected 
within the political elite. Besides pragmatic considerations to limit the scope of this study, this approach 
also seems justified by the findings of Steenbergen, Edwards, and de Vries (2007) who show that the way 
the political elite deals with Europe has a significant impact on citizens’ attitudes. 
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ing chapters the parties are at several points discussed in more detail due to their out-
standing role, the study repeatedly takes a broader perspective and looks at how other 
political actors deal with Europe. This allows us to verify whether the special focus on 
parties is actually justified. What is even more important, in our contemporary era of 
“audience democracies” (Manin 1995) the mass-mediated public sphere is the main fo-
rum of political contestation (Bennett 2001; Ferree et al. 2002; Koopmans and Statham 
2010; Kriesi 2004). The public sphere increasingly serves as the main reference point for 
citizens and politicians alike. Chapter 3 on the design of the study discusses in detail the 
further advantages of an analysis of public debate, as well as the related challenges. Now 
let us look at each of the three essential elements of politicization. 
The polarization of attitudes. The presence of diverging attitudes among different 
social groups or political actors is a precondition of political conflict. Yet the degree of 
controversy surrounding a particular issue varies considerably. Traditionally, the concept 
of polarization is used in the context of the study of party systems to describe the “degree 
of ideological differentiation among political parties” (Dalton 2008, 900), as proposed in 
Sartori’s (1976, 120) seminal study.11 Applied to individual issues, polarization is high if 
the distances between the attitudes of the relevant political actors are large. This is par-
ticularly the case if some actors adopt extreme stances. In the case of European integra-
tion, scholars observe that since the beginning of the 1990s fringe parties mainly from the 
right, but also from the left, have become fundamentally Eurosceptic, and even main-
stream parties have moved away from the formerly pre-existing “permissive consensus” 
in favor of Europe and adopted more skeptical positions. Hence, the growing amount of 




11 For an application of the concept of polarization to the electorate, see e.g. Baldassari and Gelman 
(2008); Baldassari and Bearman (2007). 
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negative orientations towards European integration has led to increased polarization of 
this formerly consensual issue. Therefore, the factors that explain negative orientations 
towards European integration are particularly relevant to us, although it is not necessarily 
the case that issue polarization is driven by negative attitudes.  
The intensity of the public debate. Clearly, if no one talks about an issue there can 
be no political conflict about it – a certain degree of visibility is necessary. This is far 
from trivial since the carrying capacity of the public sphere is highly limited and many 
more issues compete for attention than actually make it into the news, let alone for them 
to become established them as a regular topic of public debate. During the earlier times 
of the “permissive consensus”, European integration was largely a blind spot for public 
contestation, although this has changed. Europe has become a regular topic of political 
debates. The salience of a political issue can either be followed over time, as is usually 
done in studies exploring individual issue dynamics in public debates (see e.g. Ferree et 
al. 2002; for European integration Boomgaarden et al. 2010), or salience can be assessed 
relative to other political issues, i.e. the share of statements in which politicians deal with 
European integration, as is done by most agenda-setting studies (see e.g. Petrocik, Benoit, 
and Hansen 2004; for European integration Green-Pedersen 2011). The present study will 
consider both of these approaches to salience. 
It is crucial to keep the two elements of politicization, polarization and intensity 
(salience), well separated. A political issue may be intensively debated in public, but the 
general course may be hardly polarizing, such as in the case of welfare, a typical valence 
issue, particularly during the golden years of continuous and undisputed expansion. Con-
versely, some issues are highly polarized but hardly salient, such as abortion. Unlike in 
the USA, in most Western European countries this issue is rarely relevant to general po-
litical competition, although it is still occasionally able to ignite fierce short-term debates. 
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As will be shown in Chapter 8, this distinction between polarization and salience is also 
highly relevant to the issue of European integration. 
A connection to political core concerns. Salience and polarized attitudes among 
elite members alone are insufficient to trigger the politicization of an issue. What is 
needed, moreover, is public resonance – the engagement and mobilization of citizens 
around an issue. This is similar to Schattschneider’s (1960) notion of “expansion of con-
flict”, i.e. the public is being increasingly involved in a conflict originally confined to a 
few individuals. As Schattschneider argues, members of the political elite can win or lose 
a conflict by successfully including or excluding the audience.  
Frames fulfill a crucial function in mobilizing and engaging citizens, as has been 
widely acknowledged in the social movement literature (Benford and Snow 2000; Gam-
son and Modigliani 1989). According to Entman’s (1993, 52) influential definition, to 
frame is to “select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a 
communicating text in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal 
interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation”. Hence, frames pro-
vide citizens with cues as to why they should care about an issue. By explicating what an 
issue is actually about, elite frames are able to “activate adherents, transform bystanders 
into supporters, exact concessions from targets, and demobilize antagonists” (Snow 2004, 
385). Especially in the case of a complex and relatively new issue such as European in-
tegration, political actors have to actively and explicitly construct these linkages and they 
enjoy considerably leeway concerning how to present Europe to the citizens. 
Which frames are conducive to politicization, i.e. resonate widely and have the 
power to mobilize the public? For Williams (2004, 105), public resonance is basically the 
fit between a frame and the audiences’ beliefs, worldviews and personal experiences. In 
the case of the abstract issue of European integration, however, it is unlikely that it can 
be readily connected to personal experiences. Instead, beliefs and worldviews should play 
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an important role only. Likewise, several scholars argue that the resonance of a frame 
depends on whether it successfully builds on widely shared cultural material (Benford 
and Snow 2000, 619; Hänggli and Kriesi 2010, 143). A typical framing strategy is there-
fore to connect an issue to values that are widespread in the population (Chong and 
Druckman 2007b, 101).  
Yet, as already argued above, politicians are constrained by their ideological pro-
file. In particular because credibility matters – in terms of both the content of the frame 
(internal consistency) and the source (reputation). If they are interested in politicizing an 
issue, politicians will not pick any value that might find resonance among the wider pub-
lic, but one that is part of their ideological profile. Once the linkage is established, the 
conflictive issue and the existing more general political core concerns mutually stabilize 
and reinforce each other; political conflict stretches beyond the individual issue and feeds 
broader political divisions. 
 
STRATEGIES TO POLITICIZE EUROPE 
The politicization of Europe does not happen automatically or simply by chance; politi-
cians are crucial to its success or failure. As Hooghe and Marks (2009, 18) argue, “[a]s 
European integration has grown in scope and depth, it has proved ripe for politicization. 
But there is nothing inevitable about this. Whether an issue enters mass politics depends 
not on its intrinsic importance, but on whether a political party picks it up.” Political 
actors choose whether they want to politicize European integration, and the outcome of 
these efforts leads to either a high or low level of the politicization of Europe in a partic-
ular country and for a particular point in time. The present section looks in more detail at 
the strategies available to them. 
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If politicians think they benefit from politicizing an issue, what will they do about 
it? They can rely on a combination of three strategies that are related to the three compo-
nents of politicization outlined above. First, they will adopt a position distinct from the 
majority of the political elite, which increases issue polarization. In the case of European 
integration with its traditional pro-European consensus, this means taking a Eurosceptic 
position. Second, they will emphasize European integration with the aim of pushing it 
onto the political agenda and focusing public attention (intensification of the debate). 
Third, to create a sustained effect and to mobilize citizens, they engage in the framing 
contest over Europe. By framing appropriately, they are able to influence how citizens 
place the issue and the conflict surrounding it within the broader political context. Estab-
lishing such a connection between the issue in question and their political core concerns 
not only helps to persuade citizens of their own issue stance, but also to promote and 
sharpen their ideological profile. 
 
Dissenting attitudes. The first available strategy to politicize an issue is to adopt 
a position that is distinct from other groups of the political elite. In the case of European 
integration, this means taking a Eurosceptic position as pro-European attitudes have been 
prevailing for a long time. The idea that issue positions are central to political competition 
goes back to the classic work of Anthony Downs (1957) and is a core assumption in the 
vast literature on spatial theories of politics (e.g. Enelow and Hinich 1984; Enelow and 
Hinich 1990; Rabinowitz and Macdonald 1989). In this view, parties try to maximize 
votes by adopting optimal positions on policy dimensions in terms of direction and prox-
imity to their targeted voters. Positions are also relevant for cleavage theory (Rokkan and 
Lipset 1967), which assumes that political conflict can be traced back to a limited number 
of structural divisions that shape collective identities and are organizationally manifested, 
usually in the form of parties. Yet while a (crude) rational choice perspective assumes 
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that politicians are largely free in their choice of the position they want to adopt, the 
cleavage perspective emphasizes the importance of existing ideological constraints. 
Groups of issues are bundled together and related to specific cleavages.  
Hence, ideological reputations and commitments should severely constrain poten-
tial attempts by politicians to position themselves strategically on a particular issue, in-
cluding European integration (Hooghe and Marks 2009, 19). At the same time, however, 
the multi-faceted nature of European integration provides considerable leeway for politi-
cians concerning how to link the issue to pre-existing lines of division. Taken together, 
actor positions can be expected to be systematically linked to their programmatic profile, 
but at the same time to be conditional on the specific European integration sub-issue in 
question. For example, a Conservative party in the lower-right quadrant of the political 
space may oppose enlargement (for cultural motives), but at the same time support market 
making measures (for economic reasons). Similarly, a Green party in the upper-left quad-
rant might fully endorse further deepening (for cultural motives), and at the same time 
oppose market making (as it contradicts its economic leftist stance).  
 
Issue emphasis. A second strategy is to promote a particular political issue by 
emphasizing it relative to others. The vast literature on issue competition and “issue own-
ership” argues that parties primarily compete by drawing attention to those issues that 
benefit them, while trying to depoliticize unfavorable ones (e.g. Budge and Farlie 1983; 
Budge et al. 2001; Petrocik 1996; Riker 1986). Politicians trying to politicize Europe will 
elaborate on this issue whenever they have the opportunity to talk about it in public. Spe-
cifically, politicians with strong and consistent negative attitudes should emphasize the 
European integration issue heavily and try to put it onto the political agenda. 
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It has recently been argued that parties have moved closer to the center ground 
and positional differences have diminished due to increasing voter de-alignment, the par-
ties’ professionalization and therefore de-ideologization, and ever more external eco-
nomic and political constraints (e.g. economic globalization and the European Union). As 
a result, “valence issues” (Stokes 1992) – issues on which voters and parties largely agree, 
such as economic prosperity – have grown in importance, and voters base their vote 
choice less on the issue positions taken by a party and more on a party’s perceived com-
petence, i.e. the ability to deliver in a particular policy field. Party strategies therefore aim 
at increasing the salience of those issues regarding which they think they have a compar-
ative advantage (Green 2007). However, Green finds for the UK that at least for the Eu-
ropean integration issue, party positions still matter a lot as these have become not less, 
but more conflictive. Hence, instead of juxtaposing approaches based on (diverging) po-
sitions and on issue salience, it seems more fruitful to combine them (also see Green and 
Hobolt 2008; Meguid 2005; Wagner 2012).  
While both dissenting positions and issue emphasis are crucial elements of polit-
icizing an issue, the two approaches might differ in how strongly they are influenced by 
politicians’ strategic considerations (as opposed to ideological motives). It has been ar-
gued in the literature on issue emphasis that positions are difficult to change for politi-
cians, while it is considerably easier to manipulate the salience of an issue (see, e.g., Bale 
et al. 2010, 413–4). Hence, a short-term strategic consideration might be highly relevant 
for issue-emphasis strategies, yet less important for positioning. 
Finally, the issue-emphasis strategies employed by individual political actors are 
to some extent influenced by the general political agenda. If an unfavorable issue is at the 
top of the political agenda, it is difficult or at least costly to fully ignore it. In contrast, it 
would be a waste of resources to heavily emphasize a favorable issue that only attracts 
marginal public attention. Accordingly, political actors are likely to take the importance 
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of the issue on the general political agenda into account when choosing whether and how 
strongly to emphasize an issue (Steenbergen and Scott 2004, 187–8; Green-Pedersen and 
Mortensen 2010, 261; Sides 2006). Framing, to which we turn next, is a strategy that can 
be used by politicians to prevent the potential damaging effects of having to emphasize 
an unfavorable issue – by interpreting it in an alternative, more favorable way.  
 
Framing. Political actors back their positions with arguments, often with those 
that link the issue in question to more general political concerns in a way favorable to 
them. Such framing provides cues for the citizens as to what conflict over Europe “is 
actually about” – is it primarily a question of national sovereignty, of future economic 
well-being, or of international stability and security? While framing works in principle 
for any issue, it should be particularly effective in the case of European integration, as it 
is a complex, abstract and relatively new issue for which opinions are not yet definitely 
made and firmly established. Its meaning for citizens is still in flux and therefore highly 
malleable by political actors who enjoy quite some leeway in constructing the links be-
tween European integration and the underlying lines of political conflict (Hooghe and 
Marks 2009, 13; Janssen 1991, 468). 
Elite framing can pursue two analytically distinct aims. First, with regard to the 
issue that is being framed, the intention of political actors is to shape public opinion, i.e. 
to persuade citizens of their own issue position. The underlying mechanism is that, de-
pending on which consideration citizens base their evaluation, the result of this evaluation 
may turn out differently. Research has shown that framing is able to shape public opinion, 
although the effect varies according to the context, topic, individual attributes and frame 
employed (for an overview, see Chong and Druckman 2007b). Hence, political actors try 
to frame the issue in such a way as to reach as many voters as possible and to maximize 
support for their cause (Jacoby 2000, 750).  
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This is arguably the primary motive for framing in a referendum campaign, where 
winning the vote is the ultimate goal. In such situations, a political actor may also engage 
in counter-framing, i.e. trying to rebut the opponents’ frame or to deliberately broaden 
their argumentative repertoire (Hänggli 2010, 11). However, the latter strategy is limited 
and not without risks. If they overdo it, political actors risk losing their credibility, which 
is based on some degree of ideological consistency (see Hinich and Munger 1992). Em-
ploying a frame only because it resonates among citizens, even though it is not in line 
with the actor’s general programmatic profile, may do more harm than good. If, for ex-
ample, a Green party all of a sudden cares about national identity, or a traditional eco-
nomic interest association argues in favor of an issue because of environmental consider-
ations, it is very likely that this would make citizens suspicious or confuse them, and the 
argument will not be persuasive. Worse, the reputation of the political actor may seriously 
suffer. 
This brings us to the second aim of elite framing, and this perspective is neglected 
by most of the framing literature: Framing establishes and strengthens the connection of 
a particular issue with a particular ideological profile. Framing ties separate issues to-
gether, makes the motivation for such a connection explicit to the citizens, and thereby 
gives ideological coherence to a party program. This is also suggested by Hinich and 
Munger (2008, 1512), who argue that “[t]o be able to persuade voters that they can trust 
the party to do as promised after the election, parties must give reasons and explanations 
rather than just take positions. But explanations require some sort of overarching system 
of justifications, and the advancement of values that can be applied to a variety of issues. 
Parties trade on reputations, but reputations are meaningful only if they provide poten-
tially separating signals. If parties act on their ideologies when such actions do not appear 
self-interested, reputations gain value as signals.” By framing, political actors make ex-
plicit the ideological underpinning of their issue stances.  
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Successful framing by a political actor renders a particular core concern more sa-
lient and hence enables a party to emphasize and articulate a particular political line of 
conflict that goes beyond the debated issue. Framing an issue enables a political actor to 
shape political conflict more generally and to sharpen its ideological profile.  
In practice, these two aims of framing – on one hand persuading citizens of their 
issue stance and, on the other, promoting their ideology – usually go together because 
political actors enjoy a rhetorical advantage on the frames that citizens easily associate 
with them (Jerit 2008, 4). Hence, politicians will primarily use those frames to persuade 
citizens that fit their programmatic profile, i.e. the frames they own. The logic behind this 
“frame ownership” is analogous to the concept of issue ownership.  
Specifically, political actors close to the culturally conservative pole are expected 
to take advantage of European integration primarily to promote their nationalist ideology 
and to make this fundamental divide more salient. Those actors near the libertarian pole 
of the cultural axis, by contrast, are expected to cue citizens preferably by referring to 
universal and multicultural values. Frames related to the secondary, economic line of 
conflict will also be used, in particular by political actors for which this traditional conflict 
is still the most pressing (e.g. the Radical Left and economic interest groups). Actors that 
are near the economic left pole should connect European integration to questions of wel-
fare and labor, while those to the right should rely more on arguments related to wealth 
and prosperity. The connection of the contested issue with basic conflict dimensions via 
framing also increases its public resonance. Hence, both the individual issues as well as 
the more general conflict promote each other mutually, and politicization increases. 
Moreover, as suggested above, framing can be used to overcome the limitations 
of issue emphasis. As Petrocik (1996, 829) argues, “[w]hen the opponent’s issues are 
unavoidable, they can be interpreted in a way to highlight some feature of the issue on 
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which they are likely to be regarded as more competent.” In other words, politicians read-
ily apply favorable frames that “are consonant with their party’s traditional philosophy” 
(Sides 2007, 408) to an otherwise unfavorable issue. This is why “trespassing”, empha-
sizing an opponent’s issue and entering into dialogue, is a relatively frequent phenomenon 
– which issue ownership theory does not predict. According to Sides, who coined the 
term, trespassing is widespread because “candidates have enough rhetorical freedom 
when designing campaign messages that an amenable frame can likely be found for nearly 
any issue”. (Sides 2007, 467). In the long-term, such successful framing may even estab-
lish new or alter existing issue-ownership patterns by redefining the linkages between an 
issue and the general political space. 
 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter explicated the theoretical framework and derived some general expectations 
that will guide the empirical analyses in the subsequent chapters. Politicization is essen-
tially a process whereby the level and scope of conflict around a particular issue increases. 
It can be most comprehensively studied in public debates in the mass media, which are 
the main forum of political contestation nowadays. Public debates are – at least in princi-
ple – open to all kinds of political actors and allow us to study all three defining elements 
of politicization in detail: the polarization of attitudes, issue salience (intensity of the de-
bate), and the connection of the issue with core political concerns to create wider public 
resonance and shape public opinion. However, politicization does not happen automati-
cally – political actors choose whether they want to politicize a particular political issue. 
Three corresponding strategies are therefore related to the three elements of politicization: 
Politicians may adopt dissenting attitudes (in the case of European integration, this means 
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taking a Eurosceptic stance), they may emphasize the political issue, and they may engage 
in framing the issue to connect it to more basic political concerns and mobilize citizens.  
The central argument of this study is that the politicization of Europe is strongly 
influenced by the way the issue of European integration is embedded into the general 
political space. Pre-existing lines of conflict powerfully shape politicians’ responses to 
European integration, be it the orientations they adopt, issue emphasis or the framing. 
However, the multi-faceted character of European integration is expected to result in mul-
tiple, changing and sometimes contradicting linkages with pre-existing lines of conflict. 
Specifically, I expect European integration to be currently strongly aligned with the cul-
tural axis of the political space and to evoke opposition primarily from culturally con-
servative politicians. Yet the traditional economic axis is likely to interfere with this dom-
inant logic. The alignment of the economic axis with Europe is supposed to be ambiguous 
since opposition to Europe may arise from both the left (as prevalent in earlier times) and 
from the right poles.  
The complex linkage of European integration with the political space poses a dif-
ficult challenge for political actors and scholars alike. Researchers are unable to uncover 
the underlying systematic patterns as long as they treat European integration as a unitary 
issue. Consequently, this chapter called for opening the “black box” of European integra-
tion for the analysis and proposed a typology of European integration policies distinguish-
ing the sub-issues of enlargement, deepening, market making, and social regulation. Each 
of these four sub-issues represents a fundamental aspect of European integration, and 
individual politicians’ responses are expected to vary significantly depending on the par-
ticular aspect at stake. Chapter 5 will elaborate in depth on the structuring of European 
integration orientations conditional on the sub-issue at stake. 
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Politicians struggle, in many cases badly, with connecting European integration 
consistently to their more general ideological concerns. Particularly the mainstream par-
ties might end up with seemingly contradictory patterns of attitudes, which are difficult 
to communicate to voters and likely to impede the politicization of Europe. Overall, pol-
iticians’ resulting diverse and cautious responses are expected to result in the sustained 
but simultaneously limited politicization of the European integration issue. We will come 
back to this question of the system-wide politicization of Europe in Chapter 8, equipped 
with the results of the previous chapters’ analyses of the public debate on Europe and of 
the politicization strategies pursued by the various political actors. First of all, however, 




CHAPTER 3  
Design of the study 
This brief chapter lays the methodological foundations for the subsequent empirical chap-
ters. It introduces the innovative approach adopted to gain a better understanding of the 
politicization of Europe – the study of public debate by relying on the “nuclear sentence” 
coding of politicians’ statements in the mass media. The distinct advantage of this ap-
proach is, as will be shown, that it allows this question to be tackled in its full scope and 
complexity, while still being systematic and comparative.  
In general, using mass media content as a source for political analysis has a long 
tradition in political science, particularly in the field of political communication. How-
ever, it is still rare in studies that deal with the politicization of European integration, 
which commonly rely on expert surveys (Hooghe, Marks and colleagues), party mani-
festo data (e.g., Gabel and Hix 2004), or public opinion surveys (e.g., Gabel and Scheve 
2007; McLaren 2007). Certainly, there are a few studies dealing with European integra-
tion that rely on media data, but their focus is primarily on the media themselves or the 
public sphere (de Vreese 2003; Koopmans and Statham 2010; Trenz 2005). By contrast, 
a central aim of this book is to demonstrate the huge potential of the study of public debate 
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and the use of mass media particularly in those areas of political science that have rou-
tinely relied on other, more traditional empirical sources. Also for this reason, the present 
chapter will detail how the data was generated and discuss its reliability and validity by 
comparing it to alternative data. First, however, the next section presents the selection of 
the countries for this study and some of their particular characteristics. 
 
THE SIX WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES UNDER EXAMINATION 
Applying a most-similar-systems design (Przeworski and Teune 1970) to the overall 
framework of the study, the selection of the six Western European countries included in 
the analysis – Austria, the UK, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland – 
follows a “comparable-cases strategy” (Lijphart 1975). These countries share many basic 
common features, but at the same time differ in some aspects that are expected to have 
an impact on the phenomenon we want to explain – the politicization of European inte-
gration, or more specifically, orientations towards it, its salience, and the framing of this 
political issue.  
As for the similarities among the countries under study, these are all some of the 
most economically developed liberal democracies with stable political institutions and 
consolidated party systems. Moreover, they are all exposed to the process of European 
integration. This also holds for non-EU member state Switzerland, a country politically 
and economically highly interdependent with the EU. The conclusion of several bilateral 
sectoral agreements with the EU that led to the adoption of substantive sections of the 
acquis communautaire has been described as “integration without membership” (Lavenex 
2009). Further, European integration is a regular key topic of Swiss political debates, 
even more so than in most member states, as the unsettled question of EU accession looms 
large every once in a while.  
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Relevant contextual variations among the six countries are discussed in the sub-
sequent chapters, but these are the most important: First, the UK and Switzerland are two 
countries renowned for their traditional Euroscepticism (Kriesi 2007, 89), while the 
founding EU members France, Germany and the Netherlands were committed to Euro-
pean integration from the start. Austria adopts an intermediate position in this regard. 
Second, during the period 2004–06, for which I most closely examined public debate, 
direct-democratic votes related to European integration (in particular referendums) were 
held in Switzerland, France and the Netherlands. These direct-democratic votes with their 
considerable agenda-setting power (Hoeglinger 2008, 224; Marcinkowski 2006, 413–4) 
provide a window of opportunity that is expected to encourage the politicization of Eu-
rope. Third, the party systems of the UK and Germany lack any relevant right-wing pop-
ulist party, while the mainstream parties of the remaining countries have to face such a 
challenger, a constellation that is expected to foster the politicization of Europe as these 
parties are known to mobilize their voters with the issues of immigration and European 
integration (Kriesi et al. 2008).  
Features of the particular national social security and welfare systems are poten-
tially relevant regarding orientations towards economic integration. In terms of welfare 
state regimes (Esping-Andersen 1990), the sample consists of cases close to the lean lib-
eral ideal type, as well as the status-preserving conservative type, and some mixed re-
gimes. A paradigmatic case of the liberal welfare state is the UK. Germany, France and 
Austria are representatives of the conservative welfare state regime. Switzerland is gen-
erally considered a continental welfare state with strong liberal traits remaining (Arm-
ingeon 2001). The Netherlands defies any easy classification as it is a hybrid type com-
bining conservative and universalistic social democratic characteristics (Vis, van Kers-
bergen, and Becker 2008). An additional factor related to the politico-economic context 
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is unemployment. Countries suffering from severe unemployment are France and Ger-
many, with high rates of 9 percent or more, compared to the remaining countries in the 
sample with rates of 5 percent or less during the period under study (OECD 2010). 
The main reasons this study is restricted to Western European countries are, first, 
that the Eastern European party systems are still highly fluid and, second, that the Eastern 
European parties’ configuration in the political space is dissimilar to the standard line-up 
in Western Europe (see Kitschelt 1999). This leads to an entirely different logic of the 
politicization of Europe in these countries (see Marks et al. 2006). 
 
WHY STUDY THE PUBLIC DEBATE USING MASS MEDIA DATA? 
A public debate is the sum of all public communication related to a particular issue in a 
– usually implicit – process of argument and counter argument by political actors 
(Helbling, Hoeglinger, and Wueest 2012). This definition is similar to that used by Ferree 
et al. (2002) in their seminal study of the abortion discourse in the USA and Germany. 
Studying the public debate on European integration offers several advantages compared 
to mainstream approaches dealing with the politicization of Europe. We can distinguish 
between theoretical and more pragmatic reasons. In line with the former is the argument 
that the mass-mediated public debate can be considered an arena of political contestation 
in its own right (Gamson 2004; Kriesi 2004). The public sphere functions as a “master 
forum” (Ferree et al. 2002, 10) of political contention in contemporary forms of repre-
sentative democracies, which can be described as “audience democracies” (Manin 1995). 
According to Manin, political debates are transferred from parliamentary backrooms to 
the public sphere, where they are confronted with the logics of a commercialized media 
system. 
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Moreover, citizens’ perceptions of political issues, actors, and political conflict in 
general are largely shaped by their representation in the media. Or, as Neuman, Crigler, 
and Just (1992, 11) summarize this argument: “Citizens have come to depend on the me-
dia because they have virtually nowhere else to turn for information about public affairs 
and for cues on how to frame and interpret that information.” The ordinary citizen does 
not read policy proposals nor does he consult the carefully balanced and rapidly outdated 
party manifestos (see Adams, Ezrow, and Somer-Topcu 2011). Rather, they obtain infor-
mation on important issues and political actors’ positions from the mass media. In addi-
tion, the mass media not only serves as a central point of reference for citizens, but for 
politicians as well. Based on extensive interviews with politician, Herbst (1998, Chapter 
2) finds that the political elite even relies – somewhat naively – on media content as a 
proxy for public opinion when making policy decisions. 
There are also pragmatic reasons to study public debate. Such debate brings po-
litical actors from various political arenas together (e.g. parties from the electoral arena, 
social movement organizations from protest politics, interest organizations from the ad-
ministrative arena) and therefore permits a simultaneous analysis of the full spectrum of 
actors who are potentially relevant for the politicization of European integration. In most 
other research designs, the scholar has to decide in advance which actors to take into 
account and which to ignore. By contrast, in the present study we can empirically assess 
the relevance of particular actors and actor groups – in general, but also for particular 
episodes of the debate, e.g. referendum campaigns. Moreover, the approach here allows 
the collection of data on positions, salience and framing simultaneously. This is not only 
for European integration in general, but differentiated for the particular sub-issues. Taken 
together, this enables a comprehensive and fine-grained, yet still systematic comparative 
analysis of the politicization of Europe.   
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GENERATION OF THE DATA – NUCLEAR SENTENCE CODING OF NEWSPAPER ARTICLES12 
For each of the six countries, the most widespread quality newspapers were content ana-
lyzed, namely Die Presse (A), Le Monde (F), Süddeutsche Zeitung (D), NRC Handelsblad 
(NL), Neue Zürcher Zeitung (CH), and The Times (UK). These quality newspapers ex-
hibit a high level of influence on other news organizations’ editorial decisions and there-
fore on media agenda setting in general (Bennett et al. 2004, 445; Gerhards, Neidhardt, 
and Rucht 1998, 191). Other advantages of elite media are, first, that they are a relatively 
homogenous type of media product, which is especially important in our context as we 
are not interested in particular media characteristics but in cross-country comparisons. 
Second, quality newspapers report much more extensively on political matters than tab-
loids or television (Druckman 2005, 468–9).  
We applied a two-step procedure to obtain a representative sample of relevant 
articles for the public debates on European integration for the years 2004 to 2006. The 
first step involved identifying relevant events in each country that were related to Euro-
pean integration. These events were identified by a systematic retrieval using various 
yearbooks such as Keesing’s World Record of Events and Facts on Files: World News 
Digest Yearbook. This list of events constituted the basis for developing an extensive 
keyword list for each country, which helped us to find potentially relevant articles. Rely-
ing on such event lists yielded the advantage of knowing about the relevant discussions 




12 In addition to the data concerning the public debate on European integration for the years 2004 to 2006, 
which is discussed in this section, Chapter 6 and Chapter 8 rely on an additional data set of national elec-
tion campaigns from the 1970s until the 2000s. This data was generated with the same method, but with-
out coding the more fine-grained sub-issues and frames. See Kriesi et al. (2012) for further information 
about this data.  
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in each country before we deployed a keyword search. This is especially important when 
dealing with an issue as complex as European integration, which is debated in a variety 
of different ways in each country.13 Thus, we sought to reduce the risk of missing im-
portant aspects of the debate in our selection procedure. In the second step, we selected a 
chronological random sample for each country. From this sample, we coded all articles 
in which a European integration-related issue appeared in the title, lead, or first paragraph.  
The coding was done sentence by sentence using a slightly adapted version of the 
“nuclear sentence” coding method (Kleinnijenhuis, de Ridder, and Rietberg 1997; van 
Atteveldt 2008, 29–33). This method represents a very flexible and inductive approach, 
intended to capture the full complexity of political communications by reducing a real 
grammatical sentence into its elements and the relations between them. With this method, 
each statement is reducible to a basic structure with the four elements of subject actor, 
issue evaluation (position), the particular European integration issue, and up to five 
frames. I elaborate on each of these elements in the following.   




13 The European integration debate is to be understood in a broad sense, i. e. we were not only interested 
in articles about the great questions of the deepening and widening of the European Union, but in all poli-
cies at the European level and those with an explicit European dimension. However, we restricted our 
analysis to a manageable number of contested and influential sub-issues by only selecting those that at-
tracted a certain minimum threshold of public attention. With this procedure, we managed to exclude the 
flood of meaningless technical, purely factual, or uncontroversial media coverage, which would have di-
luted our analysis. 
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As for the subject actor, we coded the name of the person (if mentioned in the 
article) and the organization on behalf of which the statement was made. The issue posi-
tions could vary between -1.0 (opposition) to +1.0 (support).
14
 The European integration 
issue was coded on a low level of abstraction and later for the analysis aggregated into 
the more encompassing four European integration sub-issues.  
In addition, and as an extension to the standard nuclear sentence method, we also 
coded the framing, i.e. the justification an actor supplies to support an issue position. 
What is special about our approach is that we code frames at a propositional level – con-
trary to the majority of media frame studies on European integration which typically focus 
on the whole newspaper article (e.g., de Vreese 2003; Trenz 2005). In an article, some-
times multiple justifications of a position are reported in successive sentences. We coded 
such frames as being part of a nuclear sentence, but only if they were clearly attributable 
to the respective actor and position. Hence, the coding not only provides information on 
the content of the framing but also, more specifically, on the actors who invoked a par-
ticular frame (frame ownership).  
Moreover, as previous research has found, actors often back their issue statements 
by using multiple frames (Lerch and Schwellnus 2006, 307), usually because their state-
ments in the public debate are targeted at a heterogeneous audience, and frames resonate 
differently among the various constituencies. Hence, using multiple frames can be seen 




14 Understated opposition/support, i.e. when a political actor e.g. “considers thinking about supporting” a 
policy, was coded -/+0.5, respectively. Ambivalent positions, i.e. if an actor explicitly refuses to take po-
sition on a particular issue, were coded 0.0. Yet these three intermediate types of evaluations were un-
common and each make up only 5.0 percent or less of all nuclear sentences.  
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as a strategy to maximize the appeal of a particular issue position. To account for this 
behavior, we coded up to five frames for each nuclear sentence. 
Table 3.1 provides an illustrative example of the coding of two sentences in a 
newspaper article. From the first sentence, two nuclear sentences have actually been 
coded, which demonstrates that a single real sentence can actually contain several nuclear 
sentences. Moreover, only the issue position in the second real sentence is backed up by 
justifications, a cultural nationalistic-exclusive and an economic prosperity frame. Cod-
ing several hundreds of articles this way, we finally came up with a dataset of several 
thousands of nuclear sentences and frames, as the overview in Table 3.2 shows. The data 
and detailed documentation is available by the author on request.  
 
TABLE 3.1. Nuclear sentence coding example 
 
[1] While taking a clear stance in favor of the European Constitution in his speech yester-
day, Edmund Stoiber carefully avoided mentioning the “Turkish question”– an issue on 
which his party, the CSU, is deeply divided. [2] However, the party chairman has unambi-
guously rejected EU membership for Turkey on several occasions before, mainly because 






















1.2 CSU 0.0 












2. Economic prosperity 
(unspecified) 
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VALIDITY AND RELIABILITY OF THE DATA 
Scholars working with media data are used to the critical objection by fellow political 
scientists that their results are certainly interesting, but that they reflect “only the media”. 
This is usually followed by the slightly malicious question of what about the “true” posi-
tion or motives of a political actor and, depending on the background of the questioner, 
he/she thinks of roll call data, expert surveys, party manifestos, or some other well-estab-
lished method. There are several rejoinders to this general criticism. One need not go as 
far as radical constructivist currents in communication and media science who argue that 
“[w]hatever we know about our society, or indeed about the world in which we live, we 
know through the mass media” (Luhmann 2000, 1). From this theoretical perspective, the 
only socially relevant manifestation of political attitudes would be represented in the mass 
media. Even if one does not share this radical view, one certainly cannot ignore the par-
amount importance of the mass media in shaping how citizens and politicians perceive 
politics, although direct experience (a vivid illustration is a child putting their finger in a 
TABLE 3.2. Number of coded nuclear sentences and frames of the debate on Europe  
Country Coded newspaper N articles N nuclear  
sentences 
N frames 
Austria Die Presse 339 2,774 1,087 
UK The Times 217 2,000 756 
France  Le Monde 619 4,869 4,113 
Germany Süddeutsche Zeitung 240 2,217 888 
Netherlands NRC Handelsblad 521 3,444 2,951 
Switzerland Neue Zürcher Zeitung 919 3,030 1,936 
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socket) and face-to-face or group interaction also constitute relevant sources of social 
reality (van Bulck 1999).15  
Less benevolent scholars might ask to what extent media data reflects the real 
attitudes of political actors. This of course immediately raises the question of where to 
find these “real” attitudes. Are they to be found in party manifestos (e.g. Budge et al. 
2001 in general; Gabel and Hix 2004 for European integration)? Party manifestos are 
thought of as representing the views of the party elite, but they typically avoid internally 
controversial and potentially divisive issues – a particular characteristic the European in-
tegration issue is well known for. Moreover, and probably most importantly, ordinary 
citizens rarely read party manifestos.  
Alternatively, are real attitudes tapped by expert surveys (e.g. Benoit and Laver 
2006 in general; Hooghe, Marks and colleagues for European integration)? Here a limited 
number of country experts have the difficult task to judge the policy positions of parties. 
Often, these experts also rely heavily on information from the mass media for their judg-
ment. I mention these critical points not to degrade these approaches – they have greatly 
improved our scholarly knowledge and have their specific merits – but simply to show 
that it is not so easy to find an uncontested measure (for more criticism of these two 
particularly relevant approaches, see Dolezal 2008 and Mudde 2011).  




15 Van Bulck draws heavily on the works of Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann. Moreover, he suggests 
that individuals may actually regard the mass media as one of the more trustworthy sources, as “[n]ot 
every symbolic representation is equally probable and believable, but a message distributed by television 
is not necessarily less believable than a message received from a friend. […] A rumour spread by neigh-
bours about the death of a king or a president may, in fact, only become believable (and therefore ‘real’) 
after the media have acknowledged it” (1999, 10). 
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One way out of this dilemma is to compare the measures of the different data 
sources to assess their convergent validity. Helbling and Tresch (2011) are the first to 
compare the measures of party positions on European integration from the Chapel Hill 
expert surveys (CHE), the Comparative Party Manifesto Project (CMP), the European 
Election Studies (EES), and political claims analysis (PCA)16 with the approach used 
here, the nuclear sentence coding of mass media data. They find that the different position 
indicators correlate highly and that the degree of shared variance across all methods is 
high. Hence, the validity of the position measures seems to be satisfactory for all data 
sources.  
The results are less convincing regarding the issue salience measures, for which 
correlation and shared variance are low, as found by Netjes and Binnema (2007, 48). 
They did not include media data in their comparison, but suggest that mass media coding 
may be a “harder” measurement of salience than the data sources tested. Helbling and 
Tresch (2011) find that the mass-media salience measure of nuclear sentence coding 
sharply differs from the other methods. Hence, issue salience in the mass media seems to 
tap a different underlying concept than the other indicators. One reason might be that 
while manifesto data captures the initial promises or intentions of parties, mass media 
salience reflects the effective outcome, their actual behavior (Netjes and Binnema 2007). 
The latter is, however, influenced by additional factors such as unexpected events and 
developments, the agenda-setting efforts of competing political actors and the general 
political agenda. Taking this automatically into account, mass media data is likely to be 




16 PCA is an alternative method for coding mass media content and is used to study the European integra-
tion debate in Koopmans (2010). For details of the method, also see Koopmans and Statham (1999). 
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the most accurate measure of issue emphasis in real-world political contestation (Epstein 
and Segal 2000).   
As for the framing, the available evidence suggests that on the condition that me-
dia frames are coded at a propositional level – as done by nuclear sentence coding – it is 
reasonable to infer from the framing in the media to the framing used by political actors. 
In her study on framing effects in direct-democratic campaigns in Switzerland, Hänggli 
(2010, 172) compares the framing in political actors’ campaign material with the media 
output. She finds that the media reported the frames the different political actors used 
quite accurately and concludes that they “respect frame ownership” (although more pow-
erful actors on average receive more media attention). In other words, the arguments at-
tributed to a particular political actor in newspaper articles are the same as those promoted 
in that actor’s own leaflets and press releases. Note, however, that this finding only ap-
plies to frames at a propositional level attributable to a particular political actor, not to 
the overall framing of an article – which is what most framing studies, unlike the present 
one, are concerned with. The framing of a whole article is a different story, and it is much 
more at the discretion of the journalist who is crafting it (see e.g. Callaghan and Schnell 
2001).  
While the discussed validity of media data for political analysis is a concern of 
political scientists, media and communication scholars are quick to point to potential 
problems of reliability and media selection bias. The ideological orientation of a mass 
media outlet, i.e. whether it leans more to the left or the right, and differences between 
media types, i.e. newspapers and television, are the most often mentioned potential 
sources of bias.  
According to Hallin and Mancini (2004, 67, 73–5), all the media systems of our 
six countries under study exhibit a high degree of political parallelism (i.e., particular 
newspapers share particular political views), although they represent different types of 
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media systems.17 Caused mainly by the legacy of the traditional strong linkages between 
political parties and newspapers, this political parallelism constitutes a potential source 
of bias in our data, especially as we only coded one medium per country. However, the 
coding method we used is relatively robust to such distortions as we only considered 
directly and indirectly cited statements from external political actors, such as parties, gov-
ernments, interest groups, and so on. All the information extracted from the newspapers 
– issues, positions, and frames – are clearly attributable to such an external actor’s state-
ment. We deliberately did not code opinion pieces, such as editorials and regular columns, 
where the political orientation of a newspaper comes to the fore most clearly.18 Further, 
we also did not consider judgmental statements made by journalists in regular articles – 
a practice still common in many European newspapers where the norm of a clear separa-
tion of fact and opinion is less established in journalistic culture than in the USA (Dons-
bach and Patterson 2004; Hallin and Mancini 2004, 226). 
Moreover, by exploring selected threads of the public debate on European inte-
gration in the 1990s with political claims analysis, an actor-centered mass media coding 
method similar to ours, Statham and Koopmans (2009, 450) find that party positions on 
European integration are robust across different newspaper types and newspapers with 




17 For Hallin and Mancini, France belongs to the polarized pluralist model, typically found in the Medi-
terranean area; the UK belongs to the Anglo-Saxon liberal model; and Germany, Austria, Switzerland, 
and the Netherlands are classified as democratic-corporatist models, typical of Continental and Northern 
Europe.  
18 For an insightful study into how the media deals with European integration in editorials, see Pfetsch et 
al. (2008). 
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ideological orientations. They find no significant differences between center-left vs. cen-
ter-right newspapers, and broadsheets vs. tabloids. Only regional newspapers tend to re-
port generally more pro-European statements.  
However, while journalists may report the content of politicians’ statements ac-
curately, they may select their sources depending on whether they are close to their own 
ideological profile. A right-leaning journal such as the German FAZ might provide polit-
ical actors from the right more space than those from the left, for example. Hence, this 
would not affect the positions, but the measured standing or the salience of an actor in the 
media. Hagen (1993) provides evidence for Germany that the journalistic practice of more 
frequently selecting statements from “opportune witnesses” does indeed exist.19 A closer 
look at his results reveals that the more extreme the ideological orientation of a newspaper 
(taz as the newspaper most on the left, Die Welt most on the right), the stronger this effect, 
while moderate newspapers (including the Süddeutsche Zeitung, the German newspaper 
in our sample) are more balanced. Therefore, while we cannot rule out that some bias 
might be reflected in our salience measure due to the restricted newspaper sample, the 
decision to choose a moderate quality newspaper in each country limits this effect.  
Finally, is the decision to exclude the additional and much more resource-demand-
ing coding of television coverage in the present study a tolerable omission? The scholarly 
debate on whether there are substantial differences in political coverage among newspa-
pers and television, and which of the two forms have a greater influence on citizens, is 
still undecided. However, a recent study by Druckman (2005) that was meant to overcome 




19 However, Gerhards, Neidhardt, and Rucht (1998, 95–9) find no substantive differences in the actor sa-
lience between newspapers in the public debate on abortion in Germany. 
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the methodological pitfalls of earlier work suggests that, at least for the USA, differences 
are quite limited. He finds that “television news and newspapers differ substantially in 
the quantity of coverage, but do not drastically differ in terms of content” (476). Moreo-
ver, according to this study, only reading newspapers plays a significant role in informing 
voters on candidates issue positions. By contrast, watching TV news, discussions with 
family and friends, or being directly exposed to the campaign do not.  
Taken together, these findings on the potential risks of bias in media data due to 
ideological orientations and different media types and channels, although certainly not 
the final say in these ongoing scholarly debates, suggest that the exclusive focus on one 
single newspaper per country is a reasonable choice for the present comparative study, 
given the existing time and resource constraints. 
A last methodological issue to discuss is inter-coder reliability. In a pretest, the 
coefficient of reliability for the identification of the nuclear sentences was 0.77; the inter-
coder agreement for the actor variable was 0.88, for the issues variable 0.85, and for the 
frames 0.74. Given the common acceptance level of 0.8 (Lombard, Snyder-Duch, and 
Bracken 2002, 600), and in light of the fact that particularly the frames are very complex 
variables, these numbers are quite acceptable. Following the pretest, supplementary train-
ing and continuous monitoring addressed remaining uncertainties. Moreover, the coding 
work of individual newspapers was divided among several coders to reduce any potential 




Studying the public debate by coding nuclear sentences, this chapter argued, holds huge 
yet hardly exploited potential for new and improved insights into the politicization of 
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European integration. Not only because the public debate constitutes a “master forum” of 
political contention in modern democracies, as the mass media decisively shapes citizens’ 
perception of politics, but also because the data generated by this approach compares 
favorably with other data in terms of validity and reliability. A main reason for this is that 
the coding is not done at the article level, as in the majority of studies that rely on mass 
media data, but at the level of actor statements, with each position and frame being clearly 
attributable to a particular political actor.  
The data reflects political actors’ original attitudes (issue positions, emphasis, and 
framing) quite accurately. Positions on European integration showed to be relatively ro-
bust and were similar across different measures, including our approach. The framing of 
European integration – not by the media or in different countries, but by individual polit-
ical actors – is an understudied topic and no cross-validation has been conducted so far. 
However, the above-mentioned findings by Hänggli (2010) suggest that by coding media 
frames at a propositional level, we can be fairly confident about tapping the framing that 
was actually intended by the politicians. The measured salience of an issue varied con-
siderably across the different methods. This urges us to keep in mind what salience as 
measured in the mass media means: Not the intended or desired amount of attention for 
a specific issue by a particular political actor, as reflected, for example, in party manifes-
tos, but the actual emphasis a political actor gives to an issue in public political contesta-
tion, which is also affected by the strategies of other actors and the general political 
agenda.  
Finally, what speaks strongly in favor of the approach used here is the ability to 
disentangle European integration, i.e. to determine the different elements of politicization 
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not only for the issue of European integration generally, but for specific sub-issues.20 This 
advantage will be particularly important in Chapter 5, which explores the multidimen-
sional structuring of European integration orientations. 




20 The CHE expert surveys also asked for the positions on a limited number of European integration sub-
issues. 
  
CHAPTER 4  
Content and participants of the public debate on Europe 
The public sphere is the central venue for political contestation in modern mass-mediated 
democracies (Bennett 2001; Ferree et al. 2002; Koopmans and Statham 2010; Kriesi 
2004; Manin 1995). Citizens rely fundamentally on the mass media to obtain information 
on contested issues and politicians’ differing views. Political actors compete for scarce 
public attention to gain political influence, and this holds for governments, political par-
ties, interest groups, and social movements alike – although the latter depend even more 
on access to the public sphere as they lack institutionalized channels to the political sys-
tem. Conflict over Europe is no exception in this regard. Politicians invest heavily in 
public communication in order to convey their views of whether Europe is a relevant 
issue and what European integration is essentially about, and to convince citizens of their 
attitudes on Europe.  
This chapter explores the dynamics, content and participants of the European in-
tegration debate. It looks at the main driving factors and the particular role referendums 
play in that regard. As will be shown, referendums have an outstanding ability to focus 
public attention and broaden the field of participants. At the same time, however, they 
take place only infrequently and calling a referendum (or giving reason to call one) is in 
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effect usually at the discretion of national governments, which considerably limits their 
role in the politicization of Europe in most countries. Moreover, the chapter presents the 
major issues of the European integration debate during the period under study, 2004 until 
2006, and the relevant participants discussing them.21 The question of which political ac-
tors engage in the European integration debate is of particular relevance. Most studies on 
the politicization of Europe routinely focus on the parties, without empirically verifying 
whether this is actually justified. In fact, there are good reasons to believe that other actors 
play an important role, too, e.g. social movement organization or economic interest 
groups.  
 
INSTITUTIONAL EVENTS AS MAIN DRIVERS OF THE EUROPEAN INTEGRATION DEBATE 
The public debate over European integration is dynamic and involves significant ebbs 
and flows. Public attention devoted to European issues varies considerably over time alt-
hough European integration has become a permanent topic of political contestation. This 
section discusses the main events that drive the public debate on European integration, 
the resulting dynamics for the period under study, and what this implies for the politici-
zation of Europe. We know from previous research that news coverage of European is-
sues is in general low, and attention is highly centered on events (e.g. Peter and de Vreese 
2004). During routine periods in European politics, national issues prevail in the member 
countries. By contrast, important events such as national referendums on Europe spark 
off intense public debates in the affected countries and they typically go far beyond the 




21 It is beyond the scope of this chapter to investigate how journalists cope with Europe, or the degree of 
the Europeanization of the national public spheres. These are questions the growing literature on a Euro-
pean public sphere deals with (see Koopmans and Statham 2010; Trenz 2005; 2005; Tresch 2007). 
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actual issue voted on and engage in fundamental questions about European integration. 
Similarly, during the regularly held European Council summits, newspapers all over Eu-
rope are usually filled with stories about the European Union in which politicians express 
their views about current issues and speculate about future developments. 
In their recent study of EU news coverage from 1990–2006, Boomgaarden et al. 
(2010) find that public attention is mainly attracted by infrequent institutional and policy-
related events. The visibility of Europe in the news is greatly increased in particular by 
national referendums, changeovers of the Commission, elections to the European Parlia-
ment, and enlargement steps (in this order of appearance). To a lesser extent, the regular 
Council summits also increase visibility, especially in those countries holding the rotating 
EU presidency. Moreover, the national referendums not only have a tremendous impact 
in those countries where they take place, but show significant effects in other member 
states, too. As a result, temporal variation in the countries in terms of public attention 
follows similar patterns. 
Further, what characterizes most of the key events of the European integration 
debate is that they are extraordinary but predictable, and scheduled and controlled by 
public authorities at the European and national level. This is quite an exceptional situation 
– many other political issues are driven by contingent events and activities outside the 
realm of the state, e.g. terrorist attacks, single incidents, or party political contestation 
over, for example, the issue of immigration (see Helbling, Hoeglinger, and Wueest 2012; 
Vliegenthart and Boomgaarden 2007). Of course, the European integration debate also 
involves such contingent events, although their impact is clearly secondary to the large-
scale institutional events. 
Why are referendums in particular so powerful in shaping the European integra-
tion debate? Generally, they exert a strong agenda-setting effect because they force polit-
ical actors to focus on a specific issue for a certain period of time. For Kriesi (2004, 202), 
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referendums allow for a “quasi-institutionalized going public”. In most countries, it is up 
to governments to decide whether to call a referendum. However, once scheduled, gov-
ernments cannot control the outcome, as the defeat of the Constitutional Treaty in France 
and the Netherlands in 2005 vividly demonstrated. As Hooghe and Marks (2009, 20) put 
it, “[r]eferendums are elite-initiated events which can have elite-defying consequences”.  
Fortunately for them, governments enjoy quite some leeway whether to put a 
treaty to a popular vote, not least by scaling down the scope of a treaty beforehand, and 
they usually avoid it if they presume the odds are against them. Even if a referendum 
fails, not everything is lost as they can call a vote for a second time, usually making some 
minor concessions. This is well illustrated by the case of the Lisbon Treaty which suc-
ceeded the defeated Constitution and was ratified in most countries by parliament only. 
In Ireland, after the Lisbon Treaty had been turned down in a first referendum, the vote 
was simply repeated a year later. Only in Switzerland, where access to direct-democratic 
procedures is open to all, are referendums under very limited governmental control. In 
such a context, political challengers and more marginal actors are also able to use refer-
endums as a highly effective tool to shape the political agenda – and to politicize Europe. 
Table 4.1 shows the origin of the events that triggered statements about Europe 
during our period of study 2004–06. The findings confirm the expected importance of 
institutional and policy-related events that are initiated by national governments or the 
EU. Slightly more than 50 percent of all statements were made in the context of events 
that took place in public authority arenas at the European or national level – mostly policy 
decisions by the Commission or the Council, and meetings by European bodies and the 
member states. Further important sources of statements are direct-democratic processes 
(25.4 percent), and the parties and legislative arena (20.7 percent). Other arenas are 
largely irrelevant. These irrelevant arenas include not only the arena of interest groups, 
i.e. the privileged actors of the economic sector with traditionally close ties to the political 
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system and who therefore depend less on public visibility, but also the protest arena 
whose representatives rely critically on public support to be able to exert pressure on 
governments (Beyeler and Kriesi 2005, 103). I will come back to this lack of protest 
politics in the European integration debate when dealing with the participants of the de-
bate. 
The impact of specific key events is visible in Figure 4.1 which displays the tem-
poral development of the debate intensity. The national referendums on the Constitutional 
Treaty in France and the Netherlands (and the referendum on the Schengen Treaty in 
Switzerland) were held at the end of May/beginning of June 2005 and added an enormous 
boost to the public debate. This did not only happen in the countries where they were 
held, but also in the other member states. The agenda-setting function of European refer-
endums goes beyond national boundaries as they usually have far-reaching consequences 
for the integration process in general. In contrast, the frequent referendums held in non-
TABLE 4.1. Origin of the events driving the European integration debate 
Event arena  
Public authority arenas 51.2 
European Union 39.1 
Domestic state 12.1 
Intermediary arenas 48.1 
Direct democracy  
(referendums and initiatives) 25.4 
Parties and legislature 20.7 
Interest associations 1.7 
Protest 0.3 
Economy and Society  0.7 
Total percentage 100.0 
N 7,372 
Note: Share of statements triggered by a particular event arena; only statements for which the 
triggering event could be identified; country weights applied. 
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member state Switzerland are less important for other countries and therefore have little 
resonance outside. They are typically about bilateral agreements with the EU and are 
therefore only crucial for Switzerland. Further events in the period study that are also 
classified by Boomgaarden et al. (2010) as having a high impact, namely the Commis-
sion’s changeover, EP elections and the Eastern enlargement, led to a marked increase in 
debate intensity in many of the countries under study, but none as strongly and systemat-
ically as the referendums. There are also significant country-specific differences due to 
other, minor events, but the degree of common variation caused by the key events is re-
markable. 
To summarize, European integration is clearly an issue in the control of public 
authorities. The public debate on Europe is driven primarily by key institutional and pol-
icy-related events that are initiated by either European Union bodies or national govern-
ments. Boomgarden et al (2010, 519) conclude “the more the EU does, the more likely it 
is to get on the news agenda”. Conversely, this implies that if the EU and (as I would add) 
national governments remain inactive in these matters, European integration holds little 
salience in the public debate. A consequence of this is that non-state actors and party 
politicians in opposition who are interested in politicizing this issue are unable to get the 
debate going (and have difficulties developing a strong hold on this issue). Such a situa-
tion is uncommon for many domestic issues. Immigration, for example, is driven to a 
considerable extent by deliberate attempts of oppositional politicians trying to politicize 
it (Vliegenthart and Boomgaarden 2007). Moreover, the results showed that referendums 
are institutional events with an unparalleled ability to focus public attention. However, 
their impact is limited by the fact that they are largely controlled by national governments 
and take place only infrequently – with the exception of Switzerland. 
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Note: Number of statements on European integration per month; major institutional events indi-
cated. 
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THE CONTENT OF THE DEBATE 
Since major institutional events provide the main impetus for the European integration 
debate, this should also be reflected in the topics being discussed. The most important 
events during the period under study were the referendums on the Constitutional Treaty 
in France and the Netherlands held in the summer of 2005, which brought many funda-
mental and institutional questions to the fore. A further milestone event was the simulta-
neous accession of 10 Central– and Eastern European countries in the spring of 2004, 
including Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Po-
land, Slovakia and Slovenia – the largest enlargement round to date.  
Table 4.2 reports the salience of the four European integration sub-issues accord-
ing to the typology developed in Chapter 2.22 Across all countries, deepening and en-
largement, the two politico-cultural sub-issues, dominate the debate with 74.4 percent of 
all statements, which is well in line with the above-mentioned key events. In member 
states that held or announced referenda on the Constitutional Treaty (the UK, France, and 
the Netherlands), deepening is the most salient sub-issue. In non-EU Switzerland, deep-
ening is the most important sub-issue as well due to the referendum on the Schengen 
accord. Enlargement is the most important sub-issue in Germany and Austria, which are 




22 Statements not clearly attributable to one of the four categories account for roughly 10 percent of all 
statements, but were excluded from the analysis. Two issues with which some of the statements of this 
very heterogeneous residual category dealt are worth mentioning, namely the Common Agricultural Pol-
icy (CAP) and budget negotiations. The interrelated issues of the CAP and the budget have substantial 
redistributive side-effects at the micro-level, but even more so at the macro-level, particularly in France 
and the UK. However, the reason they were not assigned to the social regulation sub-issue is that the spe-
cific topics debated in the period under study were mainly idiosyncratic questions about the net payments 
of individual countries (e.g. the British rebate). 
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geographically closest to potential new member countries. By contrast, only a quarter of 
all statements deal with the economic sub-issues social regulation or market making. Alt-
hough secondary to the politico-cultural sub-issues in all countries, economic sub-issues 
hold comparatively high salience in Switzerland, mainly because a contested referendum 
on the free movement of persons was held. Economic sub-issues are also relatively im-
portant in Germany and France, where adjustments of the monetary union (reform of the 
stability pact) and the services liberalization directive, respectively, received above-aver-
age attention. 
The referendums on the Constitutional Treaty and Eastern enlargement were cer-
tainly extraordinary events, but how unique are they? In fact, referendums have been 
constant companions of the integration process since the 1990s, and they have become 
more frequent. By 2001, there had been 25 referendums on European integration (Hug 
2002, 27); by 2009 this number had already risen to 41. And while the defeat of the Con-
stitutional Treaty may have temporarily tempered the enthusiasm of the elite to imple-
ment direct-democratic instruments at the European level, they will certainly continue to 
play an important role at the national level. The issue of further broadening the EU is also 
TABLE 4.2. Content of the European integration debate 
European integration  
sub-issue All  
countries A UK FR DE NL CH 
Market making 18.8 15.6 17.1 17.7 23.3 17.5 21.7 
Social regulation 6.8 3.0 4.1 12.8 1.4 6.2 13.2 
Enlargement 29.1 51.9 22.4 17.9 42.3 26.5 13.6 
Deepening 45.3 29.6 56.5 51.5 33.0 49.8 51.4 
Total (%) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
N 12,986 2,002 1,256 3,643 1,626 2,058 2,401 
Notes: Country-weights applied for the results across all countries. 
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likely to remain important in the future. Although the breadth of the Eastern enlargement 
round is unique, other candidate countries are already preparing for accession. Even more 
importantly, it was not the ongoing Eastern enlargement that received most of the public 
attention, but the lingering conflict about the potential future accession of Turkey. More 
than half of all statements about enlargement were actually preoccupied with this issue 
and Turkey’s application will stay on the European agenda for years to come. Hence, 
referendums and enlargement rounds have been extraordinary, but not unique events in 
the past and both will be part of the integration process in the future.  
However, what is certain to vary over time is the relative importance of the four 
sub-issues. It already has varied by the time of writing: Preoccupied deeply by the aggra-
vating European sovereign debt or euro crises, European politics have become more con-
cerned with the economic aspects of European integration. Yet this is exactly what makes 
the disentangling of European integration in this study so valuable. While the overall 
perception of European integration is shifting over the course of time, the underlying 
mechanisms for each of the four sub-issues should be less subject to change. 
 
 
THE STANDING OF POLITICAL ACTORS 
Most studies of the politicization of Europe restrict their analysis beforehand to a singly 
type of political actors, political parties, and thereby take their exclusive role for granted. 
Yet the literature on protest politics and social movements (e.g. Kriesi et al. 1995) has 
long demonstrated that there is more to political conflict than the parties and the electoral 
arena. There are other actors and alternative arenas where political mobilization takes 
place and new political issues are introduced. European integration, it has been argued, 
has increasingly become a target of politicization from below – although this claim was 
again derived by exclusively focusing on particular actors and action repertoires, namely 
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protest politics (Balme and Chabanet 2008; Imig 2004; Imig and Tarrow 2001). By con-
trast, with its focus on the public debate the present study is able to systematically evalu-
ate the importance of all kinds of political actors.  
Participating in the public debate on European integration is essential for any actor 
trying to politicize Europe. A political actor who does not speak up publicly is neither 
able to make his stand visible nor to convince or mobilize citizens. In the literature on 
public debates, participation is usually known as standing, which means “having a voice 
in the media” (Ferree et al. 2002, 13).23 Describing the standing of different types of po-
litical actors (e.g. governments, parties, interest groups and social movements) and ex-
plaining the differences between them, also across countries and issues, is routinely done 
in this literature (on the topic of Europe, see Koopmans 2010; Trenz 2005; Tresch 2007).  
Throughout this study, I shall distinguish the following categories of political ac-
tors (see Table 4.3): At the most general level, there are public authorities, political par-
ties, civil society actors, and unorganized individuals. Public authorities are characterized 
by their policy-output orientation and include European Union bodies (mainly the Com-
mission and the Council) on one hand, and national state actors on the other. The large 
majority of statements by the latter stems from the executive, but also the administration, 
the judiciary and central bank officials are subsumed under this category.  




23 Standing therefore requires more than passive “visibility”, another concept used in this literature (e.g. 
Koopmans and Statham 2000, 144). 
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Some scholars merge parties and civil society actors under the broader category 
of intermediaries as they both aggregate societal problems and demands, and translate 
them into more or less coherent political issues. However, in modern democracies the 
boundaries between the parties and the state are blurred – also because key positions in 
the state are filled with party politicians and executive members usually hold a party lead-
ership position. In light of this very powerful and outstanding role of the parties in the 
political system, it is more useful to treat these intermediaries as a separate category. Party 
politicians speaking explicitly on behalf of the party and party politicians who are mem-
bers of the legislative are assigned to this category. Moreover, to do justice to the fact that 
party politicians can be found in other categories as well (e.g. in the executive), some 
analyses below additionally report the results for the broader category of party-affiliated 
actors. Party politicians are the most important actors in the politicization of Europe, as 
will soon be shown below, and they therefore receive special attention in the subsequent 
 
TABLE 4.3. Categorization of the participants of the public debate 
Public authorities  
EU actors 
European Commission, Council of  
Ministers, European Council, and other 
supranational actors 
Foreign state actors 
Foreign executive, administrative, and central 
bank actors 
Domestic state actors 
Mainly domestic executives, but also  





National and European party actors  
(including members of the legislature) 
Labor unions – 
Business organiza-
tions 
Employer and producer associations  
Public interest groups 
Social movement organizations, charitable 
and environmental organizations, churches 
and other religious associations 
Non-organized  
individuals 
Experts Intellectuals and scientists 
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chapters. They can be further broken down into six party families,24 namely the Com-
munists and Left socialists (the Radical Left), the Greens, the Social Democrats, the Lib-
erals, the Christian Democrats and Conservatives, and the Populist/Extreme Right.25 Ta-
ble A.1 in the appendix shows the individual parties in the six countries under study that 
belong to these party families. 
Among the civil society actors, there are the labor unions and business organiza-
tions. The latter include all kinds of employers’ organizations and professional groups, 
such as farmers’ associations. Of these economic interests I distinguish public interest 
groups, which include charitable and environmental organizations, religious associations, 
and social movement organizations. Among the unorganized individuals, the only empir-
ically salient group are experts on whom journalists quite frequently rely. Although these 
intellectuals and scientists are usually affiliated to some academic institution, they typi-
cally speak only for themselves and do not represent any official opinion of those institu-
tions.  
In general, participating in the public debate is easier for established actors of the 
political elite because their prominence and status facilitate access to the mass mediated 
public (Schmitt-Beck and Pfetsch 1994). Journalists rely heavily on official sources as 
postulated by the indexing-hypothesis (Bennett 1990; Livingston and Bennett 2003). 




24 For a thorough discussion of the concept of the party family, see Mair and Mudde (1998).  
25 There are two reasons I treat the Christian Democrats and the Conservatives as a single category. First, 
differences in attitudes to Europe have become negligible, as shown in Chapter 5. A second reason is that 
each country under study has either a Christian-democratic or a Conservative party, but never both, mean-
ing that for the comparative analyses I have to merge them in any case for pragmatic reasons. The same 
holds for the Liberal party family where one could distinguish left-liberals vs. conservative liberals. 
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With regard to how European integration specifically fits into this general pattern, schol-
ars are more ambiguous. For Koopmans (2010, 98–9), European integration leads to a 
significant redistribution of power that also affects political mobilization and public de-
bates. He refers both to theoretical arguments that expect even more dominance of estab-
lished actors and to arguments that speak in favor of more openness towards civil society 
representatives. On one hand, the distant, complex, and bureaucratic EU decision-making 
process might further limit access by less resourceful actors. On the other hand, as the 
additional European level provides new and alternative opportunities for exit, veto and 
information that are off the beaten tracks of the national container and the monopolized 
national institutions (Hix and Goetz 2001, 12–4), the participation of traditionally disad-
vantaged actors may be facilitated. However, the fact that the European integration debate 
is driven primarily by events under the control of EU or national public authorities, as we 
have seen above, strongly suggests that these actors and the closely connected parties will 
also dominate this debate. 
Only referendums, which proved to be among the most influential events in driv-
ing the debate, should to some extent serve as a counter balance against the dominance 
of well-established political actors. Generally, they lead not only to a greatly intensified 
public debate, they also expand the scope of participating actors, in the short as well as – 
in a comparative perspective - in the long term (Hoeglinger 2008, also see Marcinkowski 
2005; Tresch 2007, 171–3). This is a result of the greater debate intensity during referen-
dum campaigns, which leads to the increased diversity of actors. As more attention is 
devoted to the issue that is put to a vote, there are more opportunities for political actors 
to speak up. Moreover, referendum campaigns are a proto-typical situation of a conflict 
between two sides. This puts otherwise disadvantaged outsiders on a more or less equal 
footing with established actors because journalists cannot tell the story by providing only 
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half of the picture. Hence, during referendum campaigns about Europe and, more gener-
ally, in those countries in which referendums are held regularly, the hypothesized disad-
vantage of non-established actors should be smaller. 
Table 4.4 presents the actors’ standing in the European integration debate for each 
of the six countries. Standing is operationalized as the frequency with which statements 
by a particular actor category appear in the news and is reported as a percentage share of 
all statements made by political actors.26 As expected, established political actors – public 
authorities and political parties – dominate heavily. Across all countries, public authori-
ties account for 51.0 percent of all statements. The single most important actor, the Eu-
ropean Commission with 10.4 percent of all statements, also belongs to this actor cate-
gory. All state actors together, which are almost exclusively various national governments 
(the share of statements from the judiciary or the central bank is negligible at 1 percent 
or lower), are responsible for 33.9 percent of all statements. Domestic national govern-
ments account for only a third of them, while the rest stems from foreign governments, 
which suggests – together with the high standing of EU representatives – a high degree 
of transnationalization. Looking at individual countries, the share of public authorities is 
highest in Austria, and comparatively low in Switzerland and France. 
Besides public authorities, the parties are the second major group with an average 
standing of 39.3 percent. Moreover, one can argue that this value for party standing still 
somehow underestimates their real importance as most members of a government  









TABLE 4.4. Actor standing in the European integration debate 
Actor type 
All countries A UK FR DE NL CH 
Public authorities 51.0 60.8 51.3 40.8 56.7 54.37 42.1 
European Union 17.0 25.2 16.9 11.2 25.2 14.0 9.9 
Foreign state 23.5 28.9 20.8 21.1 21.4 27.8 21.2 
Domestic state 10.4 6.7 13.6 8.5 10.1 12.7 11.1 
Parties 39.3 31.5 39.8 46.9 39.0 37.1 41.4 
Civil society  5.8 4.4 6.2 6.3 0.5 3.3 13.8 
Labor unions 1.6 0.2 1.8 3.1 0.1 1.1 3.1 
Business interests 2.2 3.2 1.8 1.4 0.1 0.8 6.1 
Public int. groups 2.0 1.0 2.6 1.9 0.3 1.4 4.6 
Individuals/experts 4.0 3.3 2.7 6.0 3.8 5.3 2.7 
Total (%) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Notes: Parties includes statements by party politicians in the legislature; country-weights applied for the “all” column. 
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are party politicians. When they make a statement in public, it is at least partly also per-
ceived as a partisan statement. Hence, the share of all statements by party-affiliated actors 
(i.e. party speakers, parliamentarians and members of the executive) is a remarkable 50.2 
percent. This is a noteworthy contrast to the results reported by Koopmans (2010, 108) 
who observes the dominance of core state actors in Europeanized public debates to the 
detriment of both parties and civil society actors. As his study relies on data from 1990 
to 2002, the discrepancy may reflect the subsequent increased partisan politicization of 
European integration. 
By contrast, civil society actors (such as labor unions, business and public interest 
groups) and individuals are not only clearly outnumbered by public authorities and par-
ties, but they are virtually invisible. Across all countries, civil society actors together ac-
count for just 5.8 percent of all statements in the public debate over Europe, and individ-
uals – who typically appear in the media because they were contacted by journalists for 
their expertise and rarely due to their own effort – account for 4.0 percent. To be sure, the 
low representation of civil society actors can also be found for other, domestic political 
issues. However, the degree of marginalization of civil society actors in the European 
integration debate is also exceptional in a comparative perspective. For the immigration 
debate, the share of civil society actors is more than four times higher in the same time 
period, namely 17.0 percent, and for economic liberalization the share is even higher with 
36.5 percent. These findings confirm similarly bleak assessments about the prospects for 
creating a genuinely European civil society (Imig 2004; Koopmans 2010). As Koopmans 
(2010, 104) notes “[i]t is difficult to see how the absence of any form of public visibility 
could not negatively affect the bargaining power of civil society groups within the Euro-
pean decision making process.” This means for the politicization of Europe that civil so-
ciety actors, including social movements, are largely irrelevant, at least for the time being. 
The great battle over Europe is certainly not taking place on the streets.  
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This conclusion is supported by two recent studies of protest politics. Hutter 
(2010, 187) shows that the issue of European integration is rarely taken up by protesters 
(only 0.4 percent of all protest events deal with Europe), and that this arena is still domi-
nated by traditional protest concerning cultural liberalism, the environment and, increas-
ingly, immigration. Moreover, Uba and Uggla (2011) find that there is also no observable 
increase in the level of protest activities related to Europe between 1992 and 2007, as 
could be expected given the increasing politicization of Europe since the beginning of the 
1990s. 
How does this general picture change if we look at the impact of referendums on 
the public debate over Europe? The standing of civil society actors in Switzerland, with 
its exceptionally strongly developed direct democratic institutions, is with 13.8 percent 
more than twice as big as the country with the second highest standing, France. This large 
difference supports the observation that direct-democratic votes, which regularly take 
place in Switzerland, foster the participation of otherwise marginalized groups in public 
debates (Hoeglinger 2008). Yet in the other two countries in which a referendum took 
place during the period under study, namely France and the Netherlands, no such signif-
icant effect is visible.27 Unlike in Switzerland, direct-democratic processes in these coun-
tries took place only once during the relevant period and they were not an integral part of 
the normal political process, but were extraordinary.  




27 One might include the UK in the group of countries with a referendum, as a vote on the Constitutional 
Treaty was publicly discussed after an announcement by the Prime Minister, but in light of the defeats in 
France and the Netherlands, the referendum was later cancelled.  
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Apart from this systemic impact, we can test the expected effect of referendums 
more directly by comparing the standing during referendum campaigns and normal peri-
ods in those countries where a referendum took place. As Figure 4.2 shows, the standing 
of civil society actors is greatly augmented during referendum campaigns in all three of 
these countries. It increases from 5.1 percent to 13.3 percent in France, from 2.5 percent 
to 16.0 percent in the Netherlands, and from 9.2 percent to 36.6 percent in Switzerland. 
Direct-democratic votes ease the disadvantages civil society actors experience in the Eu-
ropean integration debate. Furthermore, and quite surprisingly, the standing of parties 
Note: Party and civil-society statements as a share of all debate statements in referendum cam-
paigns vs. routine periods (only countries with referendums held). Referendum campaigns are 
defined as the 60 days leading up to the vote. N for referendum campaigns/routine periods in 
France = 541/3,088; in the Netherlands = 125/1,902; and in Switzerland = 415/1,911. Referen-
dums held during the period under study: Constitutional Treaty in France and the Netherlands 
(May/June 2005); Schengen Accord (June 2005), extension of the free movement of persons to 
the new CEE member states (September 2005), and contribution to the EU cohesion funds (No-
vember 2006) in Switzerland.   
FIGURE 4.2. Impact of referendums on party and civil society standing 
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also increases strongly in two out of the three referendum countries. In France, the stand-
ing of parties goes up from 43.3 percent to 67.3 percent, in the Netherlands from 35.2 
percent to 54.8 percent, while it remains unchanged in Switzerland. Hence, not only civil 
society actors but also the parties gain from referendums in terms of standing. If conflict 
about Europe is at its highest level, as is the case during referendum campaigns, the par-
ties manage to increase their already high standing even further, thereby underscoring 
their central role in the politicization of Europe.  
Figure 4.3 looks at party-affiliated actors only and compares the standing of the 
individual party families. Moreover, a second bar indicates the electoral strength. The two 
values are highly correlated – the media generally seems to rely on vote shares as a guide-
line for allocating the scarce public attention to parties. As a result, the two electorally 
Notes: Statements of party families (as a share of all party-affiliated statements); N=6,549. 
Electoral strength as reflected in vote shares in national elections. Both media data and the elec-
toral vote shares are country-weighted. 
FIGURE 4.3. Standing of party families in the European integration debate 
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strongest party families, the Social Democrats and the Christian Democrats/Conserva-
tives account for almost three-quarters of all partisan statements. By contrast, potential 
fundamental Eurosceptics at the fringes of the party system have difficulties making 
themselves heard. At 2.3 percent, the standing of the Communists and Left Socialists is 
only marginal, while Populist/Extreme Right parties account at least for a respectable 
10.2 percent of all partisan statements.  
Again, what is the effect of referendums on the standing of the different party 
families? As Figure 4.4. shows, the standing of fringe parties increases in all three coun-
tries during referendum campaigns. This holds for the Radical Left, partly for the Greens, 
but is most pronounced for the Populist/Radical Right. In return, the standing of the main-
stream party families decreases in these countries or, in a few cases, remains more or less 
 
 
Note: Statements by the Radical Left, the Greens, and the Populist Right as a share of all party-
affiliated statements in referendum campaigns vs. routine periods (countries with referendums 
only). N for referendum campaigns/routine periods in France = 419/1643; in the Netherlands = 
93/930; in Switzerland = 211/888. 
FIGURE 4.4. Impact of referendums on the standing of fringe parties 
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unchanged (not shown in the figure). Hence, parties generally benefit from increased pub-
lic visibility during referendum campaigns and, of those, the potentially Eurosceptic make 
the most of this situation. As a result, conflict within the party system increases during 
referendum periods. However, as already mentioned, what seriously limits the politiciza-
tion of Europe by means of referendums is that they are exceptional events. And the 
stronger the opposition that governments expect to face, the more they will be reluctant 
to call a referendum.  
 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter provided an overview of the public debate on European integration by look-
ing at the fundamental dynamics, major issues and relevant participants. The debate is 
primarily driven by extraordinary, but predictable institutional events at the European and 
national level, which are initiated by public authorities. This further reinforces the usual 
predominance of executives and the parties in public debates, while it aggravates the lack 
of civil society participation. Without doubt, and contrary to what some scholars have 
claimed, the findings strongly suggest that contestation over Europe does not take place 
on the streets and that protest politics plays a marginal role at best. 
Party-affiliated politicians are responsible for every second statement, and while 
public authorities are also relevant in terms of actor standing, it is not where one should 
turn to when looking for potential opposition against Europe. Political parties not only 
have the strength but also the motivation to oppose and to politicize the “government 
issue” of European integration. Hence, in the subsequent chapter I will again focus in 
more detail on this particularly relevant group of actors. 
As shown, the occasional direct democratic referendums serve to some extent as 
a counterweight as they broaden the range of actors that engages in the debate. However, 
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it is not civil society actors but parties that benefit the most from direct-democratic insti-
tutions. At these “flashpoints” (Hooghe and Marks 2009, 20) of the politicization of Eu-
rope, the parties, particularly including the fringe parties, manage to absorb the largest 
share of the additionally generated public attention. Thereby, the parties further 
strengthen the predominance they already have during routine periods.  
Although referendums lend a strong impetus to the European integration debate, 
their role in the politicization of Europe is at the same time limited as they take place only 
infrequently and the decision whether to call a referendum is usually at the discretion of 
national governments. The sole exception in that regard is Switzerland, where direct-
democratic votes can be initiated by any political group with sufficient resources. As a 
result, they are held on a quite regular basis. In other countries, however, any actor at-
tempting to politicize Europe in a sustained manner needs to be able to also raise the heat 
on Europe during the long periods without referendums. It is thus a political issue that is 
strongly shaped by institutional events initiated and controlled by national governments 
and the European Union. Actors from the partisan arena with their strong standing in the 
European integration debate have the largest potential to succeed in this difficult task.  

  
CHAPTER 5  
The structure of European integration orientations 
Who are the supporters of European integration, which political actors oppose it, and how 
can we explain these attitudes? The present chapter elaborates on these fundamental ques-
tions. The answers are, as will be shown, less straightforward than typically assumed. In 
line with the general argument of this study, the approach taken in this chapter is moti-
vated by the belief that European integration is a truly multi-faceted issue and should also 
be treated as such in the analysis and, moreover, by the claim that ideology plays a crucial, 
although complex, role in the politicization of Europe. As a consequence, we will go 
beyond the prominent notion that European attitudes take the form of an inverted U-curve, 
which describes the simple fact that politicians at the fringes of the political spectrum 
and/or in opposition are generally Eurosceptic, while mainstream actors are mostly sup-
portive.  
Specifically, this chapter will look at attitudes about the specific European inte-
gration sub-issues, namely deepening, enlargement, social regulation and market making. 
If European integration were truly multidimensional, we should observe distinct patterns 
of how elite orientations are shaped towards each of them. This would go unnoticed if we 
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were only to look at attitudes to Europe in general, as is done in most other studies. More-
over, in addition to describing the patterns the chapter will investigate which factors are 
actually causing them. The three main theoretical models discussed in the literature to 
explain the structuring of European integration orientations will be systematically tested, 
and we will see whether the claim that traditional ideological divides most powerfully 
shape European integration finds empirical support.  
The empirical part of this chapter, following a brief section that introduces the 
three competing theoretical models, is structured as follows. First, the geopolitical model 
(postulating that European integration orientations mainly vary along the lines of nation-
ality) is contrasted with the expectation that the bulk of variation is explained by differ-
ences between domestic social groups (as argued by both the institutional-strategic and 
the ideological models). This analysis includes all political actors participating in the pub-
lic debate – parties, as well as other political actors such as governments, economic in-
terest groups, or social movement organizations. The next section focuses on political 
parties. The supplementary information available for this particular group of actors allows 
distinguishing between the hypothesized effects of the institutional-strategic and the ide-
ological models. Further, it is possible to test specific variants of the ideological model 
and to see precisely whether and how European integration orientations are structured by 
both the cultural and the economic axis of the two-dimensional political space. Briefly, 
the results will show that the observed inverted U-curve pattern for general European 
integration orientations is in fact the outcome of the interplay of distinct underlying fac-
tors that differentially shape the orientations towards each of the four integration sub-
issues. In addition, the cultural axis of the political space proved to have a consistent and 
significant impact across all sub-issues. This complex, yet systematic pattern underscores 
the multi-faceted nature of European integration as well as the critical impact of existing 
ideological divides.  
 The structure of European integration orientations 87 
THREE MODELS TO EXPLAIN EUROPEAN INTEGRATION ORIENTATIONS 
There are essentially three theoretical propositions concerning how elite orientations to-
wards European integration are structured (Bartolini 2005, 321–6; also see Marks, Wil-
son, and Ray 2002; Steenbergen and Marks 2004, 4–10). The geopolitical model claims 
that European integration attitudes are mainly related to the nationality of a particular 
actor. Hence, all actors from a particular country would have similar orientations regard-
ing Europe, be it for the same economic, cultural or political reasons. The institutional-
strategic model assumes that attitudes to Europe are mainly a question of whether a po-
litical actor is in government or in opposition. Finally, the ideological model postulates 
that European integration orientations are structured along the basic lines of domestic 
political conflict and therefore influenced by group interests and ideology. This is in line 
with the general argument of this study. I will present each of these models and the cor-
responding expectations.   
 
Europe and national features – The geopolitical model 
European integration is a process where individual nation states voluntarily pool sover-
eignty at the supranational level. Traditionally, such developments beyond the nation 
state have been the subject of international relations theories. These theories focus on the 
nation-state as the basic unit of analysis and emphasize as crucial explanatory factors a 
country’s national interest and power, its economic preferences, its national institutions, 
or its collective identity and culture in general. The geopolitical model postulates that 
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European integration attitudes are primarily shaped by such varying national context con-
ditions.28   
Many scholars see culture as an important source of national differences. Díez 
Medrano (2003) argues that the widespread Euroscepticism in the UK has its roots in the 
country’s imperial past, which created among the population a strong sense of being dif-
ferent and impeded their identification with Europe. As a result, the fear of losing the 
national identity and culture in the course of the integration process is much more preva-
lent in the UK than, for example, in Germany where the Nazi past and the country’s 
damaged image after World War II led to both an idealistic and pragmatic endorsement 
of European integration. Spiering (2004, 146) also acknowledges the deep cultural foun-
dations of Euroscepticism in the UK and argues that this potential is readily taken up and 
amplified by both an adversarial political system (due to the first-past-the-post voting) 
and a highly competitive media system that is dominated by the tabloid press.  
Deeply rooted politico-cultural Euroscepticism has also been diagnosed for non-
member state Switzerland (e.g. Church 2004; Kriesi 2007). European integration is, ac-
cording to a prominent argument in the literature, perceived as a threat to the three core 
political institutions of Switzerland – federalism, neutrality, and direct democracy. Ac-
cording to Theiler (2004), members of the largest linguistic group in Switzerland, the 
Swiss Germans, are particularly receptive to such fears as they are caught in an identity 
double-bind. As Swiss, they are part of a multicultural state that lacks a single national 
culture, held together only by its political institutions; as Swiss-Germans they cultivate 




28 Note that the geopolitical model not only includes realist motives of state power and national security, 
but all kinds of national interests, be they political, economic or cultural. 
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their distinctiveness from a larger German-speaking culture. This gives rise to a highly 
fragile identity that is vulnerable to both institutional change and national boundary low-
ering. Both of these dynamics would be reinforced by accession to the European Union. 
The author argues that this is the source of the widespread opposition to integration in the 
German-speaking part of Switzerland.  
Besides culture, economic context conditions are also seen as essential factors in 
explaining national variations in European integration attitudes. Based on the “varieties 
of capitalism” approach, attitudes in a market-liberal welfare state like the UK should 
generally be more skeptical of a social market Europe (Brinegar, Jolly, and Kitschelt 
2004, 79). By contrast, one might expect stronger opposition to a neoliberal Europe (and 
more support for a common social model) from Continental welfare states, especially in 
the presence of high unemployment, such as in Germany and France. Indeed, in France 
calls for social regulation, public service protection and economic government at the Eu-
ropean level are not the exclusive domain of the left, but part of the general political 
culture (Milner 2004, 64). In Germany, despite overall support for European integration, 
there is a widespread feeling of unease with regard to increasing foreign labor competition 
(Díez Medrano 2003, Chapter 2). 
 
Europe as a domestic issue – The ideological and the strategic models 
The alternative and more recent view of European integration not as conflict between 
different national interests, but as a source of domestic political contestation is put for-
ward by the comparative politics literature. Here, European integration is seen as “do-
mestic politics by other means”, as Marks and Wilson (2000, 459) put it. Within a coun-
try, the impact of a particular European policy on different social groups varies, and per-
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ceptions of the pros and cons of European integration are expected to diverge. Accord-
ingly, one would expect considerable variance in European integration attitudes among 
different social groups and their political representatives as conflict over European inte-
gration is very much like conflict over traditional domestic political issues: conflicting 
interests, values, and identities of different social entities are pitted against each other.  
Well in line with this perspective, the ideological model argues that the compara-
tively new issue of European integration is being incorporated into existing patterns of 
domestic contestation. In Chapter 2, I argued in detail why and how this embedding is 
expected to take place. Based on Tsebelis and Garrett (2000), Steenbergen and Marks 
(2004) consider the possibility that European integration attitudes are structured along the 
economic left-right axis, as contrasting views on common economic regulations at the 
European level divide the left from the right. In contrast, Kriesi and colleagues (2008) 
argue that Europe is part of a new and primarily cultural conflict over denationalization 
and therefore orientations are mainly shaped by the cultural TAN-GAL axis of the polit-
ical space. Yet these two propositions are not mutually exclusive. European integration 
orientations are, I argued, neither reducible to an economic nor a cultural dimension, but 
are in fact structured by both axes of the political space – although the cultural axis is 
expected to dominate. Such a view is also suggested by Hooghe, Marks and Wilson 
(2004). More specifically, I expect that the structure of European integration orientations 
is conditional on the specific integration sub-issue in question. If economic aspects of 
European integration are at stake, attitudes should be strongly shaped by the economic 
left-right axis: The closer a party is to the economic right pole, the more it should oppose 
social regulation and at the same time support market making. By contrast, if politico-
cultural aspects of European integration are affected, attitudes should be primarily struc-
tured by the cultural axis: The closer a party is to the cultural TAN-pole, the more it is 
expected to oppose enlargement and deepening.  
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Domestic politics, however, are also affected by strategic considerations of vote 
or office seeking politicians. A common argument in the literature is that government-
opposition dynamics are decisive in shaping party attitudes to Europe. This is the funda-
mental claim made by the institutional-strategic model (Mair 2001; Sitter 2002; Taggart 
1998). It assumes that it is not programmatic reasons but strategic competition among 
parties that is the most important factor in explaining European integration orientations. 
In order to avoid possible intra-party tensions, mainstream parties take a general, if 
largely tacit, pro-European stance. By contrast, irrespective of their ideological color, mi-
nor parties take a distinctly Eurosceptic position to openly challenge the mainstream par-
ties. Hence, in this view, opposition to European integration is less a substantive, ideo-
logically grounded attitude but more a strategic choice of minor parties in their quest for 
electoral gains.29 
 
ORIENTATIONS TOWARDS A DISENTANGLED EUROPEAN ISSUE 
The empirical part of this chapter is divided into two. First, the orientations of all political 
actors participating in the public debate are presented by country and by type of political 
actor. This and the subsequent multiple regression allows the juxtaposing of the geopo-
litical model, which postulates that the bulk of variation is to be found between countries, 
with the alternative of variation primarily between the political representatives of differ-




29 Minor parties are commonly understood either in terms of government participation, votes, or ideology. 
Hence, parties in opposition (either continuously or temporarily), small parties, or extreme left and ex-
treme right parties might be more likely to adopt a Eurosceptic position (Marks, Wilson, and Ray 2002, 
588). 
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ent social groups. Since it is impossible in this set-up to distinguish between factors re-
lated to the ideological and the strategic-institutional models (both are responsible for 
variation between different types of political actors), a second, refined analysis of party 
positions is then conducted. Here, we will not only be able to evaluate the two distinct 
models of domestic political contestation, but the additional information available for the 
parties also allows us to test whether and how precisely European integration orientations 
are structured by both the cultural and the economic axis of the two-dimensional political 
space.  
 
Conflict between countries or contestation between domestic social groups? 
How do attitudes to Europe differ depending on the actors’ country of origin? Figure 5.1 
presents average orientations of the political elites in the six countries as expressed in the 
public debate. The graph at the top shows that national peculiarities exert little influence 
on overall European integration elite orientations. The variation between the different 
countries is small, and orientations in all countries are slightly supportive. However, there 
is significantly more national variation if we look at individual integration sub-issues, as 
shown in the two graphs at the bottom of Figure 5.1. As for the politico-cultural integra-
tion sub-issues, the UK adopts the comparatively most negative position towards deep-
ening having a highly ambivalent value of +0.06. This demonstrates that the deeply cul-
turally rooted British Euroscepticism finds expression in elite attitudes. Yet it does not 
translate into unqualified opposition to all things European – attitudes to enlargement are 
not affected, but are, by contrast, highly positive. Moreover, while the UK adopts a more 
skeptical stance on deepening than on enlargement, it is the opposite way in all the other 
countries, which are much more supportive of deepening than of enlargement. This pat-
tern reflects the inherent tension between deepening and widening (Szczerbiak and Tag-




Orientations towards integration sub-issues: 
 
Notes: The average positions can vary between -1.0 (only negative statements) and + 1.0 (only 
positive statements). The reported average positions are salience-weighted. AT = Austria, UK = 
United Kingdom, FR = France, DE = Germany, NL = Netherlands, CH = Switzerland. 
FIGURE 5.1. National orientations towards European integration 
 
 
lowering within Europe and European boundary extension. Apparently, for those coun-
tries favoring an ever closer union that goes beyond mere economic integration the ques-
tion of where to draw Europe’s external borders and to whom access to the EU should be 
granted is much more contested.  
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In the case of the two economic integration modes, national variation is generally 
higher. Here, France stands out; it is the country most supportive of the social regulation 
sub-issue, and at the same time most opposed to market making. The orientations of Ger-
many, a country also suffering high unemployment, are similar, although less pro-
nounced. The only country that opposes social regulation at the European level is the UK 
with its liberal welfare state. These findings are well in line with the explanations dis-
cussed above that emphasize national economic contexts when accounting for national 
differences. 
Our expectations are not met in the case of Switzerland where elite attitudes do 
not reflect the culturally rooted Eurosceptic potential. Overall, they are favorable. This 
may be due to the fact that the widespread Euroscepticism of the masses is not shared by 
the majority of the political elite, which is generally supportive of European integration 
(Theiler 2004, 637-368) – enthusiastically in the 1990s, more pragmatically thereafter. 
But then the puzzle remains whether and in what conditions elite attitudes adjust to public 
opinion, as in the case of the UK, or not as in Switzerland. 
The European integration orientations of the various actor groups involved in the 
public debate are reported in Figure 5.2. In the following, I discuss each of them in turn. 
EU and domestic state actors are the driving forces behind the integration process, and it 
is therefore unsurprising that this group is on average supportive of European integration 
overall as well as of each of the four integration sub-issues. However, there is quite some 
country-specific variation among domestic executives, reflecting different national inter-
ests and contexts (not shown in the figure). In the case of deepening, the UK executive is 
the least supportive national government (+0.18), while the French and German execu-
tives are the most committed (+0.82 and +0.80, respectively). When it comes to enlarge-
ment, in contrast, the UK executive is the most supportive national
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Overall orientations: 
Orientations towards integration sub-issues: 
Notes: The reported average positions are salience weighted. Country weights applied. EU = 
EU actors, n_state = domestic state actors, rl_com = Radical Left, green = Green parties, 
socdem = Social Democrats, lib = Liberals, cd_con = Christian Democrats and Conservatives, 
rpr = Populist/Extreme Right, union = labor unions, employ = employer organizations, pub_int 
= public interest groups, exp = experts. The reported average positions are salience-weighted.  
FIGURE 5.2. Group orientations towards European integration 
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government (+0.41), while the German, Austrian, and French executives adopt ambiva-
lent positions (-0.03, 0.04, and 0.10, respectively). As for the economic integration sub-
issues, the only national government opposing social regulation is the UK (-0.30), and 
both the French and German executives oppose market making (-0.58 and -0.37, respec-
tively). These findings highlight the importance of the geopolitical model in explaining 
national governments’ orientations, but this actor group is exceptional in this regard.  
European integration, particularly the common market, has been a salient issue 
for organized interests for decades and well before the mass politicization of Europe 
started in the 1990s. Advocating labor and capital owner interests, respectively, labor 
unions and employers/business associations occupy the two opposing sides of the eco-
nomic left-right divide. However, this clash of interests only becomes manifest in their 
antagonistic views on market making, as can be seen from the two graphs at the bottom 
of Figure 5.3. For the three other European integration sub-issues, including social regu-
lation, labor unions and business interests both hold similar and supportive orientations. 
Accordingly, when it comes to European integration, the two adversaries wage their fight 
in a relatively limited field.  
Public interest groups are a heterogeneous category and their visibility in the pub-
lic debate on European integration is extremely low, as shown in Chapter 4. Negative 
statements by anti-European groups, such as the Swiss far-right grass-roots organization 
AUNS (Campaign for an Independent and Neutral Switzerland), and supporting state-
ments by the various pro-European movements are roughly balanced. The global justice 
movement is overall ambivalent due to its strong opposition to market making and its 
diffuse support of social regulation – an attitude similar to the Radical Left parties. Inter-
estingly, the distinct negative average orientation of public interest groups vis-à-vis en-
largement is the result of the Catholic Church’s unease with the accession of Turkey and 
its related demand for a reference to the Christian heritage of Europe to be placed in the 
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Constitutional Treaty – a demand also supported by several Christian-democratic and 
Conservative parties, as will be shown shortly.  
 
Party families and European integration 
We now turn to the most important political actors in the European integration 
debate, the parties. In short, party attitudes to European integration are distinct and well 
structured. Both party families at the fringes of the political spectrum, the Radical Left 
and the Populist/Extreme Right, have strong negative overall attitudes to Europe, as 
shown in Figure 5.2. Parties from the center, by contrast, are in favor of or at least am-
bivalent to European integration. This characteristic pattern has been termed an “inverted 
U-curve” in the literature on Euroscepticism (Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson 2004, 122–3). 
However, once we disentangle European integration and look at each of the four integra-
tion sub-issues separately, the inverted U-curve is not generally applicable, but only ob-
servable for one of them, as the graphs at the bottom of Figure 5.2 show. It only exists in 
the case of deepening, with the other sub-issues being structured in a different manner. 
The other politico-cultural integration mode, enlargement, shows a left-right pat-
tern: All parties of the right, the Liberals, the Christian Democrats and Conservatives, as 
well as the Populist/Extreme Right are opposed to further enlargement, whereas all parties 
of the left, including the Radical Left, are supportive. From a purely economic perspec-
tive, this is a puzzling finding, because one would expect (economically) rightist parties 
to support a larger common market. Clearly, in the case of enlargement there is more at 
stake than simply economic motives.  
Economic motives are strongly at work, however, in the case of market making, 
where again a left-right pattern is observable, but this time in the reverse direction. While 
all leftist parties oppose market making, parties of the right support these efforts – with 
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the exception of the Populist/Extreme Right. One might also interpret this finding as a 
combination of a left-right pattern with an inverted U-curve. Finally, all party families 
except the Populist/Extreme Right evaluate social regulation efforts towards a social mar-
ket Europe positively, which makes it a valence issue among mainstream parties. Yet in 
the absence of truly effective policies in this field (Leibfried 1994; Leibfried and Pierson 
1995), this may reflect a lot of cheap talk.  
These are the general patterns for the parties, but what about the individual party 
families? The Radical Left party family comprises parties to the left of the Social Demo-
crats, which are still strongly mobilizing on the traditional class cleavage. These parties 
either have a Communist origin, resulting from an early split of the working class move-
ment (Bartolini 2000), such as the French Communist Party (PCF), or they started as new 
socialist alternatives to the established left parties in the 1950s and later, such as the Al-
ternative Left in Switzerland. Most members of the Radical Left party family are interna-
tionalist and therefore in principle pro-European. However, as they resolutely advocate 
“another Europe”30 they are firmly opposed to the current trajectory of European integra-
tion which they see primarily as a – more or less incurable – neoliberal project aimed at 
creating a “Europe of the markets”. Consequently, as shown in Figure 5.2, they firmly 
and unanimously oppose any further deepening and market making, but at the same time 
they embrace the idea of a social Europe and support enlargement.  
The Green parties have fundamentally changed their attitudes to Europe in the 
last decade (for Austria, see Pelinka 2004). Still strongly Eurosceptic in the 1990s, the 




30 Statement of the European Left, Some remarks concerning the creation of the Party of the European 
Left. URL: http://www.european-left.org/english/about_the_el/introduction [2010/07/01].  
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Greens have become the strongest advocates of European integration in the 2000s, as 
presented in Figure 5.3.31 However, whereas they support further deepening, enlargement 
and a social Europe, they oppose further market making in line with the other left-of-the 
middle party families, as shown in Figure 5.2.  
The Social Democrats historically have ambivalent attitudes to European integra-
tion. Many members of the party family initially opposed their country’s accession to the 
European Union, and while all officially supported the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, some 
of them suffered deep internal divisions on this issue, in some cases even leading to the 
formation of splinter groups such as Jean-Pierre Chevènement’s Mouvement de Citoyens 
(MDC) in France. How can we explain this wavering of the Social Democratic party 
family? Marks and Wilson (Marks and Wilson 2000, 442–8) argue that a strong Social 
Democracy was likely to be opposed to European integration because they simply had a 
lot to lose: Their national achievements in the class conflict, such as a strong welfare 
state, Keynesianism or neo-corporatism, risked coming under increased strain by the 
tougher competition in the single European market. However, over the years EU mem-
bership became consolidated, leaving the single market was perceived as less and less 
feasible, and globalization increasingly undermined national autonomy. At some point in 
this development, even strongly domestically positioned Social Democratic parties 
started to endorse the idea of regulated capitalism at the European level. This meant no 
longer opting for less, but instead pushing for more integration, which is reflected in the 
enduring supportive stance since the beginning of the 1990s (Figure 5.3) .  




31 This finding may be slightly exaggerated by our country selection as it includes no Scandinavian coun-
tries, where Greens still hold Eurosceptic positions. Something similar could be said about Ireland (Gil-
land Lutz 2004). 
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However, the dilemma for the Social Democrats is still present if we look at their 
attitudes to the four integration sub-issues in the public debate in Figure 5.2. While they 
fully endorse deepening and enlargement, the class cleavage still has an impact on their 
orientations towards economic integration. Most Social Democratic parties oppose mar-




Notes: Calculated from party statements in national election campaigns in the six countries un-
der study. The time periods in the figure are chosen in order to include for each country at least 
one election. There is no data available for the 1980s.  rl_com = Radical Left, green = Green 
parties, socdem = Social Democrats, lib = Liberals, cd_con = Christian Democrats and Con-
servatives, rpr = Populist/Extreme Right. 
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of more regulation at the European level. Only the British Labour party does not fit this 
pattern as it takes exactly opposite positions on both integration sub-issues (not shown in 
the figure), clearly a country-specific stance.  
The church-state cleavage, which was originally triggered by the Reformation and 
opposed the Conservatives to the Christian Democrats, has been largely pacified in the 
course of the increasing secularization and the decline of (institutionalized) religiosity in 
Western European societies since the 1960s (e.g. Kriesi et al. 2008, 25; Norris and Ingle-
hart 2004). Therefore, this study treats them as belonging to one single party family. 
Christian Democrats and Conservatives welcome the positive effects of European inte-
gration on economic prosperity, albeit the Conservatives with a stronger neoliberal bent 
(Hix and Lord 1997, 29–32; Marks and Wilson 2000, 451–8). Nonetheless, in the litera-
ture it has been argued that some differences between Christian-democratic and Con-
servative parties continue to exist. The fact that transnational Christian-democratic net-
works decisively shaped the trajectory of European integration (Kaiser 2007) and the 
equally supranational character of the Catholic Church both should result in very support-
ive Christian-democratic attitudes vis-à-vis European integration. By contrast, the Con-
servatives’ national origins should lead them to adopt a much more skeptical stance.  
Yet the empirical results suggest that by now these two groups of parties no longer 
differ systematically as they may have done in the past. The on average highly ambivalent 
overall European integration orientations of the Christian-democratic and Conservative 
parties in the six countries under study (Figure 5.2) are not only a result of the historically 
skeptical attitudes of the British Conservatives (-0.44), but also of the two German Chris-
tian-democratic parties, the CDU and the CSU (-0.34 and -0.42, respectively).  
If we look at the orientations towards the four integration sub-issues, the source 
of this unexpectedly strong Euroscepticism of this party family becomes apparent. It is 
opposition to enlargement that causes the Euroscepticism by the Christian-democratic 
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and Conservative parties. They all have negative orientations towards this integration 
mode, the only exception being the Austrian ÖVP which adopts a positive, but still highly 
ambivalent stance (0.08).32 In contrast, the second politico-cultural mode, deepening, is 
supported by all representatives of this party family, with the only exception of the fun-
damentally Eurosceptic British Conservatives. As for the two economic integration 
modes, average orientations of the Christian-democratic and Conservative party family 
are very positive vis-à-vis the social regulation sub-issue, and moderately vis-à-vis mar-
ket making. The latter sub-issue is, however, opposed by quite a few representatives – the 
French UMP, the Dutch CDA and even the British Conservatives; the German CSU is 
highly ambivalent.   
The Liberals are the other large party family of the moderate right. Most generally, 
liberalism finds its expression in economic as well as in social and political freedom, and 
representatives of this party family emphasize the two aspects to varying degrees (Kirch-
ner 1988, 484). European integration, one could argue, serves both ends, and therefore it 
comes as no surprise that they are – just behind the Greens – the second most pro-Euro-
pean party family in terms of overall orientations. In line with their ideology, they support 
market making and further deepening. However, they are divided on their attitude to en-
largement. The French UDP holds a salient and distinct negative position (-0.98), while 
the German FDP, the radical liberal Dutch 66 and the British Liberal Democrats are – 
quite tacitly (less than 5 statements) – in support of enlargement (+1.0, +0.28 and +1.0, 
respectively); the Dutch VVD is ambivalent (+0.05).  




32 For the British Conservatives, enlargement holds marginal relevance; as a result, only two statements 
in our data exist on this. Yet they are both positive. This may be an indicator of the party’s strategy of 
promoting widening in order to prevent further deepening.  
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At the far right of the political spectrum in Western Europe, basically two types 
of parties can be distinguished (Ignazi 2003, 20–34): the traditional Extreme Right, de-
scending from historical fascism, and the New Populist right, which is a product of the 
“new politics” cleavage. While the former has been a relatively marginal phenomenon 
(with the exception of the electorally successful Italian MSI), the New Populist Right has 
significantly increased its vote share in many Western European countries since the 
1990s. In the countries under study, all relevant representatives of the Populist and Ex-
treme Right party family belong to this latter sub-type – the Dutch LPV and its political 
heir, the PVV; the Austrian FPÖ including its splinter group the BZÖ; the French FN; 
and the Swiss SVP. Unlike the traditional Extreme Right, these new Populist Right parties 
distance themselves from crude biological racism but engage in a “differentialist nativist” 
and culturalist discourse, and they are supportive of democracy – some are even in favor 
of enhancing direct-democratic participation (Bornschier 2010, 33).  
Bornschier (2010, 35) identifies three distinctive features of New Populist Right 
parties: First, their party organization is hierarchically structured, which allows them to 
quickly adjust their programmatic positions for strategic reasons. Second, they engage in 
a populist anti-establishment discourse. This rhetorical separation of the political elite 
from the common folk fosters the emergence of a new collective identity among their 
heterogeneous electorate. Third, they adopt an extreme position near the TAN-pole of the 
cultural axis of party competition, whereas their position on the economic axis may vary 
considerably.  
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The nationalist ideology of the Populist/Extreme right, which emphasizes national 
identity, culture, and sovereignty, is clearly at odds with European integration.33 This is 
suggested by the negative overall orientations towards European integration as shown in 
Figure 5.2. In fact, every representative of this party family in the countries under study 
is opposed, without exception. Moreover, the Populist/Extreme Right is also the only 
party family that is on average opposed to all four integration sub-issues, including mar-
ket making. This latter finding at first sight contradicts Kitschelt’s (2007, 1181–4) “win-
ning formula” thesis, which expects the populist right to endorse neoliberal policies. 
However, one could convincingly argue that market making is an aspect of European 
integration where the neoliberal and Eurosceptic orientations of the Populist Right clash. 
And if forced to decide between them, the Populist Right opts for Euroscepticism rather 
than economic liberalization. This underscores its fundamental and consistent opposition 
to European integration. 
 
A joint evaluation by multiple regression 
Multiple regression allows for a more systematic assessment of how strongly country-
specific and actor-specific features shape European integration orientations. The results 
are shown in Table 5.1.34 To compare the explanatory power of the two sets of dummies 




33 Occasionally, these parties promote an exclusive pan-European identity based on an alleged supremacy 
of European civilization or by claiming to defend the Christian heritage of Europe against the threat of 
Islamization. However, this pro-European rhetoric never transformed into actual European integration 
support.  
34 For similar analyses of general European integration orientations, but restricted to the parties, see 
Marks et al. (2002); Statham et al. (2010); Statham and Koopmans (2009). 
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belonging to the geopolitical and the domestic-conflict models, respectively, the omega-
squared (ω2) is also reported. Omega-squared is an effect size measure. Unlike eta-
squared (η2) it is an unbiased estimator of the explained variance in the 
population. The different Ns in the four regressions are a consequence of the varying 
salience of the four sub-issues in the public debate – while almost every political actor 
took a public stance on deepening, many actors did not engage in the debate on social 
regulation and hence did not communicate their attitude to this sub-issue. 
In terms of explained variance of overall European integration orientations, as 
presented in the first column of Table 5.1, the actor-type dummies perform considerably 
better than the country dummies (ω2 of 0.35 compared to 0.05). As for single coefficients, 
the inverted U-curve among the party families is visible: The Radical Left as well as the 
Populist/Extreme Right are significantly more opposed to European integration than do-
mestic state actors, the reference category. Moreover, the Christian-democratic and the 
Conservative party family – although less distinctive – is also significantly less pro-Eu-
ropean; the same holds for the labor unions and the public interest groups.  
However, as argued before, looking only at general European integration orienta-
tions, as is usually done by scholars, obscures more than it reveals. Therefore, Table 5.1 
also reports the regression results for each sub-issue. In the case of deepening and en-
largement, the domestic-conflict model performs well (ω2 of 0.35 and 0.40, respectively). 
For deepening, the individual coefficients correspond to the inverted U-curve pattern 
among the party families. However, as we have already seen, in the case of enlargement 
a left-right pattern is at work: The more a party family is to the right, the less it is in favor 
of further enlargement, with the Christian-democratic and Conservative as well as the 
Populist/Extreme Right party families all being significantly more negative
  
TABLE 5.1. OLS regression of debate actors’ European integration orientations 
  Europ. integration 
overall 
Politico-cultural integration sub-issues Economic integration sub-issues 
 Deepening Enlargement Social regulation Market making 
 Coeff. SE  ω2 Coeff. SE  ω2 Coeff. SE  ω2 Coeff. SE  ω2 Coeff. SE  ω2 
Actors (domestic state ref.):   0.35**   0.36**   0.40**   0.43**   0.07 
EU actors -0.04 0.26  0.04 0.39  0.28 0.37  0.66 0.35+  -0.34 0.48  
Communists/Left Socialists -0.90 0.25**  -1.21 0.32**  - -  0.43 0.45  -0.73 0.44  
Greens -0.13 0.21  -0.24 0.28  0.43 0.28  0.95 0.47+  - -  
Social Democrats -0.14 0.20  -0.01 0.26  0.13 0.25  0.36 0.23  -0.80 0.34*  
Liberals 0.07 0.21  0.14 0.27  -0.25 0.29  0.36 0.31  0.00 0.41  
Christ. Dem/Conservatives -0.64 0.18**  -0.46 0.25+  -0.71 0.24**  -0.07 0.31  -0.33 0.31  
Populist/Extreme Right -1.21 0.20**  -1.28 0.26**  -0.86 0.28**  -1.60 0.36**  -1.46 0.54*  
Labor unions -0.42 0.22+  -0.22 0.28  - -  0.95 0.47+  -0.83 0.44+  
Business organizations -0.29 0.20  -0.37 0.26  0.13 0.47  -0.15 0.35  -0.44 0.36  
Public interest groups -0.44 0.19**  -0.33 0.26  -0.19 0.27  -0.41 0.45  -0.64 0.48  
Experts -0.27 0.22  -0.62 0.29*  0.28 0.26  -0.05 0.27  -0.20 0.37  
Countries (France ref.):   0.05*   0.02   0.00   0.30**   0.12+ 
Austria 0.28 0.17  0.51 0.22*  0.00 0.22  -0.50 0.34  0.61 0.42  
United Kingdom 0.12 0.16  -0.02 0.21  0.18 0.30  -1.29 0.34**  0.45 0.40  
Germany 0.32 0.18+  0.23 0.23  0.13 0.24  -0.16 0.45  0.73 0.37+  
Netherlands 0.18 0.14  0.17 0.18  0.00 0.20  -0.18 0.29  0.67 0.35+  
Switzerland 0.49 0.14**  0.29 0.18  -0.01 0.36  0.23 0.23  1.18 0.34**  
European/intl. level 0.29 0.16+  0.35 0.22  -0.02 0.26  -0.53 0.25+  0.86 0.37*  
Constant 0.28 0.17  0.39 0.22+  0.08 0.23  0.57 0.24*  -0.18 0.34  
N 94   81   47   33   53   
R2 0.54    0.53    0.60    0.81    0.43    
Notes:  ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1. 
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than the reference category. For both politico-cultural sub-issues the explanatory power 
of the geopolitical model is close to zero. The UK has the lowest coefficient of all coun-
tries in the case of deepening, although it is not statistically significant. 
Turning to the two economic integration sub-issues in the last two main columns 
of Table 5.1, the two theoretical models perform at a more equal level. In the case of 
social regulation, the impact of both the actor-type dummies and the country dummies is 
statistically significant. As for single actor-type coefficients, the attitude of the Popu-
list/Extreme Right is significantly more negative than the reference category. Moreover, 
British actors have significantly stronger negative attitudes than French actors, the refer-
ence category. This finding supports the proposition that political actors from a liberal 
welfare state are more skeptical of regulations at the European level than actors from 
Continental welfare states. 
Market making is the only integration sub-issue where the geopolitical model per-
forms better than the domestic-conflict model, but only slightly. The explanatory power 
of both models is quite limited (ω2 of 0.07 for the domestic-conflict model, 0.12 for the 
geopolitical model). However, a left-right pattern is discernible, which is the opposite 
way round than in the case of enlargement: Social Democratic parties and the labor unions 
are significantly more skeptical than the reference category. Moreover, the Populist/Ex-
treme right parties are also significantly less in favor of market making. Finally, all coun-
tries are less opposed to European market making than France, the reference category; 
for Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland this is statistically significant. 
Hence, the descriptive findings as well as the regression results showed that there 
is no uniform structure across the four European integration sub-issues, as suggested by 
the inverted U-curve hypothesis. By contrast, and as hypothesized, elite orientations to-
wards each of the four different European integration sub-issues are structured in distinct 
ways, which demonstrates that politicians duly consider the multi-dimensionality of the 
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European integration issue when arguing about it. The inverted U-turn pattern among the 
parties was observable only in the case of deepening. In addition, we detected not only 
left-right patterns in a shifting direction, but also widespread case-wise Eurosceptic ori-
entations among the various mainstream actors. 
 
How Europe is embedded in the political space – Party positions revisited 
In the regression analysis in this final section, I use additional information on the location 
of the parties in the two-dimensional political space based on their statements in national 
election campaigns as well as data on their government-opposition status (for the calcu-
lation of the axis scores as well as a graphical illustration of this additional data, see 
Chapter 2, particularly Figure 2.1). This allows us to more precisely uncover the under-
lying factors that account for the patterns we have observed. The findings so far have 
suggested that, while variation based on nationality is quite limited, differences among 
actor groups account for the largest share of the variance in European integration elite 
orientations. Yet the different variants of the ideological model and the institutional-stra-
tegic model suggest different underlying causes of this actor-specific variation. In princi-
ple, government-opposition dynamics, ideological extremism, or the combined impact of 
both the economic and the cultural axis could each be the source of the inverted U-curve. 
However, only the latter is in line with the general argument of this study that the two-
dimensional political space shapes the politicization of Europe. If this is the case, it re-
mains to be seen whether the expectation that the cultural axis is dominating finds empir-
ical support. 
Table 5.2 reports the results of the separate OLS-regressions that were estimated for each 
of the four European integration sub-issues. The independent variables belonging to the 
ideological model are a party’s scores on the cultural TAN-GAL and the economic left-
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right axis of the political space, respectively, and the extremism variable. The two axis 
scores range from -1.0 to +1.0. The extremism variable is the squared Euclidian distance 
of a party from the average location in the center of the political space, and values there-
fore range from 0 (least extreme) to 1 (most extreme). The opposition variable testing for 
the institutional-strategic model is the duration a party was in opposition from 2002 until 
2006 and ranges from 0 (always in government) to 1 (always in opposition). Country 
dummies control for the effects of the individual countries.  
Contrasting the three theoretical models, the results show that the ideological var-
iables clearly outperform the opposition-party variable as well as the country dummies in 
terms of explained variance. This is indicated by the considerably higher and statistically 
significant values of ω2 for the ideological variables across all sub-issues. This confirms 
the findings above regarding the very limited impact of the geopolitical model, which I 
will therefore no longer address here. In addition, the even worse performance of the 
opposition-party variable is quite surprising – it has no statistically significant effect in 
all four regressions and, moreover, the direction of the effect is unstable.35 These findings 
corroborate the main conclusion by Marks et al. (2002) who relied in their analysis of 
data from an expert survey that the ideological location of a party has the strongest im-
pact.   
  




35 I tested various alternative operationalizations of the opposition variable, such as time in opposition for 
a ten-year period instead of the used five-year period, (less precise) dummies for being in opposition/in 
government in the 2000s, and a trichotomous variable with an additional intermediate value for being in 
opposition for a limited time during the 2000s only. However, none of these highly correlated alternative 
operationalizations was significant. 
  
TABLE 5.2. OLS regression of party positions on European integration 
  Politico-cultural integration sub-issues Economic integration sub-issues 
 Deepening Enlargement Social regulation Market making 
 Coeff. SE  ω2 Coeff. SE  ω2 Coeff.SE  ω2 Coeff. SE  ω2 
Ideology:   0.33**   0.41**   0.37**   0.17+ 
Cultural TAN-GAL 0.77 0.20**  1.01 0.28**  1.10 0.27**  1.34 0.45*  
Economic left-right 0.38 0.25  -0.18 0.47  0.80 0.35+  1.23 0.52*  
Extremism -0.92 0.39*  -0.13 0.62  -1.69 0.62*  -0.33 0.70  
Opposition party -0.28 0.23 0.01 -0.11 0.34 0.00 0.25 0.25 0.00 0.44 0.44 0.00 
Countries:   0.00   0.04   0.17+   0.14 
Austria -0.01 0.28  -0.18 0.38  -0.35 0.33  0.75 0.61  
United Kingdom 0.16 0.28  0.78 0.50  -1.30 0.36**  0.65 0.48  
Germany 0.51 0.24*  0.36 0.30  0.09 0.25  1.27 0.42*  
Netherlands 0.08 0.21  0.29 0.26  -0.23 0.25  0.75 0.38+  
Switzerland 0.06 0.28  - -  -0.02 0.34  1.18 0.52*  
(France ref.)             
Constant 0.28 0.24  -0.39 0.35  1.22 0.28**  -0.32 0.44  
N 35   21   18   20   
R2 0.68**    0.71*    0.88**   0.72*    
Notes: Both axis scores range from -1.0 to +1.0 (see Chapter 2 for the calculation of the scores based on general issue positions in election campaigns). 
Extremism is measured as the squared Euclidian distance from the average location in the political space and ranges from 0 to 1. Opposition party is the 
time a party was in opposition in 2002–2006 and ranges from 0 (never in opposition) to 1.0 (always in opposition). Significance levels: ** p<0.01, * 
p<0.05, + p<0.1.
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How is it possible that opposition status has no significant impact, despite several 
studies claiming the opposite? Indeed, if we only look at bivariate correlations between 
opposition status and European orientations, we find statistically significant correlations 
in the expected negative direction in two out of the four sub-issues, namely in the case of 
deepening and market making (deepening: -0.42*, enlargement: -0.16, social regulation: 
+0.06, market making: -0.37+). However, these effects disappear when controlling for a 
party’s location in the political space as done in the regressions. This suggests that it is 
more the ideological characteristic of opposition parties that is responsible for their Eu-
roscepticism and not their opposition status per se. Moderate and mainstream opposition 
parties are not more affected by Euroscepticism than parties in government. Interestingly, 
also in the case of EU-issue voting, de Vries (2010, 109–10) finds no statistically signif-
icant effect of opposition status when controlling for ideological extremity.  
If we take a closer look at the variables related to the ideological model, several 
findings stand out. First, the cultural axis has a statistically significant, strong positive 
linear effect on European integration orientations, irrespective of the particular integra-
tion sub-issue at stake. The more culturally liberal a party, the more it favors not only 
deepening and enlargement, but also the economic integration sub-issues of social regu-
lation and market making.  
Second, the economic axis also has an impact, but it is weaker. Not only does the 
size of the coefficient change considerably, but also the direction. However, the economic 
line of conflict has a statistically significant impact on orientations towards the two eco-
nomic integration sub-issues social regulation and market making. What is surprising in 
this regard is that the relation between both economic integration sub-issues and the eco-
nomic left-right axis is positive, meaning that the more to the economic right a party is, 
the more it is supportive. While this is in line with our expectations in the case of market 
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making, it contradicts them in the case of social regulation, where we would have ex-
pected the parties to be the more favorable the more they are to the economic left. One 
reason for this finding might be the fact that this sub-issue is at the moment hardly salient 
and little contested, and therefore most parties take a supportive stance towards it.  
Third, ideological extremism, meaning a location distant to the center of the po-
litical space irrespective of the direction, has a significant negative impact in the case of 
deepening and social regulation. Hence, fringe parties in general are more likely to oppose 
integration as suggested by the notion of the “inverted U-curve” to explain European in-
tegration attitudes. Nevertheless, this effect is found only in two of the four sub-issues, 
and it is by far not the strongest factor shaping European integration orientations. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Elite orientations towards European integration, this chapter showed, are systematically 
related to ideological core concerns. Other frequently discussed factors such as govern-
ment-opposition status and nationality only have secondary relevance, if anything. While 
we found that the geopolitical model had at least some significant impact in the case of 
the economic integration sub-issues, the institutional-strategic model – somewhat surpris-
ingly – had no significant effect at all. This is not to deny that opposition parties are likely 
to be Eurosceptic – yet they are not against European integration merely because they are 
in opposition, but for the reason that many of these parties are ideologically extreme, 
either with regard to the left-right or the TAN-GAL axis of the political space. Euroscep-
ticism is more than a strategic choice; it is a substantively motivated attitude. What has 
often been described in the literature as an inverted U-curve is in fact the combination of 
two different linear effects: The cultural and the economic axis critically shape orienta-
tions towards European integration. Moreover, the relative impact of these two axes (in 
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the case of the economic axis even the direction) is conditional on the particular sub-issue 
at stake, which confirms the inherently multidimensional nature of the European integra-
tion issue.  
Interestingly, what we observed here for elite attitudes is what Hobolt (2009, 227; 
also see Hobolt and Brouard 2010, 11) also concludes for voters: “[T]he issue of Euro-
pean integration is no longer disconnected from traditional Left-Right and liberal-author-
itarian political cleavages. Yet, nor is the European issue firmly fixed within the existing 
policy space; and depending on which aspects of the issue are emphasized, the position 
[…] may change accordingly.”  
Yet what is stable across all four integration sub-issues is a strong positive linear 
effect of the cultural axis, which means that opposition from the TAN-pole is a constant 
factor. The parties closest to the TAN-pole are the Populist/Extreme Right, but also sev-
eral members of the Christian-democratic and Conservative parties are culturally con-
servative. These findings corroborate the path breaking study by Hooghe et al. (2004) 
which also found that the cultural axis most powerfully shapes European integration ori-
entations – much to the surprise of the scholars involved. The economic left-right axis 
has some influence, too, but it is considerably weaker and its direction is shifting.  
In addition, while we found evidence of fundamental Euroscepticism at the fringes 
of the political spectrum, also many mainstream political actors displayed opposition 
against some aspects of European integration. Social Democrats, the Liberals as well as 
the Christian Democrats and Conservatives selectively defect to the opposition camp, the 
former if economic aspects of European integration are touched, the latter if the politico-
cultural dimension is at stake, specifically if enlargement is debated. This pattern would 
have gone unnoticed had we not disentangled the European integration issue and dealt 
only with principled European opposition or support, as mostly done in previous research. 
Euroscepticism on a case-by-case basis is not the exception, but the rule. In light of these 
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findings, the abundantly discussed scholarly question of whether a particular actor exhib-
its soft or hard Euroscepticism seems less relevant than the question of the exact target of 
this opposition. 
What do these findings add to the more general question of the politicization of 
Europe? The fact that the European integration issue as a whole cannot be pinned down 
to a single locus in the political space, but is linked to it in several and complex ways, not 
only puts high demands on political analysts who strive to uncover these patterns. It also 
poses a challenge for politicians on the ground, who struggle with how to incorporate 
European integration into their programmatic profiles. This is a delicate task and, in the 
end, I would argue, it makes this particular political issue hardly promising and less at-
tractive to most politicians. Because of the multiple linkages of Europe with the political 
space, the issue offers many opportunities for politicization, not only for fringe parties, 
but also for mainstream actors. Yet for the same reason, politicians might end up with 
strange bedfellows, they have to cope with their seemingly contradictory and inconsistent 
attitudes, and strong framing efforts are required to make their point clear to voters. In 
sum, as I will argue below, although this does not prevent the politicization of Europe, it 
is likely to considerably limit this phenomenon in most Western European countries. 
  
CHAPTER 6  
European integration issue-emphasis strategies  
The previous chapter on elite positions suggested that European integration has become 
integrated into existing conflict structures – not straightforwardly, however, but in a com-
plex way: Orientations towards deepening, enlargement, market making and social regu-
lation are well-structured by the cultural TAN-GAL axis of the political space and, to a 
lesser extent, by the economic left-right axis. This double linkage with the political space 
creates difficulties for many political actors. Radical Left parties, for example, face the 
difficult question of whether they should oppose Europe for economic motives or support 
it for cultural reasons. Similarly, culturally conservative mainstream parties from the 
Christian-democratic and Conservative party family hold a Eurosceptic potential for cul-
tural reasons, but this conflicts with their economically motivated pro-common market 
view or with their being in government. Moreover, it is a delicate task for established 
political actors to adapt or reverse traditional, long-held European integration positions.    
In these circumstances, when European integration orientations do not fit neatly 
into a political actor’s ideological profile, if they threaten internal cohesion or may scare 
away potential voters, a useful strategy is to try to shift public attention away from this 
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political issue. By contrast, if politicians think they will benefit from increased politici-
zation – because they hold a European position that is attractive to their voters and is at 
the same time consistent with their general programmatic profile – they will try to move 
Europe further up on the political agenda. Hence, politicians deliberately either empha-
size or downplay European integration relative to other political issues in order to win 
public support and achieve electoral gains.  
The vast literature on issue emphasis and issue ownership claims that this is ex-
actly what political competition is all about: The parties that manage to put their preferred 
issues on top of the political agenda will win the election. Therefore, parties deliberately 
choose to emphasize issues that are favorable to them, and de-emphasize unfavorable 
ones (e.g. Budge and Farlie 1983; Budge et al. 2001; Petrocik 1996; Riker 1986). Partly 
developed as a critique of spatial theories of party competition, which claim that parties 
compete simply by changing their positions towards issues, this literature objects that 
issue positions are not flexible, but sticky. Politicians cannot easily change them as they 
have an ideological reputation to lose and do not want to upset principled rank-and-file 
members. In contrast, issue emphasis is a much more flexible tool in this regard (see, e.g., 
Bale et al. 2010, 413–4). Hence, instead of changing their position on an issue because it 
is electorally disadvantageous, parties might instead shift emphasis to an issue where they 
are closer to the median voter or for which they are perceived to be more competent. As 
an illustration, Petrocik (1996) finds that US presidential candidates generally mentioned 
those issues in their campaigns more frequently which they “owned”. Voters saw Demo-
crats as better able to handle welfare issues, while the Republicans were perceived as 
more successful in solving problems related to budget and crime, and the parties directed 
their communicative efforts accordingly. 
The present chapter looks at issue emphasis in the context of European integration. 
First, it investigates how and why parties emphasize European integration in national 
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election campaigns. This focus can be justified in light of the findings of Chapter 4 which 
showed the parties are the most important actors in the public debate on European inte-
gration. The analysis relies on an additional dataset, generated with the same method as 
the public debate dataset, but stretching over a considerably longer period and not being 
limited to the issue of European integration. Rather, the dataset includes statements re-
garding all political issues, as required for the analysis in this chapter. With this infor-
mation at hand, we can test several competing theoretical explanations of European inte-
gration issue emphasis. The empirical results confirm the still not generally recognized 
insight that the role Europe plays on the general political agenda of a party system matters 
a great deal in explaining the issue emphasis of individual parties. In addition, and in line 
with the general argument of this study, I show that a party’s location in the political 
space is a further main determinant of issue emphasis – in interaction with the position 
held towards Europe. Both ideology and position have largely been neglected in previous 
research on European integration issue emphasis, and in research on issue emphasis in 
general. 
Next, European integration issue-emphasis is put into a broader perspective by 
tracking the development over time and comparing it to the related issue of immigration, 
a political issue that is also part of the new structural conflict induced by the globalization 
process. We will see that the Populist/Radical Right, who are the driving force of this 
new cleavage, pursue a much more aggressive issue emphasis strategy in the case of im-
migration. This suggests that European integration is a less attractive issue for them to 
promote the new cleavage. 
Finally, the chapter considers issue emphasis within European integration, at the 
level of sub-issues in the public debate. Again, the aim is to disentangle the black box of 
European integration and see which particular aspects political actors actually promote 
when talking about Europe. Notably, the Christian-democratic and Conservative parties 
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strongly emphasize in public their opposition against the accession of Turkey, although 
at the same time they stick to their traditional pro-European stance in other fields, partic-
ularly deepening. 
 
WHY POLITICIANS EMPHASIZE EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 
Why do some politicians choose to emphasize Europe, while others try to downplay it? 
The findings in the existing literature on European integration issue emphasis are incon-
clusive. The most ambitious study to date by Steenbergen and Scott (2004) tests for of-
fice-seeking, cohesion-seeking and vote-seeking motives, and finds strong empirical sup-
port for the latter. Specifically, the closer a party’s European integration stance is to the 
population mean, the more a party emphasizes Europe. Moreover, cohesion seeking also 
seems to have an effect, although it is less consistent across different years. Modest levels 
of internal division reduce the salience of Europe, while high levels of dissent within a 
party increase it. Office-seeking, finally, seems not to be a relevant predictor of European 
issue salience. However, when cross-validating these results based on the Chapel Hill 
expert surveys with data from party manifestos and public opinion data, Netjes and Bin-
nema (2007) conclude that none of these individual factors and, moreover, neither oppo-
sition status36 nor party size have a consistently significant impact on European integra-
tion issue emphasis.  




36 Moreover, the study by Kriesi (2007) based on the same media data as used in the present study finds 
that opposition status has not a positive, as would be expected theoretically, but a statistically significant 
negative effect on European integration issue emphasis. But see below for a critical discussion of the re-
sults of this study. 
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Fortunately, there is at least one factor that Steenbergen and Scott (2004) consider 
in their study whose impact is corroborated by the findings by Netjes and Binnema 
(2007). They find a strong and statistically significant effect of the systemic salience of 
European integration on issue emphasis across the different data sources. The systemic 
salience of European integration is, in other words, the salience of Europe within the party 
system as a whole. As Steenbergen and Scott (2004, 187–8) note, “[p]arties cannot decide 
on issue salience willy-nilly. Lest they find themselves marginalized from the mainstream 
national political debate, they will have to consider the importance that other parties at-
tach to the issue of European integration.” This insight is shared by scholars from the 
agenda-setting field who criticize traditional issue-emphasis approaches for not being 
able to explain the considerable issue overlap between individual parties, as regularly 
found in empirical studies. After all, if parties only emphasized their own issues, we 
would expect them to talk past each other most of the time. From an agenda-setting per-
spective, however, “party interaction is thus completely expected because individual par-
ties have a strategic interest in shaping the common party-system agenda, even when that 
involves paying attention to disadvantageous issues. Surely, it may be tempting for a party 
to ignore an unfavorable issue […]. Ignoring an issue on the party-system agenda may 
nevertheless be both difficult and risky. Difficult because political parties are expected to 
have an opinion on all issues and therefore may come under pressure from various actors 
– in particular the mass media – to address issues that are prominent on the party-system 
agenda. And risky because […] ignoring such an issue means relinquishing influence over 
how it is framed” (Green-Pedersen and Mortensen 2010, 261). Similarly, Sides (2006) 
argues that politicians are “riding the wave” of prominent issues because they want to 
appear responsive to public concerns, even when this means emphasizing issues that are 
unfavorable to them (for a fairly skeptical view on that, see Ansolabehere and Iyengar 
1994). 
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In light of this argument, any analysis of issue emphasis remains seriously incom-
plete and risks being flawed if it fails to consider the systemic salience of the issue under 
investigation. Specifically, the importance of European integration on the general polit-
ical agenda is expected to have a strong positive effect on the issue-emphasis of individual 
parties. We leave the question of what actually accounts for the varying impact of Euro-
pean integration on the general political agenda to Chapter 8. For now, we are content 
with simply including systemic salience as an independent variable in our analysis of 
politicians’ issue-emphasis strategies and we shall not delve into the underlying causes 
of the systemic salience.  
In addition to systemic salience, the subsequent analysis considers three factors in 
detail: positions, ideology, and opposition status. Research on issue emphasis generally 
tends to largely ignore positions, and the major empirical research project in this area, the 
Comparative Manifesto Project (Budge et al. 2001; Klingemann 2006), consequently 
only codes issue salience, but no issue positions. However, these two components of po-
litical competition were jointly analyzed in recent studies and it was shown that both are 
relevant and inter-related (e.g., Green and Hobolt 2008; Meguid 2005; Wagner 2012). As 
explicated in Chapter 2, politicization is not reducible to issue salience only, and the po-
sition parties adopt vis-à-vis European integration should also influence whether they 
emphasize this particular issue. Eurosceptic parties, it has been argued, have the oppor-
tunity to broaden their electoral appeal due to the considerable gap between the on aver-
age largely supportive political elite and the skeptical public opinion concerning Euro-
pean integration in general (de Vries 2010, 97; Hooghe 2003). The results in Chapter 5 
corroborated the claim that political elites are on average supportive of European integra-
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tion in general (although there is considerable variation in support at the more disaggre-
gated level of sub-issues37). Moreover, in election campaigns in the 2000s the parties’ 
average position towards European integration is a high 0.23 (N=57). Hence, Eurosceptic 
parties may be able to attract voters by emphasizing their negative stance on this issue, 
which is close to the median voter, while pro-European (often mainstream) parties are 
expected to remain as quiet as possible in this field in order not to scare voters away with 
their unpopular stance. Therefore, Eurosceptic parties, with all other things being equal, 
are expected to emphasize European integration more strongly than their pro-European 
counterparts.   
A further factor in explaining European integration issue emphasis that has so far 
largely been neglected in the literature is ideology. In line with the general argument of 
this book, I expect that Eurosceptic parties should greatly profit from emphasizing their 
anti-European stance only if they can convincingly link it to their ideological profile, i.e. 
if it dovetails nicely with their main political concerns. Otherwise, it might both damage 
their reputation as a credible and ideologically consistent party, and could spur internal 
division. In Chapter 5, I showed that opposition to European integration is linked to both 
the conservative TAN-pole of the cultural axis, and – albeit less strongly – to the eco-
nomic left pole. Moreover, only the cultural axis had a consistent negative impact across 
all European sub-issues, while the impact of the economic axis was considerably weaker 
and its direction shifting. Hence, the closer a Eurosceptic party is to the TAN-pole of the 




37 See Hooghe (2003) for the related argument that this elite-citizens gap narrows considerably if one fo-
cuses not on European integration in general, but on particular sub-issues. The findings in Chapter 5 that 
negative orientations towards particular sub-issues are quite common even among mainstream parties 
support this argument. 
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cultural axis, the more it will emphasize European integration, as a Eurosceptic position 
fits in nicely with their general ideological profile. Further, due to the weaker and unstable 
impact of the economic dimension, we might expect a similar, but less pronounced pattern 
the more a party is to the left pole of the economic axis. As already indicated in the above 
formulation, the effect of ideology is expected to be conditional on the position a party 
adopts – it should be triggered for Eurosceptic parties only, not pro-European ones. For 
example, a culturally conservative party that is pro-European should show little interest 
in publicly promoting this stance as it is very likely to conflict with the more skeptical 
views of its constituency. 
Finally, we will also test whether issue emphasis may be influenced by a party’s 
position in government or in opposition. Why should we include this variable, despite its 
weak performance in Chapter 5 on European integration orientations? In fact, there are 
good arguments that in the short-term and for strategic reasons parties would prefer to 
manipulate the salience of an issue instead of changing their position. Adapting or even 
reversing a position is much more risky as it may damage credibility, scare off “true be-
lievers”, foster internal dissent, and in any case it takes quite some time to implement 
(Bale et al. 2010, 413–4). Hence, although strategic and tactical reasons (electoral strate-
gies, coalition formation) (see Szczerbiak and Taggart 2008, 256–60) proved to be of 
little relevance in explaining European integration orientations, they may be crucial in 
explaining issue emphasis. A Eurosceptic party in government, we expect, would rather 
tone down its anti-European rhetoric than reverse its position. By contrast, if in opposi-
tion, the same party would emphasize that it is opposed to the government’s pro-Euro-
pean policy. Again, this effect is – as formulated – likely to be conditional on a party’s 
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ISSUE EMPHASIS IN ELECTION CAMPAIGNS IN THE 2000S 
Before turning to the empirical analysis, a few words on the data and the operationaliza-
tion of issue emphasis are necessary. The data are the same as used for the calculation of 
the parties’ score on the economic and cultural axes in the political space (see Figure 2.1 
and the regression analyses in Table 5.2). They have been generated by the same nuclear 
coding method used for the public debate data. However, they not only include statements 
related to European integration, but statements on all kinds of political issues. This is 
necessary to calculate the issue emphasis, as will be shown shortly. To make the coding 
feasible, it is restricted to public statements made by parties during election campaigns, 
i.e., the two months prior to election day (see Kriesi et al. 2012 for further details). Elec-
tion campaigns are chosen because they constitute a focal point of political contestation 
between parties, during which all relevant issues are pitted against each other. Issue em-
phasis is operationalized as the public statements by a political actor on a particular issue 
as a percentage share of all issue statements by this actor.  
This approach has several benefits. First, the measure is relative, which means 
that if we add up the issue-emphasis values of all issues by a particular actor, we always 
end up with 100 percent. This adequately reflects the fact that the amount of attention that 
is available is largely fixed – if issue emphasis increases for one issue, it necessarily has 
to go down for another issue. In the Chapel Hill Expert surveys (e.g., 2004, 187–8), by 
contrast, experts are simply asked to evaluate the importance of each issue in a parties’ 
public stance on a five-point scale. It is at least doubtful whether experts are able to sys-
tematically assess the importance of an individual issue for a party relative to all other 
issues that are present in political competition, and this task is even more difficult for 
small parties and hardly salient issues. The Comparative Manifesto Project (Budge et al. 
2001; Klingemann 2006) measures issue emphasis in the same way as the present study, 
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but uses party manifestos instead of relying on public statements for the mass media data. 
This rigorous measurement is clearly an advantage over expert surveys. However, party 
manifestos reflect what parties intend to do, not necessarily their actual behavior (Netjes 
and Binnema 2007; also see Epstein and Segal 2000). Current events and the actions of 
their competitors may force them to revise their planned strategy in the short term and 
react to these changing circumstances. Clearly, issue emphasis as measured in the mass 
media is a more direct measure of how parties actually behave in real-world political 
competition (also see Chapter 3 for further methodological discussions). 
Table 6.1 provides a descriptive overview of issue-emphasis in national election 
campaigns during the 2000s. The results show that the various parties generally pay some 
attention to European integration, although at a moderate level: On average, every twen-
tieth statement made by a party politician in an election campaign is about Europe (an 
 





Radical Left 4.4 4.8 
Greens  4.2 5.3 
Social Democrats 3.8 3.5 




Populist/Extreme Right 6.4 3.8 
All parties 4.9 4.7 
Notes: Averages of individual parties’ issue emphases (percentage shares) in election cam-
paigns from 2000 to 2006. In each country under study, at least two election campaigns took 
place in the period covered: Austria 2002 and 2006, UK 2001 and 2005, Germany 2002 and 
2005, Netherlands 2002, 2003 and 2006, Switzerland 2003 and 2007.  
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overall mean of 4.9 percent). This may seem marginal, but considering that there are vir-
tually hundreds of potential issues out there, and only a small number is taken up by 
parties, particularly during elections, this is still a respectable figure.  
The two party families that on average most strongly emphasize European inte-
gration are the Christian Democrats/Conservatives and the Populist/Extreme Right – 
more than 6.3 percent of all their statements deal with European integration, compared to 
the other party families with average values of 4.4 percent and lower. However, as the 
standard deviations indicate, variation within party families is large and as a result they 
do not differ from each other in a statistically significant way. Still, the descriptive pattern 
tentatively suggests that the two party families close to the cultural TAN-pole tend to 
accentuate Europe in political competition, which is well in line with our expectations. 
The regressions in Table 6.2 test whether the factors discussed above actually ex-
ert the hypothesized effects. 38 The analysis starts with a first model that only includes the 
systemic salience of European integration. It tries to explain a party’s issue emphasis on 
European integration by the importance European integration has on the general political 
agenda at a particular time and in a particular place.39 This simple model performs very 
well and corroborates the findings by Scott and Steenbergen (2004) and Netjes and Bin-
nema (2007). The strong and statistically significant effect of 




38 As potential country effects are part of the systemic salience and adjusted standard errors correct for 
clustering, it makes little sense to include country dummies. Nevertheless, I tentatively estimated models 
with country dummies but, as expected, none of them was significant. Moreover, the introduction of 
country dummies did not change any other coefficients substantively. 
39 Note that I calculated the systemic salience for each party at a particular election by excluding the 
party’s own statements in order to avoid endogeneity (see Steenbergen and Scott 2004 for the same ap-
proach). This ensures that any visible effect is not a methodological artifact.  
  






Model 2  
Europ. integration posi-
tion 
Model 3  
Ideology and opposition 
Model 4  
Joint model with interac-
tions 
 Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE 
Systemic salience  0.748 0.077** 0.797 0.088** 0.791 0.0757** 0.783 0.109** 
Eurosceptic position   0.029 0.011*   0.016 0.015 
Cultural tan-gal      -0.047 0.011** -0.010 0.014 
Economic left-right     -0.022 0.009* -0.011 0.011 
Extremism     0.004 0.016 -0.021 0.021 
Cultural-gal*Eurosceptic       -0.053 0.017** 
Econ.-right*Eurosceptic       -0.010 0.018 
Opposition party      -0.022 0.013 -0.020 0.015 
Opposition*Eurosceptic       0.014 0.022 
Constant 0.012 0.005* 0.000 0.005 0.020 0.007** 0.016 0.007* 
N 57  57  57  57  
R2 0.34**  0.43**  0.46**  0.53*  
Notes: Systemic salience is the salience of European integration in the whole party system and for the particular election (without the impact of the 
party for which the value is calculated, in order to avoid endogeneity problems). Eurosceptic position is a dummy (1 if a negative position towards Eu-
rope). Both axis scores range from -1.0 to +1.0 (see Chapter 2 for details of the calculation). Extremism is measured as the squared Euclidian distance 
from the average location in the political space and ranges from 0 to 1. Opposition party is the time a party was in opposition during the ten years before 
the election and ranges from 0 (never in opposition) to 1.0 (always in opposition). Cluster-adjusted standard errors used (for both party and election, 
calculated with cluster2.ado in STATA). Significance levels: ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1.  
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this variable, which also persists throughout the further models, impressively demon-
strates that parties are strongly constrained in their issue-emphasis strategies by the party 
system agenda. Individual parties are highly adaptive to important political events and 
their competitors’ actions (Green-Pedersen and Mortensen 2010). 
A telling example in this regard is the British election in 2001 in which the Con-
servatives heavily emphasized European integration in their campaign. As Chapter 7 on 
framing will outline in more detail, they framed the whole election as the “last chance to 
save the pound”, and even reactivated former Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher for this 
purpose. Indeed, roughly every fourth statement by the Conservatives during the 2001 
election campaign in our data is about Europe. This strategy forced the main competitor, 
Labour, which tried to capitalize on the prospering economy, to adapt its original plans 
and also take up the potentially risky issue, as reflected by the still impressive share of 
12.7 percent of its statements that deal with Europe. Although not part of its own cam-
paign platform, Labour could not ignore the European integration issue as it had been put 
so forcefully on top of the political agenda by the Conservatives. 
The following Models 2, 3 and 4 in Table 6.2 all control for the impact of systemic 
salience, but include the hypothesized individual determinants of parties’ issue-emphasis 
in different combinations. Model 2 adds Euroscepticism as an independent variable. As 
expected, Eurosceptic parties do emphasize European integration more strongly. Model 
3 considers ideology and opposition status similarly as in Chapter 5 where we looked at 
European integration orientations. Model 4 has interactions of Euroscepticism with the 
other independent variables of interest to capture the expected conditional effects.  
What about the effect of the opposition variable? A Eurosceptic party in opposi-
tion, as argued above, will put pressure on the government by emphasizing Europe, while 
it will tone down its anti-European rhetoric if in government. After all, adjusting issue 
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emphasis should be easier than changing positions (which might contradict a party’s ide-
ology and damage its reputation). However, the findings suggest that this does not hap-
pen. Opposition status has no statistically significant effect on issue emphasis – not in 
Model 3, nor when interacted with Euroscepticism as in Model 4. To corroborate this 
finding, I tested alternative operationalizations of the opposition variable, such as a tri-
chotomous version (instead of an interval one) and being in opposition on the day of the 
election – none of them performed any better.40 Hence, opposition status not only has no 
effect on European integration orientations, as shown in Chapter 5, but also does not 
affect European integration issue emphasis. For both aspects of politicization the evi-
dence speaks against the strategic model; parties do not to politicize European integration 
systematically merely because they are in opposition.  
Still, if we look at individual cases there is some evidence of sporadic strategic 
and tactical considerations when emphasizing Europe, as is suggested by Szczerbiak and 
Taggart (2008, 256–60). Again, the Eurosceptic British Conservatives are a case in point. 
Learning the hard way from the devastating defeat at the 2001 election, where they played 
the European integration card in vain, they largely dismissed this issue thereafter. The 
Conservatives’ issue emphasis of European integration plummeted from a record high 26 
percent in 2001 to a low 1 percent at the 2005 election, while they kept their skeptical 
orientations towards European integration. This suggests that instrumental changes in Eu-
ropean integration issue emphasis take place, but they are more ad-hoc and defy any sys-
tematic explanation.  




40 Moreover, I also estimated a model with the opposition variable and systemic saliency only, but the op-
position variable was also not statistically significant in this model. 
  
European integration issue-emphasis strategies 129 
By contrast, ideology has a systematic effect on European integration issue-em-
phasis. In Model 3, the negative coefficient for the cultural axis of the political space is 
large and statistically significant. The effect of the economic axis is also significant, alt-
hough considerably weaker. In other words, the more culturally conservative a party is, 
and – to a smaller extent – the more it is to the economic left, the more it emphasizes 
European integration. However, regardless of the direction and the axis, extremism has 
no significant effect.  
Specifically, the theoretical argument was that the effect of ideology is conditional 
on Euroscepticism. Model 4 with the interaction terms allows this to be tested. Compared 
to Model 3, the main effects of both axes decrease considerably, now lacking statistical 
significance. Yet the interaction between Euroscepticism and the cultural axis exerts a 
strong and statistically significant effect. Figure 6.1 shows this graphically: In the case 
of Eurosceptic parties, the effect of the cultural axis on European integration issue em-
phasis is large, as reflected in the steep slope of the corresponding line. Eurosceptic par-
ties, as hypothesized, emphasize European integration all the stronger the more they are 
culturally conservative, i.e. the closer they are to the TAN-pole of the cultural axis. By 
contrast, in the case of pro-European parties, the effect of the cultural axis is negligible 
(and not statistically significant), as the almost flat line shows. As expected, culturally 
conservative parties that are pro-European have no interest in emphasizing their European 
attitudes, which do not fit in with their general ideological profile and therefore might 
scare off potential voters. Yet what is more surprising is that also pro-European parties 
close to the culturally liberal GAL-pole, which might have good reasons to emphasize 
Europe as their stance fits their ideological profile, do not emphasize European integra-
tion more.  
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This finding holds even when we exclude fringe parties, the Radical Left and the 
Populist/Radical Right, from our sample. The interaction of the cultural axis and Euro-
scepticism remains negative and statistically significant in a regression that did not in-
clude members of these two party families. Hence, the pattern also applies to mainstream 
parties and is not restricted to parties at the fringes of the political system. Moreover, this 
effect is observable not simply because our country sample includes the two Eurosceptic 
countries of the UK and Switzerland, which some scholars consider as outlier cases 
(Green-Pedersen 2011; Statham et al. 2010) – the interaction remains significant in a re-
gression that excludes these two countries (see Table A.2 in the appendix for these re-
gression results). 
Moreover, the effect of the economic axis, unlike the cultural axis, is considerably 
weaker (as in Model 3) or even non-significant (as in Model 4). This pattern is similar to 
 
Note: The interaction was calculated for the joint model with all independent variables (Model 
4).  
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the one observed in Chapter 5 when explaining European integration orientations: The 
economic axis has some effect, but it is clearly secondary to the cultural axis.  
The only other study that has considered the impact of ideology on European in-
tegration issue emphasis, to my knowledge, is by Kriesi (2007). His results on whether 
ideology has an impact on issue emphasis are less unambiguous since he finds that only 
the Conservatives and the Populist Right in the UK and Switzerland emphasize Europe 
significantly more than other parties. However, two reasons suggest our findings here are 
more valid. First, Kriesi operationalizes ideology in a less sophisticated way by distin-
guishing different party families, while I rely on the more precise axis scores of each 
individual party. Second, he did not model the effect of ideology as being conditional on 
a party’s European integration position. Finally, and most importantly, he did not control 
for the powerful and potentially confounding effect of systemic salience, as has been done 
here. 
In sum, the results suggest that ideology and position jointly determine whether 
parties emphasize European integration during election campaigns. Only those parties 
that have both the proper position, namely being Eurosceptic, and the proper ideological 
package, namely being culturally conservative, strongly emphasize European integration. 
Moreover, parties’ issue-emphasis strategies seemed to be severely constrained by the 
salience of Europe in the party system as a whole, as the large effect of systemic salience 
suggests.    
 
Putting the European integration issue emphasis in context 
The analysis in the above section revealed the major factors that determine parties’ Euro-
pean integration issue emphasis. These attempts to politicize Europe take place in a highly 
competitive environment in which rival parties are trying to put their own preferred issue 
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on top of the agenda, and where other issues also compete for the scarce attention of 
political actors. While a systematic comparison of European integration issue emphasis 
with other issues is beyond the scope of this study, contrasting it with immigration and 
tracking the development of these two issues over time may yield valuable insights. 
Kriesi, Grande and colleagues (2012; 2008) argue that conflict over European integration 
is part of a newly emerging cleavage between the winners and losers of globalization. 
Apart from European integration, immigration is a further key issue that drives the emer-
gence of this new cleavage and it has become increasingly politicized during the last few 
years. Hence, one should expect that issue-emphasis strategies in the case of these two 
issues follow a similar pattern – in particular, culturally conservative parties, which firmly 
oppose politico-cultural globalization, should mobilize on both of them.  
The development over time indicates that since the beginning of the 1990s, parties 
have considered European integration as a relevant issue. The average European integra-
tion issue emphasis in election campaigns back in the 1970s was 2.0 percent, while in the 
1990s it was 7.4 percent and in the 2000s 4.9 percent. However, there is considerable 
variation between party families, as shown in Figure 6.2. For all three party families to 
the right, the issue emphasis of European integration reached a peak in the second half of 
the 1990s, most accentuated by the Populist/Extreme Right with 11.5 percent of all their 
statements dealing with European integration. Until the 1990s, a similar pattern can be 
observed for the issue of immigration. Immigration was not very salient in the 1970s and 
has substantially increased since then, particularly among the Populist/Extreme Right. 
This indeed suggests that both issues are driven by the same underlying logic, as argued 
by Kriesi, Grande and colleagues. However, in the 2000s, the development of the two 
issues bifurcates. The issue emphasis of immigration by the Populist/Extreme Right 
shows a continuing upward trend, whereas the issue emphasis of European integration 
declined. Moreover, the two moderate party families to the right, the Liberals and the 
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Christian Democrats and Conservatives, also relied comparatively more strongly on im-
migration than on European integration in the 2000s. Hence, in the most recent decade, 
the emphasis on European integration given by the political right is clearly in the shadow 
of the obviously more attractive immigration issue. 
The parties to the left, on the other hand, generally mobilize less on European 
integration. They exhibit more modest and more constant levels of issue emphasis. A 
partial exception is the Greens which emphasized European integration comparatively 
 
 Notes: Averages across all countries under study for each party family. The time periods in the 
figure are chosen in order to include at least one election for each country. No data are available 
for the 1980s.  rl_com = Radical Left, green = Green parties, socdem = Social Democrats, lib = 
Liberals, cd_con = Christian Democrats and Conservatives, rpr = Populist/Extreme Right. 
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strongly at the beginning of the 1990s (6.2 percent), and again in the most recent period 
from 2005–07 (6.3 percent). Yet in between these two periods they completely reversed 
their attitudes to Europe. Having been the most Eurosceptic party family back then, they 
became the most pro-European party family by the 2000s (see Figure 5.3). The low pro-
file regarding Europe in the transitional phase in between is likely to be a consequence of 
this fundamental reorientation.  
In sum, the findings suggest that the upward trend until the end of the 1990s in 
European integration issue emphasis which could be observed for all party families with 
culturally conservative affinities, particularly the Radical/Extreme Right, was halted or 
even reversed by the 2000s. By contrast, the trend for immigration, the other issue closely 
related to the denationalization cleavage, is still going upward. While there are good the-
oretical reasons to argue that European integration is part of the new cleavage, there seem 
to be other, issue-specific factors that inhibit a similar development as in the case of im-
migration. Chapter 8 will elaborate more on the reasons that limit the politicization of 
Europe.  
 
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION SUB-ISSUE EMPHASIS 
We now shift the perspective from an emphasis on European integration (relative to other 
political issues) to the sub-issue emphasis within European integration. If politicians talk 
about Europe, which particular aspects do they emphasize? Is it mainly market making 
and social regulation, or do they choose deepening and enlargement as the central themes 
of concern? To answer this question, we switch from the above focus on parties during 
election campaigns, a specific but crucial subset of the public debate, back to a broader 
analysis including public statements about Europe made by all political actors during the 
period 2004 to 2006.  
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Similarly as above for issue emphasis in election campaigns, we would expect 
that a political actor’s share of attention to a particular European integration sub-issue is 
determined by a systemic and an actor-specific component. The systemic component 
means that political actors cannot ignore the general content and dynamics of the public 
debate over Europe and therefore all actors are expected to emphasize the two sub-issues 
that dominated the public debate, namely deepening and enlargement (as shown in Chap-
ter 4). For example, before the upcoming referendum on the Constitutional Treaty in 
France and the Netherlands in the spring of 2005, all political actors had to address this 
political-institutional issue in some way if they wanted to be heard.  
However, at the same time political actors have some margin to deliberately em-
phasize those aspects about which they care most, and which in their view are what con-
flict over Europe is essentially about. This actor-specific component is expected to be 
related to their specific role and their general ideological concerns. The parties close to 
the culturally conservative TAN-pole of the political space, the Populist/Radical Right 
and representatives of the Christian-democratic and Conservative party family, are ex-
pected to put a heavy emphasis on politico-cultural aspects of European integration, 
namely deepening and enlargement. By contrast, economic interest organizations should 
put a particular emphasis on economic aspects. Similarly, the Radical Left, whose Euro-
scepticism is primarily driven by economic motives, should try to focus public attention 
on the generally less visible economic sub-issues. Coming back to our example from 
above, a case in point is the strategy pursued by the French Radical Left during the refer-
endum campaign. It linked the debate on the Constitutional Treaty with the simultane-
ously ongoing discussion about the services directive, which aimed at further liberalizing 
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the internal market. Thereby, it strategically emphasized an economic sub-issue during a 
period that was otherwise heavily dominated by a political-institutional issue.41 
Table 6.3 presents the sub-issue emphasis for each of the different actor types and 
the six party families. Deepening, the sub-issue that dominates the European integration 
debate overall, is also the most important sub-issue for each of the different actor types, 
with percentage shares of between 38.7 percent and 79.6 percent. The only exception in 
this regard is the European Union (mainly the Commission), which emphasizes enlarge-
ment the most, the second most important sub-issue in the debate (40.8 percent of all its 
statements). The focus on deepening is most pronounced among the parties. Overall, the 
systemic component is clearly visible. Hence, what we have already observed for parties 
in election campaigns across political issues is also confirmed here within a single debate 
at the level of sub-issues – political actors largely emphasize the same issues when they 
engage in public debate.  
Apart from this basic pattern, however, there is also some actor-specific variation. 
Two points stand out. First, unlike all other actors, the EU, business interest organizations 
and the labor unions put a strong emphasis on economic issues in general and market 
making in particular, with one-third or even more of their statements dealing with this 
sub-issue. While this was expected, it is quite surprising that no party family on the left, 
which is skeptical of economic integration (see Chapter 5), puts a particular emphasis on 
economic sub-issues. A more detailed analysis (not shown in the table) 




41 Moreover, a further strategy by the French Radical Left was the reframing of the referendum debate in 
economic terms. The Radical Left opposed the Constitution with its mostly political-institutional content 
because, in its view, the occasional references to a “social Europe” were too weak and the treaty would 
instead only codify the existing “neoliberal Europe”. Chapter 8 looks at framing strategies in detail. 
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reveals that this holds for all individual parties except the Swiss Radical Left and the 
Swiss Social Democrats, which strongly emphasize economic sub-issues. They engaged 
heavily in the debate about the extension of the free movement of persons to the new 
Central and Eastern European member countries, and the question of how to protect Swiss 
employers from increased pressure on wages and social dumping. In general, however, 
parties of the left are, unable or unwilling to forcefully voice their existing concerns about 
economic integration – despite such efforts of the French Radical Left during the refer-
endum campaign, as mentioned above. They do not actively challenge the dominant view 
that European integration, at least for the time being, is basically about enlargement and 













Public authorities       
European Union 32.7 7.6 40.8 18.8 100.0 2,059 
Domestic state 22.3 8.2 24.2 45.3 100.0 2,766 
Parties       
Radical Left 12.9 5.0 2.5 79.6 100.0 182 
Greens 5.8 4.3 27.7 62.2 100.0 270 
Social Democrats 9.3 8.1 18.1 64.5 100.0 1,521 
Liberals 12.3 5.4 21.5 60.8 100.0 496 
Christian Dem./Conserv. 9.9 2.7 39.6 47.8 100.0 1,390 
Populist Right 17.3 8.7 14.9 59.1 100.0 649 
Civil society       
Labor unions 39.2 7.5 1.1 52.3 100.0 226 
Business interests 33.8 8.4 14.8 43.0 100.0 297 
Public interest groups 12.4 5.6 23.9 58.1 100.0 252 
Individuals/experts 28.3 8.9 24.1 38.7 100.0 365 
All actors 18.8 6.8 29.1 45.3 100.0 12,986 
Notes: Sub-issue shares that are more than 10 percentage points above the overall share (last 
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deepening – both being aspects about which they are quite in favor. This impedes any 
serious attempts by the political left to politicize Europe.   
Second, as all party families strongly emphasize politico-cultural sub-issues, we 
cannot observe any additional effort to stress these sub-issues even more by parties close 
to the culturally conservative TAN-pole. However, it is noteworthy that Christian-demo-
cratic and Conservative parties stress enlargement in particular. 39.4 percent of all their 
statements deal with this sub-issue, which is roughly twice as much as the other two large 
mainstream party families, the Liberals and the Social Democrats. This is most accentu-
ated for the German CDU and CSU, with 73.6 percent and 59.0 percent, respectively, of 
all their statements about Europe referring to enlargement. Chapter 5 showed that the 
Christian-Democratic and Conservative party family is firmly opposed to enlargement, 
specifically against the accession of Turkey, while still largely in favor of other aspects 
of European integration such as deepening and economic integration. Hence, by strongly 
emphasizing their critical stance towards enlargement, they attempt to mobilize on the 
widespread cultural opposition against Europe, without having to abandon their tradi-
tional pro-European orientation in other fields.  
For the other culturally conservative party family that mobilizes Euroscepticism, 
the Populist/Extreme Right, there is no need to shift attention away from the dominating 
sub-issue of deepening, as it is firmly opposed to both deepening and enlargement. More-
over, these parties remain largely silent on the two economic integration sub-issues, 
which underscores that their opposition is primarily motivated by cultural motives. 
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CONCLUSION 
Politicians try to manipulate the salience of political issues. They deliberately emphasize 
those issues they think they benefit from, while keeping silent on unfavorable ones. The 
present chapter found that this also holds for European integration. In particular, the spe-
cific combination of position and ideology boosts a party’s issue emphasis. Political par-
ties promote European integration if they are Eurosceptic and the closer they are to the 
conservative TAN-pole of the cultural axis of the political space. This mainly includes 
the Populist/Radical Right, but also several members of the Christian-democratic and 
Conservative party family. Opposition status, on the other hand, had no effect, as we 
would expect if parties politicized European integration for purely strategic reasons and 
even without a proper ideological underpinning.  
Politicians differ not only in how strongly they emphasize Europe, but also in the 
relative weight they give to the different sub-issues within the European integration is-
sues. Most notably, the Christian Democrats and Conservatives heavily emphasized their 
opposition to the accession of Turkey, resulting in an overall ambivalent or even Euro-
sceptic image of these parties, even though their attitudes to other aspects of European 
integration, particularly deepening, are still largely pro-European. Hence, their profile in 
the European integration debate is at the same time pro-European and culturally conserva-
tive, a relatively new combination that might help them contain their much more funda-
mental Eurosceptic challengers to the right, the Populist/Extreme Right parties, without 
having to abandon the European project. Conversely, this strategy could backfire if the 
Euroscepticism from the mainstream right, although only targeted against specific as-
pects, nurtures the existing diffuse opposition among the electorate against all things Eu-
ropean.  
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Moreover, while European integration issue emphasis increased in the 1990s, this 
trend stopped in the 2000s. Unlike immigration, which is stressed by the same political 
actors and also related to the ongoing denationalization process, the issue emphasis of 
European integration is stagnating, and it seems to be less attractive for them – a finding 
to which we will return in Chapter 8. 
A further major finding of this chapter is that efforts of political actors to (de-
)emphasize European integration are severely constrained by the general political agenda. 
An individual political actor cannot remain silent on Europe if all other parties are talking 
about it and, likewise, he/she cannot talk extensively about it if all other parties remain 
silent. This important constraint of the systemic salience of an issue on actor-specific 
issue emphasis is well in line with the literature on agenda setting, but has not yet received 
sufficient consideration in the literature on issue emphasis and issue salience (but see 
Steenbergen and Scott 2004). A reason for this might be the frequent use of party mani-
festos in this area. Party manifestos are much less affected by the general political agenda 
than media data and they therefore tend to overestimate the room for maneuver parties 
have when emphasizing issues. Hence, when interested in the actual behavior of parties 
and not their prior intentions, mass media data are a source to which scholars should turn 
more often.  
If it is common behavior for politicians to talk about issues they do not “own” 
simply because they cannot ignore the general political agenda (a phenomenon Sides 
2006 calls “trespassing”), then rhetorical strategies that help them shape the perception 
of an issue in their preferred way become highly relevant for political competition. Chap-
ter 7 that follows investigates in detail the various ways in which politicians frame the 
issue of European integration. 
  
CHAPTER 7  
The framing of European Integration42 
In 2001 at an election rally in Plymouth, former Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher ad-
dressed the issue of whether the UK should adopt the euro as follows: “The greatest issue 
in this election, indeed the greatest issue before our country, is whether Britain is to re-
main a free, independent nation state or whether we are to be dissolved in a federal Eu-
rope. There are no half-measures, no third ways and no second chances. A country which 
loses the power to issue its own currency is a country which has given up the power to 
govern itself. Such a country is no longer free. And it is no longer democratic. To surren-
der the pound, to surrender our power of self-government, would betray all [that] the past 
generations down the ages lived and died to defend” (Guardian, 23.05.2001, cited in 
Baker 2002, 320). In the same election campaign, Tony Blair, then Prime Minister and 
leader of the Labour Party, countered: “I am British and I am proud of it but I have never 




42 Some of the material in this chapter draws on previously published work by the author and collabora-
tors (Helbling, Hoeglinger, and Wueest 2010; 2012). 
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regarded being pro-British as being anti-European or anti-anything else. It is an absurd 
position. [...] In the end the British people will make a judgment on what is best for jobs, 
industry and investment. And should we make a recommendation it will be because we 
have studied the economic conditions and said, look, this is the right thing for the British 
economy” (Observer, 13.5.2001, cited in Baker 2002, 322). 
This episode of British politics is a vivid example of how European integration is 
being framed. In general, politicians frame political issues because they “attempt to mo-
bilize voters behind their policies by encouraging them to think about those policies along 
particular lines. This is accomplished by highlighting certain features of the policy such 
as its likely effects or its relationship to important values” (Chong and Druckman 2007b, 
106). In the above quotes, the two politicians address the same issue, namely whether to 
join the monetary union and adopt the common euro currency, but they interpret it in very 
different ways. Thatcher gives the debated issue a nationalist slant by relating it to state 
sovereignty, and even state survival. Blair, by contrast, explicitly refuses such an inter-
pretation, instead putting economic considerations to the fore. 
This chapter explores the various ways political elites frame European integration. 
With regard to the overall argument of this study, the analysis of the framing serves two 
main purposes. First, we will check whether the multifaceted nature of European integra-
tion also leaves its mark on the framing of this political issue. We will see that European 
integration allows for a diverse framing and that the four sub-issues are each framed in 
distinct ways. Second, we will examine how particular political actors frame European 
integration, and what reasons account for the differences in their behavior. The main ar-
gument developed is that it is not national characteristics but politicians’ own ideological 
profiles that constitute the major determinant of how they frame European integration. 
Hence, unlike most previous work in this area, this chapter puts less emphasis on national 
contrasts (see in particular Díez Medrano 2003), but on the differences within countries, 
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specifically between the representatives of different social groups. As we will see, due to 
the multi-faceted nature of this issue politicians enjoy considerable leeway in how to 
frame European integration. However, this does not lead politicians to put forward just 
any frame they can possibly use to back up their position on Europe. Rather, political 
actors have specific preferences in line with their general programmatic profile as how to 
present European integration to their constituency and how to cue citizens regarding what 
Europe is all about. 
 
FRAME ANALYSIS AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION POLITICS  
This first section introduces in more detail the framing concept by explicating its rele-
vance to political science and the particular approach to frame analysis taken by this 
study. Moreover, it will show how the frames have been coded and categorized for our 
particular research question.  
What do we understand by the concept of framing in political science? The basic 
premise of the framing literature is that any issue can be viewed from different angles. 
Framing, as distinguished from agenda setting, does not guide us as regards what to think 
about, but how to think about a particular issue. In the famous words of Entman (1993, 
52), to frame is “to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient 
[...] in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, 
moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation.” Similarly, frames have been de-
scribed as “schemata of interpretation” (Goffman 1974, 21) or “packages with a central 
organizing idea” (Gamson and Modigliani 1989, 3) that guide our perception of reality 
and give meaning to an issue.   
Framing is ultimately relevant because it has the ability to influence individuals’ 
preferences regarding issues and political actors (Brewer and Gross 2005; Chong and 
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Druckman 2007a; Zaller 1992, chapter 9). Moreover, in particular the social movement 
literature stresses the ability of frames to mobilize the audience for some form of collec-
tive action (Benford and Snow 2000; Gamson and Modigliani 1989). To elaborate the 
mechanism through which framing influences individual attitudes, we can distinguish be-
tween “frames in thought” and “frames in communication” (Druckman 2010).43 Frames 
in thought are the set of considerations, values and beliefs an individual uses to evaluate 
an object, such as a political issue. These frames in thought are, in turn, shaped by frames 
in communication, in our context frames that are promoted by the political elite via the 
mass media. In the first place, frames in communication establish the availability of a 
particular frame – after all, an individual has to understand the significance and meaning 
of a consideration before they can use it for evaluative purposes. Moreover, and most 
importantly, exposure to frames in communication increases the accessibility of the par-
ticular frame, i.e. the likelihood a stored consideration is actually retrieved and used for 
a particular evaluation. Thereby, frames in communication may alter the relative weight 
an individual places on different considerations in the evaluation process. As a result, 
frames in communication may change an individual’s opinion on a political issue. Of 
course, the actual impact of a frame in communication is conditional on factors such as 
the applicability (its strength or persuasiveness) and context factors, e.g. whether the in-
dividual is at the same time exposed to competing frames. In addition, an individual’s 
traits and prior beliefs also play an important role (Chong and Druckman 2007b, 104–11; 
Druckman 2010).  




43 For an alternative distinction in terms of stages of the framing process, see e.g. Matthes (2007, Chapter 
2). 
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Given that framing is potentially effective, it is no surprise that political actors use 
frames strategically to achieve their political goals. Sadly for them, in many cases politi-
cians may not be able to frame a political issue in a preferred way because an issue is not 
ready for a “new spin” (Baumgartner and Mahoney 2008, 441–2) or the favorable frame 
does not fit (in our terminology above, it is not applicable). In the case of European inte-
gration, however, framing is comparatively easy and effective as it is an abstract and – in 
terms of mass politicization – relatively new issue. Therefore, its meaning for citizens is 
still in flux and malleable by politicians. Political entrepreneurs are able and even actively 
have to link European integration with existing lines of political conflict to make the issue 
politically salient and electorally rewarding (Hooghe and Marks 2009, 13; Janssen 1991, 
468). This makes European integration an ideal issue to study the framing strategies of 
political actors. The initial example demonstrated that European integration can be plau-
sibly presented as a political issue where national independence is at stake, but it may just 
as well be depicted as belonging to the sphere of economic affairs. And these are just two 
frames out of many more, as we will soon see. 
In his seminal work on the framing of Europe in Germany, Spain and the UK, 
Díez Medrano (2003) explores the different ways of seeing European integration in these 
countries and tries to explain it with distinct historical legacies and national cultures. A 
few other studies have also examined the framing of European integration in a compara-
tive perspective (Trenz 2005), most with a special focus on media framing (de Vreese 
2003; de Vreese, Peter, and Semetko 2001; Semetko and Valkenburg 2000). More re-
cently, Díez Medrano and Gray (2010, 196) assess these earlier findings and conclude 
that “[f]or all the talk of Europe’s cultural diversity, Europeans are generally thinking 
about the same beast when they reflect the European Union.” They argue that there is a 
commonly shared political culture in most European countries, the sole exception being 
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the UK, which differs markedly in its emphasis on national sovereignty and national in-
terest. 
However, is European integration truly the “same beast” for all? Looking at na-
tional contrasts may overlook significant variation within countries. If conflict about Eu-
ropean integration is mainly a domestic conflict, as argued by this study, then we should 
expect significant differences between the various domestic social groups and their polit-
ical representatives. Acknowledging the shortfalls of analyses that privilege the role of 
national over social determinants, Díez Medrano and Gray (2010) compare the framing 
of European integration by journalists, state actors including parties, and civil society. 
They find only modest differences among these different actor types. However, this find-
ing may be misleading because such a purely functional differentiation ignores major 
ideological differences, particularly among parties. In line with the general argument of 
this study, I expect that these ideological differences would result in very specific framing 
strategies as politicians try to link the European integration issue to their particular core 
political concerns. Hence, any frame analysis that aims to uncover politicians’ underlying 
motives to prefer certain frames over others needs to distinguish political actors not only 
based on their functional role, but also on their ideologies. 
  
Methodology and a general typology of frames 
Methodologically, moving beyond national contrasts and looking at how particular actors 
frame European integration requires that frames be coded at the level of individual state-
ments. This allows us to attribute each frame to a specific statement made by a particular 
political actor. Such information about “frame ownership” is lacking in most framing 
studies, which usually extract frames at the level of whole news articles. Moreover, actors 
often back their issue statements by using multiple frames at the same time (Lerch and 
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Schwellnus 2006, 307), usually because their statements in public debate are targeted at 
a heterogeneous audience, and frames resonate differently among the various constituen-
cies. Hence, using multiple frames can be seen as a strategy to maximize the appeal of a 
particular issue position. To account for this behavior, we coded up to five frames for 
each nuclear sentence. 
Frames are a notoriously fuzzy concept. For the subsequent empirical analysis, 
we narrow our understanding of frames to patterns of justifications. Which arguments are 
put forward by political actors in public debate to justify their issue positions? These 
justifications express what actually is, according to the speaker, at stake in the contested 
issue. Thereby, justifications not only define the problem that the policy is about to solve 
(or to bring along, if the speaker is opposed to it), but usually guide the evaluation in one 
particular direction and suggest a certain causal interpretation of related events or facts – 
essential functions of frames as noted by Entman in his above-mentioned definition. 
The coded frames are then categorized according to a general typology of public 
debate frames that distinguishes between cultural, economic, and other utilitarian frames, 
which are further differentiated into sub-categories, as shown in Table 7.1. The typology 
builds on Habermas’s (1993; 1996) distinction between different types of argumentations 
in his works on discourse ethics and communicative rationality. The typology is general 
enough to allow for cross-country and cross-issue comparison and has also been applied 
in Kriesi et al. (2012) to the issues of immigration and economic liberalization. 
Habermas distinguishes between group-related ethical-political, universalist-
moral, and pragmatic arguments. Ethical-political arguments point to ideas and values 
inherent in a given community. A particularly important variant of such identity-related 
frames are nationalist frames, the first sub-category of the cultural frames in our typology. 
Exclusivist nationalist frames emphasize the need for cultural homogeneity to uphold an 
exclusive identity. This is reflected in statements expressing a fear of mass immigration 
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or “Islamization”, statements that deplore the loss of unique national traditions and val-
ues, or statements expressing xenophobic attitudes. There are also nationalist frames that 
are less ethnic but more civic (Statham and Koopmans 2009). These civic frames are not 
based on the idea of a distinct and exclusive ethnic community, but on the belief in the 
exceptionality of a political community and its constitution. Such nationalist-institutional 
frames argue that a certain policy threatens to undermine national independence or par-
ticular national institutions, such as direct democracy or federalism. Note that national 
independence is defended here not for utilitarian reasons but for its own sake – the sym-
bolic value of national sovereignty is what matters here. The initial quote by Margaret 
Thatcher nicely illustrates this.  
 
The second cultural sub-category, multicultural-universalist frames, includes an-
other type of identity-related arguments, which are the exact opposite of the nationalist 
 





Labor & social security 
Economic prosperity & wealth 
Other utilitarian frames 
Political efficiency & efficacy 
Security & ecology 
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ones. Multicultural-inclusive arguments favor cultural openness and the peaceful coex-
istence of cultural and religious groups in a society. This sub-category also includes what 
Habermas calls moral-universalist arguments. They refer to general moral principles and 
universal rights claimable by everyone. Examples include basic civil rights, many politi-
cal rights, and international solidarity. For the sake of parsimony, these two closely re-
lated groups of frames that counterbalance the nationalist frames are subsumed under the 
same sub-category.  
Pragmatic arguments are used to justify a position by emphasizing its ability to 
attain a specific goal or by its potential to meet particular interests (Lerch and Schwellnus 
2006, 306). They are instrumental and output-oriented. Among them, I distinguish be-
tween economic and other utilitarian frames as we have a special interest in economic 
frames. They deal with the traditional economic left-right conflict and the first sub-cate-
gory, labor and social security frames, includes arguments about fears of unemployment, 
falling wages, and retrenchment of the welfare state. Those who use this frame argue, for 
instance, that EU membership leads to harmful competition in the job market and a dis-
mantling of national welfare states. Economic prosperity and wealth frames, the second 
sub-category of the economic frames, consist of arguments that put European integration 
in the context of economic wealth and growth, international competitiveness and budget-
ary considerations. Typical arguments in this area include claims that the common Euro-
pean market is economically beneficial or that states are too small to independently face 
economic challenges in the age of globalization.  
Among the remaining other utilitarian frames, the political efficiency and efficacy 
frames encompass arguments related to the workings of the political system such as the 
capacity of a state to act, state power, or an efficient bureaucracy. Politicians who use 
these frames may refer to the poor governance of European Union institutions or to the 
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need to break a country’s political isolation. Finally, the security and ecology sub-cate-
gory contains several additional arguments, with each of them not being very salient util-
itarian ones, such as references to internal security (crime, corruption) as well as external 
security (peace, regional stability), environmental protection, and other rarely addressed 
objectives. 
 
Framing, ideology, and politics 
Having clarified this study’s particular approach to frame analysis, we can formulate our 
expectation more precisely. Which frames do different political actors use in a real-world 
political context when engaging in public political debate? The main argument here is 
that political actors do not frame issues in any way that might persuade the largest number 
of citizens (which is often implicitly assumed by researchers when conducting their fram-
ing experiments). Instead, politicians are seriously constrained in their framing efforts by 
their ideological profile. As Sniderman and Theriault put it, frames “are not exogenous 
to political competition; they are endogenous to it” (Sniderman and Theriault 2004, 141). 
This has two relevant implications. First, it is only when political actors succeed in fram-
ing their issue stance in line with their ideological profile that they are actually able to 
persuade a constituency. Persuasion only works if arguments are credible, and arguments 
are only credible if they are based on some long-standing commitment. For example, we 
would be quite reluctant to trust a Green party’s true intentions if, out of the blue, it jus-
tified opposition to Europe on nationalist grounds – although citizens would regard such 
arguments credible if uttered by a Populist/Extreme Right party.  
Moreover, while most framing studies focus on whether framing is able to shape 
citizens’ views on a particular issue (persuasion), framing at the same time also serves 
the long-term goal of political actors to promote their ideology and give coherence to 
 The framing of European Integration 151 
their programmatic profile. For example, European integration may provide a welcome 
opportunity for a Radical Left party to denounce the “excesses of capitalism” – making 
this traditional leftist frame more salient and therefore available, and ultimately more 
readily accessible to citizens. Either way, framing by political actors is supposed to be 
heavily based on their underlying core political concerns, similar as we argued for posi-
tions and issue emphasis in the previous chapters. Moreover, connecting an issue to po-
litical core concerns that resonate widely and have the power to mobilize the public is an 
essential element of politicization. The conflictive issue and existing political divisions 
mutually stabilize and reinforce each other; political conflict stretches beyond the indi-
vidual issue and feeds broader political divisions, thereby permitting sustained politiciza-
tion.  
Surprisingly, the connection between framing and ideology has found little atten-
tion in empirical framing research. A rare exception is the article by Petersen et al. (2010) 
who conceive of the structure of party competition as a frame for citizens. They provide 
evidence that the positions different political parties adopt vis-à-vis a particular issue pro-
vide a cue to citizens as to how to situate the issue within the political space. However, 
in the case of European integration, the ambivalent positions many parties adopt on this 
issue (as shown in Chapter 5) preclude any straightforward inference based solely on 
positional cues by the voters. Rather, substantial and explicit framing by the parties is 
required if they want to cue citizens regarding where to place the new and multi-faceted 
issue of European integration in the broader political context.  
In short, the framing by politicians is, to a considerable extent, the concrete artic-
ulation of the core political values for which they have a reputation. Hence, the 




FIGURE 7.1. Frames and their relation with the political space 
 
frames used are expected to be a function of a political actor’s location in the two-dimen-
sional political space. Figure 7.1 summarizes the resulting propositions about the rela-
tionship between actor framing and the political space. Politicians close to the leftist pole 
of the economic axis of conflict are likely to link European integration to social protec-
tionist considerations and therefore emphasize labor and social security concerns, while 
proximity to the rightist pole should go along with neoliberal ideas and, accordingly, the 
prevalent use of economic prosperity and wealth frames. Likewise, politicians close to 
the conservative TAN pole of the cultural axis are likely to promote nationalist frames 
when engaging in the European integration debate, while those at the liberal GAL-pole 
can be expected to base their framing on multicultural and cosmopolitan views. 
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Moreover, I suggest that mainstream actors in the center of the political space, 
besides using these ideological frames, also rely strongly on pragmatic frames, empha-
sizing in particular political efficiency and efficacy to support European integration. Of-
ten, these actors are well represented in government and thus have to frequently deal with 
concrete problems and the need to communicate specific policy choices, which are less 
easily connectable to basic ideological concerns. Because these “neutral” or rather tech-
nical arguments cannot be clearly located in the political space, they potentially appeal to 
a broader and ideologically heterogeneous audience. Especially governments and Euro-
pean Union actors may use these frames frequently to appear impartial and standing 
above the controversies of everyday politics. 
Finally, while politicians try to deploy their preferred frames, they also have to 
take into account the general context, which may force them to engage with their oppo-
nents’ arguments and to take up well-resonating frames although they are unfavorable to 
them (Jerit 2008). If ignoring a frame is no longer a feasible option, because it is highly 
salient, then two strategies are available. Either a politician can rebut an opponent’s frame 
by questioning its validity or appropriateness. For example, Thatcher’s statement quoted 
above may be “counter-framed” (Benford and Snow 2000, 617) by arguing that national 
sovereignty is not affected by European integration. This is exactly what Blair did when 
he denounced Thatcher’s position as “absurd”, arguing that the issue is not about national 
independence but economics. Or politicians can try to take possession of the opponents’ 
frame by rhetorically flipping it over. For example, a pro-European politician could argue 
that European integration does not threaten, but rather enhances national sovereignty by 
providing a country with more leverage at the European level, as suggested by the concept 
of shared sovereignty. Hänggli (2010, 98–107) terms these two distinct strategies defen-
sive vs. offensive use of the opponent’s frame. However, she finds that both strategies are 
rare compared to the emphasis of one’s own frames, which is unsurprising given the risks 
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involved: Rebutting the opponent’s powerful frames may simply direct even more public 
attention to an opponent’s most persuasive argument, and trying to flip it on its head may 
not work and in the long term damage one’s own reputation. In short, while politicians 
cannot fully avoid responding to the adversaries’ most salient frames, we can expect them 
to do so only reluctantly and to use their adversaries’ frames rarely.  
 
WHAT EUROPE IS ALL ABOUT – EMPIRICAL RESULTS  
Throughout this volume it is argued that European integration is a political issue that is 
multi-faceted, but at the same time well-structured by both an economic and a cultural 
axis of conflict. Here, we can test this proposition against the data on framing. The results 
for the overall framing in the six countries in Table 7.2 show that the political elites reduce 
European integration neither to its economic nor cultural aspects. Clearly, the multidi-
mensional nature of this issue also becomes manifest in the framing. Two-fifths of all 
frames are cultural and one-third is economic, the remaining quarter refers to other utili-
tarian arguments – such as political efficiency and efficacy or security and ecology. Over-
all, cultural frames outnumber economic frames, but the cultural slant is marginal in size.  
Among the cultural frames, multicultural-universalist arguments about fairness 
and solidarity (27.2 percent) outnumber nationalist frames (12.4 percent). This level of 
nationalist framing may appear to be quite modest. Yet compared to other public debates 
on the opening up of political, economic and cultural borders, the European integration 
debate exhibits the highest share of nationalist framing. In the public debate on economic 
liberalization, nationalist arguments are almost absent (1.1 percent), and even in the im-
migration debate the share is slightly lower with 9.8 percent (see Hoeglinger, Wueest, 
and Helbling 2012). Hence, European integration seems to constitute the most fertile 
ground for culturally based opposition against denationalization.  
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Across the four sub-issues of European integration, the framing varies systemati-
cally, as shown in Table 7.2. Economic framing turns out to be much more likely for the 
debate on market making and social regulation, while cultural framing dominates the de-
bate on enlargement and deepening. This finding supports our theoretical distinction be-
tween economic and politico-cultural sub-issues. However, the framing of a single sub-
issue is far from being fully pre-determined. Political actors enjoy considerable leeway 
in their strategic choice of frames. Thus, the two sub-issues of enlargement and deepen-
ing, which are mostly framed in cultural terms, still give rise to a considerable share of 
economic frames (18.6 percent and 22.5 percent, respectively). Likewise, cultural frames 
make up 26.7 percent of all frames in the economic sub-issue of social regulation, but 
only 9.5 percent of the frames of the sub-issue of market making, the sub-issue that is 
most clearly dominated by economic logic. 
Moreover, between the two politico-cultural sub-issues of enlargement and deep-
ening the kind of nationalist frames that are used vary considerably. As noted above, 
nationalist arguments can be related to ethnic or civic nationalism. Accordingly, we can 
distinguish between (ethnic) nationalist-exclusive frames and (civic) national-institu-
tional frames. The former emphasize the defense of one’s own ethnic community, na-
tional traditions, and values, while the latter, by contrast, insist on the symbolic value of 
national independence or the protection of valued national institutions. Ethnic national-
ism is concentrated around the issue of enlargement – nationalist-exclusive frames pre-
dominate here with 87 percent of all nationalist frames. In contrast, civic nationalism 
finds its main target in opposition against deepening – 70 percent of all nationalist frames 
used in this context are nationalist-institutional. More detailed analysis reveals that the 
nationalist-exclusive frames put forward in the context of enlargement are targeted pri-
marily against the accession of Turkey. Interestingly, not only traditional national iden-
tities are defended here, but also a nascent European identity – culturally defined and 
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both exclusive (against Turkey) and inclusive (within Europe) at the same time. This is 
highlighted by the centrality of the argument about Europe’s “Christian heritage” among 
the opponents of Turkey’s EU accession. It supports the popular claim that the “Turkish 
question” is a crucial factor in the emergence of an exclusive European identity (Gianna-
kopoulos and Maras 2005; Madeker 2008).  
To conclude our general overview, are there significant differences among the six 
countries under study? Based on our data and in line with Díez Medrano and Gray (2010), 
it is fair to say that European integration is seen in fairly similar ways in these countries, 
although some variation exists (see Table A.3 in the appendix). As found in previous 
studies, nationalist framing is particularly prevalent in the traditionally Eurosceptic UK 
with 17.2 percent. But even in the least nationalist debate, in Germany, this category still 
accounts for a significant 6.8 percent of all frames. Moreover, economic framing is 
strongest in Switzerland with 44.7 percent. This is due to the country’s “integration with-
out membership” (Lavenex 2009). This particular approach to European integration priv-
ileges economic integration. But as soon as the more fundamental and highly controver-
sial question of EU membership flares up in public debate, as happened repeatedly in the 
1990s, cultural aspects gain importance. Notwithstanding these peculiarities, there are 
substantial shares of economic and cultural framing in all six countries. And the variations 
among countries are considerably smaller than those among different sub-issues and, as 




TABLE 7.2. The framing of the European integration debate and its sub-issues 
 
Overall 
 Economic sub-issues  Politico-cultural sub-issues 




 Enlargement Deepening 
Cultural frames 39.6  9.5 26.7  53.3 46.0 
Nationalist 12.4  4.2 8.9  14.5 17.6 
Multicultural-universalist 27.2  5.3 17.8  38.9 28.5 
Economic frames 34.4  76.9 48.7  18.6 22.5 
Economic prosperity 24.4  52.2 36.9  14.4 13.7 
Labour & social security 10.1  24.7 11.8  4.2 8.9 
Other utilitarian frames 25.9  13.6 24.6  28.1 31.4 
Political efficiency& efficacy 17.6  12.1 19.1  14.9 22.4 
Security/ecology 8.4  1.5 5.6  13.2 9.0 
Total 100.0  100.0 100.0  100.0 100.0 
N 9,212  1,868 931  2,177 4,121 
Notes: Percentages of frames of a particular category that are used. Data weighted by country.  
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Framing opposition and support 
Opponents and supporters of European integration frame their statements differently, 
which means that the evaluative component or inherent “loading” (Neidhardt 2002, xiii) 
of a frame is not arbitrary. Some frames are used by only one side of the debate, while 
other frames appeal to both sides and, hence, are more contested. The direction and per-
suasive power of a frame depends on pre-existing and relatively stable social and cultural 
resources (Williams 2004), including ideologies. We know from the previous chapters 
that opposition to Europe is concentrated strongly at the conservative TAN-pole of the 
cultural axis, as well – to a lesser extent – at the leftist pole of the economic axis, while 
support is found at the two opposite poles and in the center of the political space. In line 
with the Figure 7.1 above, opposition to European integration should therefore be based 
primarily on nationalist arguments, along with labor and social security concerns. By 
contrast, supportive voices should emphasize the positive effects on economic prosperity 
and multicultural-universalist values, and rely on the more pragmatic frames. These ex-
pectations should be reflected in the average positions of the frame categories towards 
European integration, as shown in Figure 7.2. A negative value indicates that a frame is 
used more frequently to oppose Europe, while a positive value indicates that this frame 
is used more often to articulate support. 
The pattern for the cultural framing is in line with these expectations. The two 
sides follow distinct framing strategies, with both nationalist frame categories expressing 
clear-cut opposition to European integration (-0.29 and -0.33, respectively), while multi-
cultural-universalist arguments articulate solid support (+0.52). In the case of economic 
framing, the arguments of the two sides are less clearly distinct. While prosperity argu-
ments are largely used to support integration (+0.19), labor and social security frames are 
also positively connoted (+0.12). The latter is contrary to expectations. It suggests that, 
on average, European integration is seen less as a threat to the traditional national welfare 
 The framing of European Integration 159 
state, and more as a potential answer to the challenges of economic globalization. How-
ever, the fact that the values for both economic frame categories are comparatively close 
to zero indicates they are contested and that both camps use them to persuade citizens of 
their views about European integration. Political efficiency and efficacy as well as secu-
rity and ecology frames, finally, are uncontested showing a decidedly positive tilt (+0.41 
and +0.54, respectively).  
In sum, these results strengthen the claim that the engine of opposition to Euro-
pean integration is fueled primarily and most consistently by nationalist motives and is, 
therefore, driven strongly by the cultural logic. Labor and social security concerns, which 
we also expected to be used mainly by opponents, are considerably more contested and 
are being used by both sides. All other frames are used primarily to argue in favor of 
European integration. However, who are the concrete political actors that oppose or sup-
port European integration for these various motives? The following section tackles this 
question in detail.  
       
Notes: The average positions can vary between -1.0 (only negative statements) and + 1.0 (only 
positive statements). Country-weights applied. 
FIGURE 7.2. Frame average position towards European integration 
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The framing of European integration by political actors 
How do the different political actors frame European integration? Table 7.3 reports the 
relative frequency with which a given actor type uses a particular frame. For ease of in-
terpretation, frames responsible for a substantial share of the overall framing of a partic-
ular actor type are highlighted in bold. In addition, the shading indicates whether a frame 
is used predominantly in connection with statements that oppose or support European 
integration. Hence, Table 7.3 enables us to not only see how relevant a specific frame is 
for a particular political actor type, but also whether the actor type uses the frame to ex-
press support or criticism. This is particularly instructive for ambivalent political actors 
who may support European integration for one reason and oppose it for another. 
We first turn to the two party families at the periphery of the political spectrum, 
the Radical Left and the Populist/Extreme Right. They fundamentally oppose European 
integration as shown in Chapter 5. Accordingly, both party families use all frame cate-
gories to oppose European integration (as indicated by the shading in the table). However, 
there are considerable differences in the salience of the particular frame categories. This 
suggests they oppose European integration for quite different reasons. The actors from 
the Radical Left frame their opposition heavily in terms of labor and social security, 
which is responsible for 34.0 percent of their overall framing. The heavy weight they 
attach to these concerns is only exceeded by the labor unions. Both of these leftist actors 
justify their Euroscepticism primarily by recourse to traditional concerns about welfare 
state retrenchment, public service cutbacks, wage cuts, and unemployment. Moreover, 
the Radical Left also substantively emphasizes economic prosperity and multicultural-
universalist arguments in its framing. 
By contrast, the discourse of the Populist/Extreme Right is strongly dominated by 
nationalist frames (45.4 percent), as could be expected given their location in the political 
space. This share of nationalist frames is more than twice as high as for any other political 
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actor. Although the Populist Right does not have a monopoly on nationalist framing, it 
clearly is its main promoter. Economic prosperity ranks (an already distant) second with 
a share of 21.1 percent of the overall framing of this actor type.  
The Christian Democrats and the Conservatives as well as the Liberals adopt the 
Populist Right’s nationalist framing, although to a smaller extent (22.1 percent and 17.3 
percent of the overall framing, respectively). Interestingly, the discourse of the two most 
Eurosceptic parties from the moderate right, the British Conservatives and the German 
CDU/CSU, is also the most nationalist among them (50.6 percent and 34.0 percent of 
their overall framing, respectively). This suggests that cultural Euroscepticism based on 
nationalist motives is not confined to the Populist Right, but is also articulated by mem-
bers of party families of the moderate right. 
What is the precise content of this nationalist framing? According to Statham and 
Koopmans (2009, 461), nationalist opposition to European integration is not mainly ex-
pressed in ethnic and exclusive terms by xenophobic arguments such as the fear of mass 
immigration or Islamization. Rather, they argue, it is mostly articulated in the more mod-
erate form of “civic nationalism”, meaning the defense of national sovereignty. However, 
more detailed analysis of the data does not support such a conclusion. Actor types relying 
strongly on nationalist framing use ethnic nationalist-exclusive frames and civic nation-
alist-institutional frames to roughly an equal extent (each sub-category being responsible 
for 40 percent to 60 percent of the overall nationalist framing). That these frame catego-
ries make a joint appearance suggests that the motives are closely linked – no civic na-
tionalism without ethnic nationalism, and vice versa. Hence, for culturally motivated Eu-
rosceptics, European integration poses a dual threat as it weakens both one’s own ethnic 
community and national sovereignty (Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson 2004, 131). 
Political actors from the left also occasionally rely on nationalist framing. There 
are two reasons for this. First, part of the political left does not completely refrain from 
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employing nationalist framing to oppose European integration. This applies to the labor 
unions and the Radical Left, as Table 7.3 shows. They fear the negative implications of 
the “pooled sovereignty” that greater European integration might have on national social 
and labor policies, which results in (civic) nationalist-institutional but not (ethnic) nation-
alist-exclusive framing against European integration. However, in terms of salience these 
frames are clearly secondary and other, primarily economic arguments play a much more 
important role for them.44 Second, the use of nationalist frames by leftist politicians is, as 
hypothesized, a response to fight the Populist Right’s framing by explicitly rebutting such 
arguments or by flipping them around to argue in favor of their conflicting pro-European 
stance. This is reflected by the supportive positions towards European integration that are 
connected to the – normally strongly negatively connoted – nationalist frames as in the 
case of the Greens and the Social Democrats. 
Does the moderate left, by analogy to the moderate right, also adopt the framing 
of their more radical counterparts? Indeed, the Social Democrats are skeptical Europeans 
when it comes to economic considerations. For the Social Democrats, economic prosper-
ity frames are, with 25.2 percent, highly salient and negatively connoted. Likewise, labor 
and social security frames are also relevant in terms of salience and ambivalently con-
noted. These findings reflect quite well the contradictions that Social Democrats have to 
face in the European integration debate when assessing the potential of various European 
policies to advance a truly “social Europe”. The Greens, by contrast, worry little about 
the economic consequences of European integration, as suggested by the low salience of 
these frame categories. 




44 See Milner (2004) for a more detailed elaboration of this argument for the French case. 
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Cultural frames      
Nationalist 4.0  8.4  8.5  11.1  19.2  
Multicultural-universalist 32.6  25.0  11.5  5.6  28.4  
Economic frames           
Economic prosperity 33.1  24.0  20.7  55.9  18.5  
Labour & social security 5.4  8.6  50.1  17.5  17.4  
Other utilitarian frames            
Pol. efficiency & efficacy 15.9  25.1  3.4  8.4  7.5  
Security/ecology 9.0  8.9  5.8  1.5  9.1  
Total 100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  















Cultural frames             
Nationalist 13.5  8.0  8.0  17.3  22.1  45.4  
Multicultural-universalist 22.4  31.9  30.2  31.7  26.5  9.0  
Economic frames             
Economic prosperity 24.8  2.9  25.2  13.5  18.3  21.1  
Labour & social security 34.0  2.2  15.4  8.8  5.1  9.2  
Other utilitarian frames              
Pol. efficiency & efficacy 3.2  31.0  12.4  20.8  24.2  5.4  
Security/ecology 2.2  24.2  8.9  8.0  3.8  9.9  
Total 100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  
N 134 190 1,001 383 898 442 
Notes: Percentages of frames of a particular category that are used. For ease of interpretation, 
highly salient frames (more than a 10.0% share) are highlighted in bold. If the particular frame 
category is mainly used to oppose European integration (frame average position below -0.20), 
the values are shaded in dark grey. Shading in light grey indicates they are mainly used for sup-
port (average position above +0.20). Data weighted by country.  
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Note that the Populist Right parties also raise labor and social security concerns 
at times. This frame category is responsible for 9.2 percent of their overall framing. The 
combined occurrence of identity-based nationalist framing and labor and social security 
framing lend some credence to the argument that they pursue a strategy of welfare chau-
vinism (Andersen 1992; Mudde 2000). An illustrative example is the infamous “Polish 
plumber”45 who was used to stoke fears in the context of the upcoming Eastern Enlarge-
ment. Similarly, the Swiss SVP argued during the referendum campaign against the free 
movement of persons that the massive influx of foreign “social benefits scroungers” 
would overburden the welfare state. These findings are puzzling in light of the “winning 
formula” argument which states that the Right Populist’s success rests on its combination 
of nationalist and neoliberal – not social protectionist – appeals (Kitschelt 2007; Kitschelt 
and McGann 1995). Yet if the answer to social concerns is seen (only) in limiting access 
to the welfare state exclusively to “our own people”, it may well be compatible with ne-
oliberal ideas. Moreover, the neoliberal element is not imperative for all members of this 
party family if we recall their location in the political space. While clearly at the nation-
alist TAN-pole of the cultural axis, its members are widely spread along the economic 
axis and not only located near the rightist pole (see Chapter 2). 
Apart from the above selective but systematic departures of mainstream parties 
from the large pro-European consensus, well in line with their ideological core concerns, 




45 The term “Polish plumber” was actually coined by the leader of the French right-populist MPF, 
Philippe De Villiers, but subsequently spread across all Europe. It was eventually even taken up in an ad 
by the Polish Tourism Bureau in France, in which a Polish model depicting a plumber says “I'm staying 
in Poland. Lots of you should come” (New York Times Online, June 26, 2005). 
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public authorities and mainstream parties generally argue in favor of European integra-
tion. For this purpose they mainly rely on multicultural-universalist frames, economic 
prosperity frames and, moreover, pragmatic frames. Specifically, they heavily emphasize 
political efficiency and efficacy gains resulting from European integration. A prime ex-
ample is the often heard argument that a particular policy can no longer be realized by 
going it alone, but only through close collaboration at the European level. The Greens 
share this framing pattern, which tentatively supports their transformation into an estab-
lished mainstream party in most Western European countries (see, e.g., Pelinka 2004). 
The framing of civil society actors generally follows their allies in the political 
system. Employer and business associations frame their supportive stances on European 
integration in terms of economic prosperity and wealth (55.9 percent). While this is the 
dominant strategy, it is not endorsed unanimously by all business and producer interests. 
Particularly farmers’ associations, but also other economic sectors that profit from shel-
tered national markets, are a significant source of Euroscepticism, as indicated by the 
substantive share of labor and social security concerns used to criticize European integra-
tion (17.5 percent). Of course, the labor unions voice social and economic concerns much 
more frequently (50.1 percent).  
By contrast, public interest groups use economic frames less frequently. Gener-
ally, public interest groups are a heterogeneous crowd, but it has been repeatedly shown 
that, in practice, they are dominated by left-leaning groups, as the right is hardly active 
outside the party arena (Hutter 2012; Kriesi 1999). As a consequence, public interest 
groups strongly emphasize multicultural-universalist frames (28.4 percent), which is well 
in line with the postmaterialist world view of the new social movements and their heirs. 
How to evaluate European integration based on this world view is contested among these 
groups, resulting in neither a clearly pro-European nor anti-European connotation of this 
frame. In addition, and quite unexpectedly, public interest groups also voice discontent 
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based on nationalist-exclusive motives (19.2 percent). This is largely because several rep-
resentatives of the Catholic Church spoke against the accession of Turkey with reference 
to the Christian heritage of Europe. Most prominently, the then Cardinal Ratzinger, who 
would later become Pope Benedict XVI, argued in an interview with Le Figaro magazine 
(9.8.2004) that Turkey would be in permanent contrast to Europe, making allusions to the 
repeated incursions of the Ottoman Empire into Europe in past centuries. 
 
Partisan framing and the political space 
Instead of grouping the parties into own party families as was done in the previous sec-
tion, this section alternatively uses information on the location of parties in the general 
political space to test its impact on their framing strategies in a more straightforward 
way.46 Does a party’s score on the economic left-right axis and the cultural TAN-GAL 
axis of the political space have the hypothesized effects on its framing strategy in the 
European integration debate? Table 7.4 reports the corresponding regression results for 
each frame category. As in the regressions in the previous two chapters, I included the 
parties’ scores on both axes of the political space as well as an extremism variable. Re-
member that the axis scores of a particular party are calculated from its general policy 
positions as articulated during national election campaigns in the 2000s. In addition to 




46 Note that this information on the precise location in the political space (the axis scores) is, unfortu-
nately, only available for a limited set of political actors, namely the parties, as it is based on general pol-
icy positions articulated during election campaigns. This is why I proceed in two steps, first analyzing the 
framing of all political actors and, second, looking at the framing strategies of the parties only. 
  
TABLE 7.4. The impact of the political space on the framing of European integration by the parties (OLS-regression) 
  Cultural frames Economic frames Other utilitarian frames 






 Labour &  
social security 




 Coeff. SE  Coeff. SE  Coeff. SE  Coeff. SE  Coeff. SE  Coeff. SE 
Ideology:               
Cultural tan-gal -0.25 0.08**  0.21 0.09*  -0.05 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.05 0.04 
Economic left-right -0.02 0.06  -0.09 0.09  0.08 0.05 -0.11 0.05+ 0.09 0.05+ 0.06 0.03+ 
Extremism 0.19 0.10+  0.07 0.10  -0.25 0.04** 0.08 0.08 -0.12 0.07+ 0.03 0.04 
Cultural sub-issue 0.08 0.03*  0.24 0.05**  -0.19 0.04** -0.21 0.04** 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.03* 
Countries:                 
Austria 0.13 0.10  -0.15 0.07*  -0.02 0.06 -0.13 0.06* 0.18 0.05** -0.01 0.03 
United Kingdom -0.02 0.08  0.00 0.13  -0.04 0.03 -0.02 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.01 0.04 
Germany -0.09 0.07  -0.07 0.09  -0.02 0.04 0.03 0.07 0.13 0.04** 0.02 0.05 
Netherlands 0.00 0.08  0.04 0.08  -0.03 0.04 -0.04 0.07 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.02 
Switzerland -0.07 0.08  -0.12 0.08  0.10 0.05* -0.08 0.07 0.10 0.05+ 0.07 0.03* 
(France ref. cat.)                 
Constant 0.11 0.08  0.12 0.08  0.40 0.03** 0.24 0.07** 0.12 0.04** 0.00 0.02 
N 59   59   59  59  59  59  
R2 0.50   0.46   0.57  0.44  0.31  0.26  
Notes: The dependent variable is the share of the indicated frame category on the overall framing by a party. Both axis scores range from -1.0 to +1.0 
(see Chapter 2 for details of the calculation). Extremism is measured as the squared Euclidian distance of the party from the average location in the 
political space and ranges from 0 to 1.0. Cluster-adjusted standard errors used (parties). Significance levels: ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1. 
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these ideological variables, I also included dummies to control for potential country ef-
fects. A dummy for cultural European integration sub-issues allows for the expected 
higher baseline level of nationalist framing for the politico-cultural sub-issues of enlarge-
ment and deepening (in contrast to the economic European integration sub-issues of mar-
ket making and social regulation).  
With regard to the nationalist and the multicultural-universalist framing, we ex-
pect that the use of these frame categories is primarily influenced by the cultural axis of 
the political space. The closer a party is to the liberal GAL-pole, the less it should rely on 
nationalist frames and, in turn, the more it should use multicultural-universalist frames. 
The results in Table 7.4 are in line with these expectations. Nationalist framing is highest 
at the conservative TAN-pole of the cultural axis and decreases the more a party moves 
to the opposite liberal GAL-pole. Likewise, there is a statistically significant effect of the 
cultural axis on the frequency of the multicultural-universalist framing, but as expected 
in the opposite direction: The closer a party is to the liberal pole of the cultural axis, the 
more likely it is to use multicultural-universalist arguments to justify a European integra-
tion stance. Moreover, there is also a positive significant effect of extremism on nation-
alist framing – the more extreme a party is, the more frequently it relies on nationalist 
arguments.  
For the use of economic frames, we expect an analogous effect of the economic 
left-right axis of the political space. The empirical results here are less clear-cut than for 
cultural framing. Although the direction of the effects on economic framing is in line with 
our expectations – the closer to the rightist pole of the economic axis it is, the less likely 
a party is to use social security and labor frames, but the more likely it is to rely on eco-
nomic prosperity frames – the coefficient reaches statistical significance only in the case 
of the former. Moreover, there is a strong negative and statistically significant effect of 
extremism on economic prosperity framing. In other words, parties located in the center 
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of the political space are likely to use this frame more often than those parties at the 
fringes of the political spectrum. This finding suggests that economic prosperity seems to 
be primarily an argument of the mainstream parties and ideological orientations matter 
less here. 
Ideological extremism also has a statistically significant negative effect on the use 
of political efficiency and efficacy frames, as hypothesized. As expected, moderate par-
ties at the center rely more frequently on these non-ideological, pragmatic frames to jus-
tify their (mostly supportive) European integration stances. Yet there is also a significant 
positive effect of the economic axis, which means that the more a party is to the right, the 
more likely it is to use this frame. For the residual framing category security/ecology, 
moreover, we find a similar significant positive effect of the economic axis.  
In sum, these findings for our ideological variables support the argument that 
framing patterns of political parties are heavily shaped by their ideological profiles. In 
particular, the effects of the two axes of the political space on the use of the four cultural 
and economic frame categories was always in the expected direction and reached statis-
tical significance in three out of the four frame categories – despite the relatively small 
number of cases. Moreover, the hypothesized effects of the cultural TAN-GAL axis were 
considerably stronger than those of the economic left-right axis, suggesting that ideolog-
ical differences along the cultural fault line are more distinctly articulated in the public 
debate on European integration than the economic divide. 
In addition to these results for the main variables of interest, the effect of the sub-
issues type is strong and statistically significant for the economic and cultural framing. 
This suggests that political actors are not only constrained by their ideological profile, but 
also by the inherent characteristics of the sub-issue debated. By contrast, country effects 
in all of the six regression analyses are rare and only marginal. Hence, there is no evidence 
in our data for systematically distinct national elite discourses on European integration in 
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terms of framing (cf. Díez Medrano 2003; Díez Medrano and Gray 2010). Rather, the 
findings tentatively suggest that the varying frame content of the public debates in the 
individual countries is primarily a result of the differential standing of the various political 
actors. For example, the alleged nationalist slant of the European integration debate in the 
UK is mainly due to the strong standing of the British Conservatives and their strong use 
of nationalist frames. Their framing strategy, however, is not unusual if we compare it 
with parties in other countries that share a similar ideological profile. 
 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter provided an insight into the framing of European integration, in other words, 
how political elites attempt to shape citizens’ thinking about this political issue. The find-
ings substantiated our expectation of a diverse framing, which confirmed that the question 
of what European integration is all about is an open one. On one hand, this is due to the 
inherently multi-faceted nature of this political issue. Deepening and enlargement are 
framed primarily in cultural terms, and economic framing prevails in the sub-issues of 
market making and social regulation. Yet even within the individual sub-issues, the fram-
ing is far from homogenous. Politicians do not share a common image of Europe; rather, 
an intense framing contest is raging. Clearly, contestation about Europe can be reduced 
neither to only an economic nor to a cultural dimension of conflict.  
The fault lines of this framing contest do not run along national boundaries, where 
most previous framing studies have looked, but between different domestic social groups. 
The strategies of individual political actors are strongly shaped by their intention to tie 
European integration to their more fundamental ideological concerns. Notably, politicians 
close to the economic leftist pole, particularly the Radical Left, and politicians close to 
the culturally conservative TAN-pole, particularly the Populist Right, oppose European 
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integration, but for different reasons. The former emphasize labor and social security con-
cerns, while the latter rely heavily on nationalist framing. We did not explore the impact 
of elite framing on citizens’ attitudes, but both of these motives have been shown to be 
crucial in explaining negative attitudes among the population (Bornschier 2011; Garry 
and Tilley 2009; Hooghe and Marks 2004; 2005; McLaren 2004; 2006; 2007). Moreover, 
Edwards and de Vries (2009) found that the presence of Populist Right parties increases 
Euroscepticism among individuals with national exclusive identities, whereas the pres-
ence of Radical Left parties mobilizes Euroscepticism among individuals who feel eco-
nomically insecure. The present chapter strengthens this argument by providing the miss-
ing link between the presence of these parties and the importance of the corresponding 
motives in European attitude formation. It found that these politicians explicitly and fre-
quently articulate their respective arguments in public debate, cueing receptive citizens 
to evaluate European integration in their preferred way.  
Contrary to politicians at the fringes of the political spectrum, mainstream parties, 
national governments and the EU rely frequently on pragmatic frames that potentially 
appeal to a broader audience than ideological frames when justifying their overall pro-
European attitudes. This strategy is shared by the Green parties, which suggests that this 
party family has firmly arrived in the political mainstream – not only regarding its pro-
European positions (as shown in Chapter 5), but also with respect to the arguments it puts 
forward. However, mainstream party families share the motives of their more radical 
counterparts at the periphery of the political spectrum and at times join in their critical 
views. The Social Democrats are highly critical of Europe if evaluated in the light of 
economic considerations. The parties of the moderate right, in turn, evaluate European 
integration negatively in light of nationalist considerations. Particularly the German CSU 
and the British Conservatives also rely heavily on nationalist frames, which are advocated 
most forcefully by the Populist Right. 
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Interestingly, the nationalist framing by these political actors close to the cultur-
ally conservative TAN-pole commonly combines both ethnic and (more moderate) civic 
nationalism. This suggests that these two nationalisms are just two faces of the same coin. 
European integration is perceived by these politicians as a dual threat weakening both 
one’s own ethnic community and national sovereignty. Moreover, the Populist Right also 
occasionally adopts the framing strategy of the Radical Left and emphasizes labor and 
social security concerns which suggests that, now and then, they purse a “welfare chau-
vinist” strategy. In general, however, their nationalist framing clearly prevails. In the fol-
lowing chapter, we will see which implications the possibility to frame European integra-
tion in such diverse ways has on the politicization of this political issue in Western Euro-
pean countries.  
  
CHAPTER 8  
The limited politicization of Europe 
The previous chapters examined which political actors are trying to politicize European 
integration, and for what reasons. We identified those actor characteristics that explain 
which politicians are more likely to adopt negative positions vis-à-vis European integra-
tion – in general, but also towards each of its four sub-issues (Chapter 5). We explored 
which politicians are more likely to emphasize European integration in public (Chapter 
6), and we studied which frames are preferred by whom when talking about Europe 
(Chapter 7). Ideology, conceptualized in a two-dimensional political space, proved to be 
a key factor. Notably, but – to complicate matters – not exclusively, the closer a politician 
is to the conservative TAN-pole of the cultural axis, the more likely he or she is to polit-
icize Europe.  
These strategies are a necessary precondition for any system-wide politicization 
of Europe. Yet the question whether these individual efforts by political entrepreneurs 
can ultimately rock the boat, i.e. whether they have a significant impact on the political 
system as a whole, is a different one – although equally relevant. The present chapter will 
tackle this question of how strongly European integration is being politicized in Western 
European political systems.  
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Scholars sharply disagree on the broader significance of conflict about European 
integration and whether it is powerful enough to affect domestic political conflict in gen-
eral. Hooghe and Marks (2009, 22) acknowledge the large-scale politicization of Europe 
as an established fact and argue that it is “difficult to believe that [it] could be stuffed 
back in the bag”. Other authors are more skeptical and claim that, in general, the level of 
politicization in Western European countries is low (see, e.g., Mair 2001; Taggart and 
Szczerbiak 2008a). The most elaborated theoretical argument to date as to why the normal 
case should not be the abundance but the lack of politicization of the European integration 
issue, is put forward by Green-Pedersen (2010; 2011). For him, European integration – 
unlike immigration – has been and will remain “a giant fast asleep” because mainstream 
parties find the issue to be not very attractive. 
The present chapter contributes to this ongoing scholarly debate in two ways. 
First, it evaluates these arguments and adds new ones, both based on the detailed analyses 
in the previous chapters. Second, it presents new empirical results on the level of politi-
cization by applying an alternative measure of politicization. While previous work based 
their claims, if not merely on anecdotal or unsystematic evidence, on either issue salience 
or positions, the indicator applied here accounts for both issue salience and issue polari-
zation, in line with a comprehensive conceptualization of politicization.  
We will see that the empirical results on how strongly European integration is 
being politicized relative to other issues, over time, and across the various countries, sug-
gest a sustained but at the same time limited politicization of Europe. Moreover, the find-
ings will reveal considerable variation across countries and over time. Particularly the 
search for factors able to explain country differences has occupied scholars in this area 
for quite some time. Yet finding a convincing and simultanously parsimonious explana-
tion appears to be a challenging task. It is telling that, after examining the roughly 20 
individual case studies in their edited volume, Taggart and Szczerbiak (2008, 358) have 
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to conclude somewhat helplessly that “it is specificities of the cases rather than the simi-
larities between them that generate such contestation. In short, open contestation over 
Europe in party systems appears to occur for different reasons in different states.” Not-
withstanding this difficulty, this chapter will also try to shed some light on this question 
and identify the factors accounting for differences across countries. Because of the limi-
tations imposed by the small country sample of the present study, these findings are nec-
essarily tentative. 
 
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION – A POLITICAL ISSUE THAT CAN ROCK THE BOAT? 
In a widely cited article, Hooghe and Marks (2009) argue that European integration has 
become increasingly politicized following the Maastricht Accord in 1991. According to 
them, this has happened not because public opinion on Europe has changed fundamen-
tally, but because on many crucial European issues decision-making has shifted from in-
sulated elite politics to mass politics, as some political entrepreneurs have taken ad-
vantage of the Eurosceptic potential that has existed among the population for quite some 
time (2009, 13). Although mainstream parties suffered from internal disagreement about 
this issue and tried to depoliticize European integration, they ultimately failed to do so. 
The Populist Right parties, national Conservatives and the Radical Left “smelled blood” 
and did not pass up this opportunity (Hooghe and Marks 2009, 21; also see de Vries 
2007). Moreover, Kriesi and colleagues (2006; 2008; 2012) argue that Europe is, together 
with immigration and economic liberalization, a key element of a newly emerging con-
flict between the winners and losers of globalization, which has spurred a far-reaching 
restructuring of the political space in Western European countries and is primarily driven 
by opposition from parties close to the conservative TAN-pole of the cultural axis. As a 
result, both groups of scholars argue, European integration has become an integral part 
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of domestic political contestation gaining critical significance in elections, referendums, 
and party competition.  
Scholars who challenge this affirmative view primarily take issue with the claim 
that Eurosceptic extreme parties are able to drive the politicization of Europe. The crucial 
point is rather, they argue, whether and how the mainstream parties react to these efforts 
to politicize newly emerging issues (for the general argument, see Meguid 2005). Build-
ing upon that objection and based on a “crucial case” study of Denmark, Green-Pedersen 
(2010) arrives at a bleak assessment regarding the potential for the politicization of Eu-
rope in Western Europe. According to him, mainstream parties have no incentives to po-
liticize a new issue if it makes government coalition-building more difficult and if it does 
not fit easily into the established patterns of political conflict –- the latter brings the risk 
of ending up with strange bedfellows. Because European integration is effectively such a 
difficult issue, he argues, the “sleeping giant” is expected to remain fast asleep.  
What do the findings in the previous chapters of the present study suggest regard-
ing the potential to politicize Europe? In sum, they provide a mixed assessment and sug-
gest a sustained but at the same time limited politicization of this issue. Chapter 4 showed 
that public attention to European integration is strongly focused on institutional events 
initiated and controlled by (generally pro-European) national governments and the EU, 
such as constitutional reforms, enlargement steps, and referendums. As a result, it is dif-
ficult for challengers to get a grip on this issue and to politicize European integration 
continuously and independently. In the case of immigration, to mention a closely related 
cultural issue, this is easier as the issue is driven by smaller events and party political 
contestation.  
A welcome opportunity for the disadvantaged challengers are referendums on Eu-
ropean matters, which are often considered as “flash points” of the politicization of Eu-
rope (Hooghe and Marks 2009, 20; also see Mudde 2011, 17; Mair 2001, 48). However, 
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although referendums lend strong impetus to the European integration debate, their role 
in the politicization of Europe is at the same time limited as they take place only infre-
quently and the decision whether to call a referendum is usually at the discretion of na-
tional governments. Hence, any actor attempting to politicize Europe in a sustained man-
ner also needs to be able to raise the heat on Europe during the long periods without 
referendums. The sole exception in this regard is Switzerland, where any political group 
with sufficient resources can initiate direct-democratic votes. Unsurprisingly, the right 
populist SVP has made frequent use of this opportunity in its effort to politicize Europe.  
The findings on the nature of the European integration issue and on the politiciza-
tion strategies of the political actors in Chapter 5–7 are more ambiguous regarding their 
implications for the system-wide politicization of this issue. The fact that it is a highly 
multi-faceted issue leads to complex, multiple and over time shifting linkages with the 
general political space. As a result, we found opposition to Europe in different places 
(although concentrated at the conservative TAN-pole of the cultural axis), case-by-case 
Euroscepticism even among mainstream actors, and highly diverse framing by individual 
political actors. 
On one hand, these findings can be interpreted as being conducive to a large-scale 
politicization. The fact that European integration is systematically related to the existing 
basic lines of domestic political conflict (and that it does not constitute an independent 
and fundamentally new line of conflict, as suggested by some scholars) provides oppor-
tunities for politicians from the entire ideological spectrum. For most political actors, 
even from the political mainstream, there is an aspect of European integration that runs 
counter to their programmatic profile and on which they are able to mobilize opposition 
if they want to. Moreover, they should be able to convey such an opposing stance com-
pellingly to their constituency by framing European integration accordingly and connect-
ing it to their core political concerns. Culturally conservative politicians draw on fears of 
178 Chapter 8 
 
  
losing sovereignty and weakening the national community, while economic leftist actors 
promote concerns about the retrenchment of the welfare state, unemployment and harm-
ful competition by the economic left.  
Further, the most powerful and consistent opposition to Europe comes from the 
conservative TAN-pole of the cultural axis – these politicians continuously fuel the po-
liticization of Europe. Parties close to the TAN-pole exist in all six countries under study, 
although they are not necessarily Right Populist. The Conservatives in the UK and the 
Swiss SVP are the most powerful representatives of this kind in our sample, they have 
vote shares of around 30 percent or more. However, Austria and France also both have a 
significant Populist Right, and the German CDU/CSU is also close to the culturally con-
servative TAN-pole. Only the Netherlands did not have a relevant culturally conservative 
actor during the period under study as the Populist Right was still clearly below 10 percent 
back then. However, as I argued above, also for these culturally conservative parties Eu-
ropean integration is a challenging issue and, as shown in Chapter 6, less attractive than 
immigration, on which they strongly mobilize. 
On the other hand, the intricate linkage of European integration with the political 
space and the abundance of opportunities may instead impede any effective politicization. 
Indeed, why should political actors invest heavily in the politicization of European inte-
gration if this issue is particularly difficult to own and does not help to distinguish them-
selves clearly from their competitors because it is highly evasive and its lines of conflict 
are blurred? In the end, politicians may be deprived of the fruits of their labor or have to 
share them. Even worse, politicians might find themselves siding with their enemies as 
both the Radical Left as well as the Populist Right oppose European integration, albeit 
for different reasons. The risk of strange bedfellows constitutes a potential problem, par-
ticularly for the mainstream parties (Green-Pedersen 2011). This is not the case in the 
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field of immigration. Here, the political right does not run the risk of being involuntarily 
joined in their opposition by actors of the political left.  
Finally, even strong framing efforts may not help to overcome these difficulties. 
As shown in Chapter 7, the diverse framing of European integration leads to a situation 
in which the image of European integration – i.e., what this issue means for the broader 
public – is difficult to control for any single actor. Orientations towards Europe might 
suddenly not fit in with a political actor’s ideological profile because of an unexpected 
re-framing of the public debate. Green-Pedersen (2011, 10) illustrates the difficulty of 
controlling the framing by pointing to the Euro Referendum in Denmark in 2000, where 
even with a concerted effort the mainstream parties did not succeed in establishing their 
(pro-European) economic frame as hegemonic and, as a result, lost the vote (see de Vreese 
and Semetko 2004).In sum, European integration is an issue politicians find particularly 
difficult to handle. Its multiple connections to core political concerns of politicians of 
various sorts might be a blessing as well as a curse. Certainly, they provide many oppor-
tunities for politicization, but, at the same time, the intricate situation poses a challenge, 
particularly for the mainstream parties, and may make the issue hardly attractive for large-
scale politicization efforts by political entrepreneurs. Moreover, the fact that the issue is 
usually under the tight control of national governments and the EU complicates any po-
liticization by challengers, and it is unclear whether the occasionally held referendums 
can compensate for that. Hence, based on these quite mixed arguments, I expect a mod-
erate level of politicization of European integration. The issue is unlikely to be irrelevant 
in domestic political competition, but it is equally implausible that it will become all-
dominant.  
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MEASURING THE POLITICIZATION OF EUROPE 
How strongly is Europe actually being politicized in the six Western European political 
systems under study? This section presents in detail the empirical findings for the 2000s 
as well as the development over time. However, before then a few words on the measure-
ment of politicization are necessary. Politicization remains an ill-defined concept in the 
literature and it is not always clear what scholars actually understand by it. Often, the 
level of politicization in a particular country is assessed qualitatively, usually based on 
impressionistic or anecdotal evidence (see, e.g., Taggart and Szczerbiak 2008a). More 
systematic accounts simply equate politicization with issue salience, with the advantage 
that this can be measured systematically and in a straightforward way. Green-Pedersen 
(2011, 5–6) strongly encourages the use of this indicator. In his view, diverging attitudes 
between different social groups or political actors are a necessary, but not a sufficient 
condition for politicization – what is instead needed is a certain level of attention. Hence, 
he suggests that researchers should focus on issue salience. The first part of his argument 
is persuasive. Indeed, diverging attitudes are not the only element of politicization. In 
Chapter 3, I argued in favor of a more comprehensive conceptualization of politicization 
that includes polarized attitudes, salience, and the framing of an issue. In light of this 
argument, the remedy to rely on issue salience only is again incomplete. Hence, what I 
propose in the following is to combine issue salience with a systematic measure of the 
polarization of attitudes. These are elements of politicization that both can be measured 
by quantitative indicators. Unfortunately, it is impossible to integrate the third element of 
politicization – how and whether an issue is connected to more basic political concerns 
by its framing – as this cannot be quantified.   
Why is it crucial to conceive of politicization as the result of both polarization and 
salience? To make this point compellingly, I first look at both of these elements separately 
in the data. Again I rely on the data on national election campaigns as used in Chapter 6 
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because that allows me to calculate the salience of European integration compared to all 
other political issues. Hence, the subsequent findings reflect the level of politicization in 
the partisan arena. This includes only a subset of political actors but, as shown in Chapter 
4, partisan actors are by far the most relevant ones in the European integration debate. 
Figure 8.1 shows the hierarchy of issues on the political agenda in the 2000s 
across all six countries as reflected in national election campaigns. The figure reports the 
average salience of all 12 categorized issues. European integration is ranked number 10, 
as party politicians devote on average 5.2 percent of all their statements to it. Dominating 
the agenda is the issue of welfare, which party politicians refer to in every fifth public 
statement. Cultural liberalism (support for cultural diversity, gender equality, human 
rights etc.) and economic liberalism are the second and third most salient issues. Hence, 
European integration is definitely not a top-ranking issue on the political agenda. Several 
other issues receive more attention and rank higher, including immigration with 7.8 per-
cent and rank order number six. On the other hand, one has to acknowledge that European 
integration has at least made it onto the political agenda – unlike myriads of other poten-
tial political issues that never gain any visibility. If a politician has the opportunity to 
speak to the public, in at least one out of 20 cases he or she will actually utter a statement 
about Europe. Yet, altogether, we can safely say that the salience of European integration 
in our six countries is only modest. Green-Pedersen (2011) finds similar results for Den-
mark, a crucial case in his view. Based on this result, he draws the more general conclu-
sion that the degree of politicization has been exaggerated in most of the literature and 
that European integration is still and will remain a “giant fast asleep”.  
 
However, before adopting his interpretation, let us look at how polarized attitudes 
to European integration are. The polarization measure used for this purpose is the same 
as in Kriesi et al. (2008; 2012). It is based on Taylor and Hermann’s (1971) index, which 
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was originally designed to measure the degree of left-right polarization in a party system. 
Yet it can also be used to indicate how strongly actor positions differ in a given country 
over a specific issue. Polarization is defined as follows:  
Issue polarization = ∑ uk(xk − x̅)2nk=1  
where uk is the standing of political actor k for the issue, xk  is the position of 
political actor k on the issue, and x̅ is the weighted average position of all political actors 
on the issue. The latter is calculated as: 
x̅ = ∑ ukxknk=1  
The possible values of this polarization index range from 0 to 1. Polarization is 
high if there is a high level of divergence in attitudes to the particular issue. Generally, 
the value increases the more those actors with substantial standing adopt extreme and 
conflicting attitudes. 
In fact, this second indicator paints quite a different picture. Figure 8.2 shows the 
degree of polarization for the various issues that are ranked on the political agenda. The 
two issues that are the most polarizing in our six countries are the army and European 
integration (both 0.31). Immigration comes in an already distant third. These are those 
issues on which politicians fundamentally disagree and on which they are most deeply 
divided. Hence, if we were to evaluate the politicization of Europe based on its polariza-
tion we would come up with an assessment that directly contradicts the one above based 




Notes: Averages of issue polarization in election campaigns in the six countries.  
FIGURE 8.2. Issue polarization in election campaigns in the 2000s 
 
 
Notes: Averages of issue salience for the six countries. In each country under study, at least two 
election campaigns took place in the period covered. Austria 2002 and 2006, UK 2001 and 
2005, Germany 2002 and 2005, Netherlands 2002, 2003 and 2006, Switzerland 2003 and 2007.  
FIGURE 8.1. The political agenda in election campaigns in the 2000s 
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More generally, a comparison of the results presented in Figures 8.1 on issue sa-
lience and 8.2 on issue polarization reveal that the two elements of politicization do not 
go together so often.47 High levels of issue salience are not necessarily accompanied by 
high levels of polarization. As mentioned above, the issue of European integration is only 
modestly salient, but at the same time highly polarizing. A substantive share of politicians 
adopts (negative) extreme positions on European integration, although the opportunities 
to articulate them are limited. The issue of welfare, by contrast, is highly salient, but the 
conflict surrounding it is not very polarized. Most politicians take balanced positions and 
no one questions the existence of a system of social security in principle, although there 
are numerous minor disputes about the adequate scope, level and specific means to 
achieve welfare goals. Interestingly, our findings for these two issues are consistent with 
Green (2007). She argues that in the UK issues along the economic left-right dimension 
– although still highly salient – have transformed from traditionally highly conflictive 
into consensual “valence issues” (Stokes 1992), while European integration, by contrast, 
has become increasingly polarized.  
This may also explain why there is so much disagreement in the literature on the 
level of the politicization of Europe – depending on what one measures, one arrives at 
different conclusions. Well, where do we go from here? Which issues are more politi-
cized, those that are more salient, as suggested by adherents of the agenda-setting ap-
proach; or those that are more polarizing, as (implicitly) assumed by spatial models of 
voting? In line with the comprehensive approach adopted in this study, I would argue that 




47 For the issue of European integration, the correlation between salience and polarization in individual 
elections in the six countries between the 1970s and the 2000s is a low 0.18 (not significant, N=32), 
which corroborates this observation. 
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both answers miss the point. It would be wrong to contend that the highly salient issue of 
welfare is per se an irrelevant issue only because it is not very polarizing. However, it 
would be equally wrong to claim that the strongly polarized issue of European integration 
is not important for political conflict merely because its salience is modest. Instead, sali-
ence and polarization represent different, but equally essential elements of politicization 
(for similar arguments in the context of European issue voting, see Clements and Bartle 
2009; de Vries 2007). Both is needed, issues that are either only highly salient or only 
strongly polarizing are not politicized as the other necessary element is missing. Con-
versely, the most politicized issues are those which are both highly salient and strongly 
polarizing. Hence, to systematically compare the level of politicization across issues, 
countries and over time, an indicator is needed that combines these two elements. For 
this, I simply take the product of the two separate elements: Issue politicization = issue salience × issue polarization 
This indicator more adequately reflects the politicization of an issue than relying either 
on issue salience or on polarization alone.  
With this combined indicator in hand, we can compare the politicization of Euro-
pean integration with other political issues. What are the politicization scores of the var-
ious issues? As shown in Figure 8.3, the two most politicized issues are both well-estab-
lished, namely budgetary rigor and cultural liberalism, with scores of 2.3 and 2.2, respec-
tively. Behind these two, a larger group of four issues follows, each with above-average 
politicization scores of between 1.5 and 1.8. This group includes the issues of immigra-
tion, economic liberalism, welfare, and European integration. The remaining six of the 
overall twelve political issues all have considerably lower levels of politicization. Hence, 
if we consider both salience and polarization in our politicization measure, the issue of 
European integration can be found in the upper midrange. It is neither marginal, nor is it 
the one issue that is dominating domestic political competition. These findings are well 
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in line with our mixed assessment and the corresponding expectation of a significant but 
simultaneously limited politicization of Europe.  
Until now, I have deliberately ignored country differences to keep matters simple. 
It is time to consider them in more detail. Table 8.1 shows the degree of politicization as 
well as the salience and polarization of European integration in the 2000s for each of the 
six countries under study. Both the absolute value and the resulting rank order among the 
12 political issues are reported. The UK is the country in which European integration is 
politicized most heavily. In fact, its politicization score of 3.04 is higher than for any 
other political issue debated in the UK. This is the result of its considerable salience as 
well as its high level of polarization in this country. The salience of European integration 
is 9.3 percent, making it the fifth most salient issue during this period. The value for 
 
 
Notes: Averages of issue politicization in election campaigns in the six countries. Politicization 
is the product of salience and polarization. 
FIGURE 8.3. Issue politicization in election campaigns in the 2000s 
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polarization is 0.28, which is the highest value of all political issues considered. Switzer-
land comes close with the second highest politicization score of 2.62, which is particularly 
influenced by the strong polarization regarding European matters, while the salience of 
European integration is only average in a comparative perspective. Yet politicization in 
Switzerland sharply decreased in the 2000s compared to the 1990s, when it reached an 
all-time high, as we will see soon. In the four remaining countries, both the absolute value 
of the politicization of Europe as well as the rank order among the 12 political issues are 
considerably lower than in the UK. The Netherlands is the country where Europe is the 
least politicized (0.43), as it is both not very salient (2.9 percent) and not very polarizing 
(0.15). The remaining countries Germany, Austria, and France adopt a middle ground 
with politicization scores of between 1.0 and 1.5. 
 











  Value Rank no.  Value Rank no.  Value Rank no. 
UK  3.04 1  9.3 5  0.28 1 
Switzerland  2.62 4  4.8 11  0.54 2 
Germany  1.42 4  4.2 8  0.21 5 
Austria   1.34 5  5.4 8  0.24 6 
France   1.07 6  4.8 10  0.46 1 
Netherlands  0.43 12  2.9 12  0.15 5 
Overall  1.65 4.5  5.2 9  0.31 3.5 
Notes: The values are averages of the two first elections in the 2000s for each country (except 
NL, the first three elections). Rank number of Europe among all 12 political issues. The rank 
number indicated in the overall row is the median. 
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How the level of politicization develops over time in the individual countries is 
shown in Figure 8.4. As a benchmark for comparison, the figure also displays the level 
of politicization for two additional issues – the equally newly emerging cultural issue of 
immigration, which is closely related to European integration since it also deals with de-
nationalization processes and the traditional economic issue of welfare. European inte-
gration was largely absent from political competition in the 1970s, whereas it has subse-
quently gained momentum. Yet the increase in politicization in the 1990s and/or 2000s 
varies from modest to massive in scale across the countries. Moreover, there is no clear 
trend observable in the most recent years.  
Let us briefly look at the development in individual countries. In the UK, Euro-
pean integration was highly politicized from the mid-1990s until the first election of the 
2000s. The values for welfare and immigration are considerably lower, as shown in Fig-
ure 8.4. The all-time high was reached at the 2001 elections, when the Conservatives 
made the question of whether to join the euro one of their main campaign issues – yet 
with only modest electoral success (Evans 2002; but see Baker 2002, 324). In the subse-
quent elections of 2005, the Conservatives focused instead on the issue of immigration 
(Fisher 2006, 1282), while keeping fairly quiet on Europe. As a result, immigration was 
for the first time more politicized than European integration.  
In Switzerland, the politicization of Europe has remained continuously at a high 
level since the early 1990s, when the Swiss People’s Party (SVP) won the referendum 
against joining the European Economic Area single-handedly and incorporated opposi-
tion to European integration as a defining issue of its programmatic profile. Yet in the 
last two elections covered by our data, European integration has become, somewhat un-
expectedly, less politicized. This is probably because Swiss mainstream parties have 
adopted less Euro-enthusiastic stances than in previous years and embarked on a strategy 
of “integration without membership” (Lavenex 2009) based on a number of bilateral 
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agreements with the EU. In fact, in 2007, the Social Democrats were the only mainstream 
party that was openly in favor of opening EU accession negotiations. As a result, immi-
gration has caught up with European integration in Switzerland in terms of politicization 
in the 2000s. 
Austria, France and Germany are countries where European integration has been 
moderately politicized since the 1990s. Unlike in the UK and Switzerland, European in-
tegration there has remained mostly in the shadow of the more heavily politicized immi-
gration issue. Yet this was not the case in Germany at the recent elections of 2005 when 
European integration was, by contrast, considerably more strongly politicized than immi-
gration. This was mainly due to the pronounced opposition of the CSU/CDU to Turkey’s 
prospective EU membership. Finally, the Netherlands not only exhibited a low level of 
politicization of Europe in the 2000s, as shown in Table 7.1, but this issue also played a 
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marginal role in the 1990s. Immigration, in contrast, is continuously more strongly polit-
icized there.  
Summarizing these findings, we can group the six countries in three distinct clus-
ters depending on the level of their politicization of European integration (Figure 8.5). 
First, Europe is highly politicized in the UK and Switzerland. As shown above, both 
countries not only exhibited high average levels of politicization in the 2000s, but they 
also had downright outbursts in which European integration was dominating individual 
election campaigns, either in the 1990s or 2000s. In the literature, the UK and Switzerland 
are often described as particular cases with a strong Eurosceptic tradition (see, e.g., Kriesi 
2007; Statham et al. 2010; for the UK also Díez Medrano 2003; Mair 2001, 35). While 
according to Kriesi (2007) these two countries represent typical cases and forerunners of 
a more general development in Western Europe caused by the newly emerging globali-
zation cleavage, Green-Pedersen (2011) sees them as atypical outliers. In his view, their 
peculiar political systems (majority voting and the resulting one-party government in the 
UK; the “magic formula” that guarantees government participation for all relevant parties 
in Switzerland) make coalition considerations less relevant – in contrast to most other 
Western European countries. However, this argument is at odds with the findings in the 
previous chapters which suggested that, first, politicization efforts are not restricted to 
fringe parties but are also common among mainstream actors and, second, that govern-
ment-opposition dynamics are largely irrelevant in explaining the politicization strategies 
of individual actors. What matters more is that in both countries there are electorally very 
strong culturally conservative parties close to the TAN-pole which proved to be the main 
drivers of opposition to European integration. Moreover, for Switzerland, the ready avail-
ability of direct-democratic instruments – also for the Eurosceptic challengers – seems, 
as expected, to facilitate the politicization of European integration. 
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The countries with medium politicization levels in our sample are Germany, Aus-
tria and France. Here, European integration is neither wide awake nor fast asleep. All 
three have culturally conservative parties with significant vote shares, and the opposition 
of the German CDU/CSU and the French UMP to the accession of Turkey illustrates that 
cultural opposition against European integration is also prevalent among mainstream ac-
tors. Of course, this opposition is selective and not fundamental, but it is – in combination 
with more fundamental, but less visible opposition from marginal actors – able to keep 
the politicization of Europe going. A significant Eurosceptic force at the left pole of the 
economic axis exists only in the case of France, not in the other countries. Finally, the 
only country in our sample with a low level of politicization is the Netherlands. Here, 
European integration is quite an insignificant issue – both on average and at individual 
elections. This might be explained by the fact that the Extreme/Populist Right was com-
paratively weak in electoral terms during the period under study.  
 
 
















In domestic politics, the European giant is neither wide awake nor fast asleep, as both 
proposed in the literature. In light of the findings of this chapter, the answer to how 
strongly the issue of European integration is being politicized in Western European po-
litical systems lies somewhere in between. We found evidence of sustained but at the 
same time limited politicization. While Europe integration was, after all, the fourth most 
politicized issue during election campaigns in the 2000s across all countries under study, 
it was surpassed by the equally newly emerging and in many respects very similar issue 
of immigration, as well as by the more traditional issues of budgetary rigor and cultural 
liberalism. European integration is currently a highly relevant political issue, but it is far 
from being all-dominant. Clearly, its level of politicization has considerably increased 
since the 1970s. Yet at the same time we observed no steady upward trend – the level of 
politicization declined in the 2000s compared to the 1990s. Moreover, differences be-
tween countries and fluctuations between individual elections are high. Only in a few 
countries has European integration become the major issue in political competition, and 
only temporarily. Nevertheless, it is even rarer that European integration has been mar-
ginally politicized. 
Explaining these patterns of the politicization of Europe at the country level is a 
difficult task, as already indicated in the introduction. Like immigration, European inte-
gration is related to the denationalization process and politicized by similar political ac-
tors. However, the politicization of European integration is less straightforward than the 
case of immigration because of its multi-faceted nature, the resulting multiple linkages 
with the political space, and its characteristic as an issue that is strongly in control of 
national governments. As this chapter has shown, these complications limit the politici-
zation of Europe and prevent a steady rise, but they do not preclude its politicization at a 
more moderate, yet still significant level.  
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As the present study is limited to six countries, the question of which factors ac-
count for country variations can necessarily only be answered tentatively. The results 
suggest that a strong party close to the culturally conservative TAN-pole, regardless of 
whether it is from the Populist/Radical Right or the Christian-democratic and Conserva-
tive party family, seems to be conducive to the politicization of European integration. In 
those two countries with the two electorally strongest TAN-parties, European integration 
is also the most politicized. Moreover, the Swiss case further suggests that the ready 
availability of direct-democratic instruments also increases the level of politicization as 
it provides otherwise rare opportunities for challengers to put European integration on top 
of the political agenda. The power of referendums to focus public attention can hardly be 
overestimated, as Chapter 4 showed. However, referendums are rare events in most West-
ern European countries and, although they may lend extra impetus to the politicization of 





CHAPTER 9  
Conclusion 
The goal of this study was to examine the politicization of European integration in West-
ern Europe and to explore how the different political actors deal with this political issue 
in domestic politics. What have we learned? Four main points of this study stand out. 
First, the analysis showed that ideology matters greatly for the politicization of Europe. 
Pre-existing lines of conflict have been proven to crucially shape politicians’ responses 
towards European integration. The three strategies available to politicize an issue – issue 
positions, issue emphasis, and framing – are all significantly influenced by a political 
actor’s location in the two-dimensional political space. Other frequently mentioned fac-
tors, such as nationality and strategic considerations (i.e., opposition-government status 
of the parties) were shown to be clearly secondary or even irrelevant. This is not to deny 
that opposition parties are likely to be Eurosceptic – yet they are not against Europe 
merely because they are in opposition but for the reason that many of these parties are, 
first and foremost, ideologically extreme. Eurosceptic attitudes and European integration 
issue emphasis are more than strategic choices; they are substantively motivated.  
This finding is well in line with the literature that stresses the importance of tra-
ditional lines of conflict and well-established programmatic profiles to explain whether 
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and by whom European integration is being politicized (e.g., Kriesi 2007; Marks, Wilson, 
and Ray 2002). In contrast, it calls into question the competing argument that opposition 
to European integration is motivated primarily by strategic considerations (e.g., Sitter 
2002; Taggart 1998). The deeper reason for this result, I suggested, is that politicians are 
highly reluctant to jeopardize their well-established and costly ideological reputations 
even if they might benefit in the short term from adjusting their European integration 
attitudes. Moreover, while I hypothesized that politicians might enjoy more strategic flex-
ibility when emphasizing Europe (compared to adjusting their attitudes), the empirical 
analysis also provided no evidence regarding the significance of government-opposition 
status in that case. Instead, an individual political actor’s choice about how strongly to 
emphasize Europe proved to be most seriously constrained by the salience of Europe on 
the general political agenda. If no one else is talking about Europe, an individual actor is 
not able to prioritize the issue on their own. More generally, this results in the considera-
ble overlap between individual parties on the issues they address in election campaigns, 
a fact largely ignored by traditional issue-emphasis approaches, as adherents of the 
agenda-setting perspective have criticized (Green-Pedersen and Mortensen 2010; Sides 
2006; for European integration, Steenbergen and Scott 2004). 
 
Second, and following up the first point, the study showed that the European in-
tegration issue is linked to the political space in multiple, shifting and sometimes contra-
dictory ways. Further, precisely how European integration is aligned with pre-existing 
lines of conflict profoundly influences by whom and how the issue is being politicized. 
Chapter 5 in particular revealed that the inherent multidimensionality of European inte-
gration best explains why this issue is linked to the political space in such a complex way. 
By disentangling the “black box” of the European integration issue – all too rarely done 
in preexisting research – it could be shown that orientations are neither “too inchoate and 
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incoherent” (Mair 2007, 158) nor “orthogonal” (i.e., unrelated to traditional lines of con-
flict; see Hix and Lord 1997). Instead, European integration orientations are systemati-
cally related to the cultural as well as the economic axis of conflict, but the exact magni-
tude as well as direction of this effect depends on the particular sub-issue at stake – 
whether market making, social regulation, deepening, or enlargement is the subject of 
debate.  
Generally, the closer a politician is to the conservative TAN-pole of the cultural 
axis of conflict, the more they are likely to adopt negative orientations towards Europe 
and to emphasize this particular issue. The Populist/Extreme Right parties are nearest to 
the TAN-pole, but several mainstream right parties, such as the British Conservatives and 
the German CDU/CSU, are also culturally conservative. The cultural dimension, to the 
detriment of the economic one, has also increasingly come to dominate domestic politics 
in general since the early 1990s. This makes these actors the driving force in the ongoing 
politicization of Europe. Such cultural opposition is accompanied primarily by nationalist 
framing emphasizing the dual threat of European integration weakening both one’s own 
ethnic community and national sovereignty.  
However, not only the cultural axis but also the economic axis has an impact, 
although to a smaller extent; and the direction of the latter is shifting. Opposition to Eu-
ropean integration from the left pole of the economic axis is concentrated among the 
Radical Left and chiefly motivated by worries about unemployment and a dismantling of 
the national welfare state. Left mainstream parties also share these concerns to some ex-
tent, leading them to selectively abandon the pro-European mainstream consensus and to 
join their more radical counterparts in their Eurosceptic attitude, a phenomenon we could 
also observe for the mainstream political right. Similar observations led Statham et al. 
(2010) to speculate about a “normalization” of Euro-criticism in national party politics. 
Support for European integration, still prevalent among mainstream parties and public 
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authorities at the European and national level, is frequently framed by referring to moral-
universalist and multicultural values or by stressing pragmatic reasons, i.e. political effi-
ciency and efficacy. 
 
Third, the study found that the partisan arena still plays the main role in the polit-
icization of Europe. Contrary to other claims in the literature (Imig 2004; Imig and Tar-
row 2001), the results suggest that contestation over European integration does not take 
place on the streets – protest politics is barely visible and civil society actors, including 
social movements, play a marginal role at best. By contrast, party-affiliated politicians 
are responsible for every second statement in the public debate and, while public author-
ities are also relevant in terms of actor standing, opposition is clearly concentrated among 
the parties. The reason that European integration is under such tight control of these two 
actor groups is that the public debate over Europe is mainly driven by key institutional 
and policy-related events which are initiated and scheduled by either the European Union 
or national governments (also see Boomgaarden et al. 2010). 
Moreover, the findings showed that referendums may to some extent indeed serve 
as a counterweight due to their strong tendency to focus public attention and to broaden 
the range of the participating actors. Therefore, referendums lend fresh, strong impetus 
to the European integration debate and, in several instances, the political elite was caught 
on the wrong foot by unexpected developments, as the referendum defeats of the Consti-
tution in France and the Netherlands amply demonstrate. Yet, to our surprise, the actors 
that benefit most from these periods of heightened public attention are not the marginal-
ized civil society actors but the already strong parties, particularly the Eurosceptic fringe 
parties, which manage to increase their already high standing still further (also see 
Hoeglinger 2008). However, what severely limits the politicization of Europe by means 
of referendums is that they only take place rarely. And the stronger the opposition that 
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governments expect to face, the more they will be reluctant to call a referendum. Hence, 
any actor attempting to politicize European integration in a sustained way needs to be 
able to also raise the heat during the long periods between referendums. The sole excep-
tion in that regard is Switzerland, where direct-democratic votes can be initiated by any 
political group with sufficient resources. Tellingly, it is a party – namely the Right Pop-
ulist SVP – that routinely and quite successfully makes use of this opportunity in its effort 
to politicize Europe.  
 
To sum up the first three main points, we found that the multiple linkages of the 
European integration issue with the political space provide many opportunities for polit-
icization from various angles – opposition to European integration can be substantively 
motivated by cultural or economic reasons, from the left as well as from the right. At the 
same time, this constellation leads to ambivalent attitudes and unclear lines of conflict, 
which prevents European integration from becoming an “easy” issue (Carmines and Stim-
son 1980; also see Slothuus and de Vreese 2010, 643). The risk of strange bedfellows 
also looms (particularly for the mainstream parties). Moreover, the meaning of the issue 
is difficult to control for any individual actor in light of the highly diverse and contested 
framing. Further, while referendums give great momentum to the European integration 
debate and may provide a window of opportunity for otherwise marginalized actors and 
Eurosceptic fringe parties, the catch is that in most countries they are held only rarely. 
This mix of conducive and impeding factors results in – and this is the fourth main point 
– the moderate yet sustained politicization of Europe in Western European countries, as 
Chapter 8 showed.  
The empirical findings in this chapter are based on a comprehensive indicator that 
takes both polarization and salience into account and suggested that the answer to the 
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scholarly question of whether the sleeping giant of European integration has finally awak-
ened (de Vries 2007; Hooghe and Marks 2009; Kriesi 2007; van der Eijk and Franklin 
2004) or, by contrast, is still fast asleep (Green-Pedersen 2011; Mair 2001) lies some-
where in between these two perspectives. European integration was the fourth- most po-
liticized issue during election campaigns in the 2000s across all countries under study, 
only being surpassed by the issues of immigration, budgetary rigor, and cultural liberal-
ism. Yet we have also observed that, after it reached an all-time high in the 1990s, the 
level of politicization again declined in the 2000s. As a result, the emphasis on European 
integration given by the culturally conservative parties, the main driving force behind the 
politicization of Europe, is clearly in the shadow of the very similar but more attractive 
issue of immigration. Hence, European integration has become politicized on a sustained 
basis but with a limited magnitude only, as it is no easy issue – politicians are struggling 
with this intricate giant that is difficult to both domesticate and unleash for very long. 
 
What are limitations of this study and where are possible avenues for future re-
search? First, the proposed comprehensive conceptualization of politicization that incor-
porates the three elements – polarization of attitudes, intensification of the public debate 
(salience), and the connection to preexisting basic political concerns (which is accom-
plished by framing and ensures wider resonance in the public) – has not been fully main-
tained throughout this study. While all three related strategies were separately analyzed 
in depth, I did not incorporate the third element in the systematic measure of politicization 
and, as a consequence, the level of politicization was examined in Chapter 8 by jointly 
considering only polarization and salience. While this is undoubtedly a step forward com-
pared to previous research, future efforts might try to integrate the third element as well, 
possibly by utilizing public opinion data. 
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Next, while part of the analysis in this study stretched over several decades, the 
focus was clearly on the 2000s, as the more detailed data about the non-electoral public 
debate, which included information on non-partisan actors and the framing, was restricted 
to this period. It would be worthwhile to extend this focus over a larger time span, ena-
bling the study of changes over time with regard to actor participation, framing, and sub-
issue emphasis (as the present study already does with general European integration ori-
entations and issue emphasis). Moreover, I proposed that while the relative weight of the 
different sub-issues in public debate is subject to regular change as the agenda of Euro-
pean integration advances, the underlying mechanism and the patterns at work in each 
sub-issue are expected to be much more persistent. Detailed data over a longer period of 
time would be required to further probe this proposition.48 
The effort to open the “black box” of European integration and to systematically 
distinguish between the different fundamental subareas of this issue proved to be very 
productive and useful for our research question. Clearly, the point is not that European 
integration is multidimensional and other political issues are not but that, in our case, this 
multidimensionality is a critical factor in politicization and attitude formation. While the 
more recent research into the politicization of Europe and Euroscepticism already pursues 
similar paths, more consequential work needs to be done, and scholars should try harder 
to move beyond all-too-simple unidimensional concepts and measures.  




48 Moreover, in the long term the relative impact of the factors shaping the politicization may also 
change. For example, one could hypothesize whether strategic considerations played a more important 
role in earlier times when the newly emerging issue of European integration was only beginning to be-
come embedded in the political space.  
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The finding that the parties are the key players in contestation about European 
integration is good news for the majority of scholars who routinely only consider this 
actor group in their research – it suggests that this is indeed a viable strategy. Still, a few 
words of caution are in order. One should not treat this finding as being set in stone and 
it is certainly worth rechecking it once in a while. The observed partisan predominance 
may disappear during extraordinary circumstances. Moreover, one should not generalize 
this finding across issues – in the immigration debate, to mention the example in Chapter 
4, civil society actors participate much more actively. 
Moreover, the theoretical framework and the innovative data used in the present 
study could well be applied to other political issues. Kriesi et al. (2012) compared the 
public debate on European integration with the public debate on other issues that are also 
related to globalization, namely immigration and economic liberalization – albeit less 
extensively and with a different research interest than the present study. Studying other 
political issues similarly as was done here for European integration would further advance 
our general understanding of why a particular political issue becomes politicized or not, 
and in which ways. 
 
To conclude, European integration is no “easy” issue. Therefore, it will not fun-
damentally reshape domestic political competition single-handedly; by contrast, the issue 
is instead influenced by the existing, more general lines of political conflict. One might 
ask what the limited domestic politicization of Europe implies for the future prospects of 
European integration. Simon Hix (2008) proposed several institutional measures to “fix 
what’s wrong with the European Union”. These measures aim at promoting limited dem-
ocratic politics at the European level, which means more open political competition and 
partisan politics. Ideally, there is some level of political conflict that would bring the 
European Union closer to the people but, at the same time, it is limited enough not to lead 
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to policy gridlock or major disruptions. As we have seen in the present study, this already 
holds for European contestation within national political systems and, in this sense, it 
seems to me that the moderate domestic politicization of Europe might positively support 
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TABLE A.1. Party families and their national and European representatives 





    Parti Communiste 
Français – PCF  
Die Linke  
 
Socialistische 
Partij – SP  










  Les Verts Bündnis 90/Die 
Grünen 
GroenLinks – GL  Grüne Partei der 
Schweiz – GPS  






terreichs – SPÖ 







Partij van de Ar-
beid – PvdA 
Sozialdemokrati-
sche Partei der 
Schweiz – SPS 
Party of European 




– LIF   
Liberal Demo-
cratic Party  












kratische Partei – 
FDP  
Alliance of Liberals 
& Democrats for Eu-
rope –ALDE 
Christian Demo-







Union pour un 
Mouvement Popu-
laire – UMP  
Christlich-Demo-
kratische Union – 
CDU, Christlich-
Soziale Union – 
CSU 
Christen-Democ-




Volkspartei – CVP  
European People’s 
Party – European 










 Front National – 
FN;  Mouvement 
pour la France – 
MPF  
  Lijst Pim Fortuyn 
– LPF & Partij 






Union for Europe of 












TABLE A.2. European integration issue emphasis by parties, regressions with sub-sets 
 
Model 1  
w/o fringe parties 
Model 2 
w/o Switzerland/UK 
 Coeff. SE Coeff. SE 
Systemic salience 0.772 0.131** 0.748 0.185** 
Eurosceptic position 0.020 0.024 0.010 0.007 
Cultural TAN-GAL -0.009 0.018 -0.007 0.016 
Economic left-right -0.022 0.011+ -0.009 0.013 
Extremism (sq.) -0.007 0.021 -0.042 0.031 
Cultural-gal*Eurosceptic -0.053 0.026* -0.061 0.011** 
Econ.-right*Eurosceptic 0.012 0.034 -0.014 0.023 
Constant 0.012 0.008 0.011 0.012 
N 46  42  
R2 0.53*  0.48*  







TABLE A.3. The framing of the European integration debate by country 
Frame Austria UK France Germany Netherlands Switzerland 
Cultural frames 40.2 46.5 42.5 34.3 47.2 27.0 
Nationalist 14.4 17.2 12.7 6.8 13.9 9.7 
Multicultural-universalist 25.9 29.3 29.8 27.6 33.3 17.3 
Economic frames 34.8 25.7 41.5 36.4 23.4 44.7 
Economic prosperity 24.1 18.6 28.4 28.8 16.8 29.6 
Labour & social security 10.7 7.2 13.2 7.6 6.6 15.1 
Other utilitarian frames 24.9 27.8 16.0 29.2 29.4 28.3 
Political efficiency& efficacy 15.1 20.3 13.5 18.5 20.9 17.2 
Security/ecology 9.9 7.5 2.6 10.8 8.6 11.0 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
N 850 641  3,689 725 2,148 1,748 
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